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Articles 
The Situational Character: A Critical Realist 
Perspective on the Human Animal 
JON HANSON* & DAVID YOSIFON** 
This Article is dedicated to retiring the now-dominant "rational actor" model 
of human agency, together with its numerous "dispositionist" cohorts, and 
replacing them with a new conception of human agency that the authors call the 
"situational character." This is a key installment of a larger project recently 
introduced in an article titled The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational 
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture. 1 That introduc­
tory article adumbrated, often in broad stroke, the central premises and some basic 
conclusions of a new approach to legal theory and policy analysis. This Article 
provides a more complete version of one of those central premises by elucidating a 
more realistic conception of the human animal than is currently embraced in legal 
theory. The Article begins with a short introduction to the larger project, and de­
scribes the central place that a realist conception of the human actor plays in that 
project. It then explores several bodies of literature within the fields of social, 
cognitive, behavioral, and neural psychology in pursuit of a vision of the human actor 
that is grounded in social science. Having explicated that conception, the Article then 
outlines some of the basic implications of it for law, legal theory, and social policy. It 
then analyzes conventional legal scholars', particularly legal economists', arguments 
for ignoring the lessons of social science in their treatment of human agency. As part 
of that analysis, this Article describes why recent efforts to incorporate some psycho­
logical findings-the sort of work that is often labeled "behavioralist"-have been 
inadequate. Finally, the authors briefly look beyond the human actor itself to consider 
some of the fairly obvious-but generally ignored-realities of our present social 
situation, and some of their implications for common policy presumptions. 
As subsequent work will make clear, this new, situationist conception of the 
human animal is as important to a realist account of law and legal theory as the 
dispositionist conception has been to now-dominant accounts. 
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"What is a human being? Legal theorists must, perforce, answer this 
question: jurisprudence, after all, is about human beings. " 
- Robin West2 
"If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad 
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge 
enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, 
whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of con­
science. " 
- Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 3 
"[Tlhe implicit modern liberal conception of the average person [is that he 
is] good, but inept, and for both reasons not very responsive to incentives, 
though perhaps rather plastic. The implicit conservative view of the average 
person, in contrast, is that he is competent but bad; hence conservatives place 
emphasis on incentives and constraints. " 
- Richard Posner4 
2. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 ,  I ( 1 988). 
3. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 ( 1 897), reprinted in 78 
B.U. L. REv. 699, 701 ( 1 998). 
4. Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1 55 1 ,  
J 5590. 1 5  ( 1 998). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BRINGING THE READER UP TO SPEED 
In a companion article we introduced the concept of "critical realism," our 
name for an analytic posture that strives to begin with as real an account of the 
human animal-the ultimate subject of legal inquiry-as can be mustered. That 
version of realism is critical in that it is suspicious of, and willing to scrutinize, 
even our most basic lay and legal-theoretic assumptions about ourselves and 
society.5 In that first article-titled The Situation-we began to develop our 
critical realist project by bringing together in a new way a few of the core 
insights of social psychology and economics. With respect to the former, we 
focused particularly on a central and recurring finding that humans tend to 
overstate the role of individual disposition and under-appreciate the role of 
situation in accounting for human behavior.6 As a general matter, lay theories of 
human behavior, as well as legal theories, recognize the role of situation only 
when it is palpable or when theorists are particularly motivated to do so. And 
even then, only the most salient or satisfying elements of the situation are 
considered. Otherwise, disposition is presumed to govern. 
Particularly in Western cultures, as we will explore, a person's behavior is 
generally understood to manifest, not simply her disposition, but a particular 
dispositionist causal schema that presumes that behavior reflects freely willed 
(often consciously made) "choices," which in turn reflect a stable set of 
"preferences." This Article thoroughly fleshes out that widely held conception 
of human behavior which we call dispositionism. In so doing, we provide a 
more realistic depiction of the human animal, and a more promising starting 
place for theorizing about humans and their institutions, including laws and 
legal theory. We call that depiction the situational character. 
B. INTRODUCTION TO DISPOSITIONISM 
In The Situation, we highlighted several foundational studies illustrating both 
the strength of dispositionism and the extent to which our dispositionism is 
5. Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to The Situational Character, 
Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 1 52 U. PA. L. REV. 1 29 (2003) [hereinafter 
Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation] .  
6.  See LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETI, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION 4 ( 1 983) ("People's inflated 
belief in the importance of personality traits and dispositions, together with their failure to recognize 
the importance of situational factors in affecting behavior, has been termed the 'fundamental attribution 
error."'); see also Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The Correspondence Bias, 1 1 7 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 2 1 ,  2 1  ( 1 995) ("Three decades of research in social psychology have shown that many of the 
mistakes people make are of a kind: When people observe behavior, they often conclude that the person 
who performed the behavior was predisposed to do so-that the person's behavior corresponds to the 
person's unique dispositions-and they draw such conclusion even when a logical analysis suggests 
they should not."). Some more recent writings in social psychology use the term "correspondence bias" 
instead of "fundamental attribution error." See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNmON: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 
430 ( 1 999). 
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wrong.7 Our exposition centered on the path-breaking work of Yale psycholo­
gist Stanley Milgram, who cracked the dispositionist nut wide open in a 
dramatic series of experiments in the 1960s. 
Milgram arranged an experimental situation in which subjects--compensated 
volunteers-were led to believe that they were participating in a study on 
memory.8 In the basic design of the experiment, the subject first met another 
"subject"-who was actually one of Milgram's confederates-and the two drew 
straws to determine what part in the experiment they would take. The confeder­
ate was inevitably assigned the role of the "student," and promptly strapped into 
a chair with electrodes affixed to his body. The true subject was (seemingly 
randomly) assigned the role of the "teacher," and was instructed to administer 
an electric shock-by flipping a switch on a shock box--each time the "stu­
dent" incorrectly answered a question posed by the experimenter. The "teacher" 
was led to believe that the shocks would be painful, and that their intensity 
would increase in fifteen-volt increments with each wrong answer-from 15 
volts all the way up to 450 volts, which was labeled "Danger! XXX!" on the 
shock box.9 
Before the experiment was undertaken, Milgram described the protocol to lay 
people and psychologists and then asked both groups to estimate how far most 
"teachers" would go with the shocking before refusing to continue. Those 
surveyed believed, as might the reader, that most would refuse early on. College 
students predicted that just 1 in 100 subjects would shock all the way to 450 
volts, and professional psychologists predicted that only 1 in 1000 -"the 
sadists"-would go that far. 10 
But we humans do not-and this is a central theme of critical realism­
understand ourselves well. 11 In the basic design of the experiment, 100% of the 
subjects continued with the shocking at least to 350 volts, and 65% went all the 
way to 450 volts ("Danger! XXX!,,).12 The dispositionist assumption, that 
people would never freely choose to knowingly inflict pain like that on an 
innocent subject in the absence of a highly salient situational force-such as a 
gun to their heads-is robust. But it is often wrong. In our dispositionism we 
7. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 1 57-79. 
8. See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY ( 1 974) (describing and analyzing these 
experiments); Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 1 50--53 (discussing Milgram's 
studies). 
9. See MILGRAM, supra note 8, at 1 3-26 (describing the experimental design). Two other variations 
on the basic experimental design are worth noting. First, a clipboard-toting "experimenter" was to 
implore the subject to continue shocking as the experiment continued. Second, the "learner" could be 
heard yelping, then screaming and kicking, then complaining of heart irregularities, and, finally, at 300 
volts, falling silent. See id. at 55-72 (desribing variations and controls on the basic experiment). 
1 0. See id. at 28-29. 
I I .  Although this generalization is less true of some individuals and cultures than others, it is 
nonetheless the case that few people (particularly in the West) come close to appreciating accurately the 
role that disposition and situation, as we define those terms, play in moving us. See Hanson & Yosifon, 
The Situation, supra note 5, at 250--59. 
1 2. See MILGRAM, supra note 8, at 60 tbl.3. 
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fail to appreciate the powerful, but unseen, situational influences over the 
subjects' behavior in Milgram's lab. Milgram performed his study in numerous 
settings on hundreds of subjects who were, in all respects, typical people. They 
were not sadists; they were simply, like all of us, situational characters who 
were subject to unappreciated but profound influences in the situation. Indeed, 
Milgram was able to alter his subjects' behavior by altering the situational 
influences. By varying the proximity of the "teacher" to the "student," or the 
"teacher" to the "experimenter," or by altering the prestige of the experimental 
setting (by moving the location of the experiment from Yale to Bridgeport, 
Connecticut), Milgram discovered he could increase or decrease the level of 
shocking that subjects would be willing to administer. 13 
Experiments like Milgram's, and there are literally hundreds of others, 14 have 
demonstrated that we place far too much emphasis on disposition-on an 
individual's perceived motivations, preferences, choices, and will-in account­
ing for her conduct. In so doing we fail to appreciate the very potent, though 
often unnoticed, influences of situation. 
c. THE UBIQUITY OF DISPOSlTIONISM 
Before we further describe the situational character, it is essential that we 
make clear just how central and vital dispositionism is to virtually all of our 
conventional legal theories, laws, social policies, and common sense self­
conceptions. At almost every tum, dispositionism defines or biases what we see 
and how we construe what we see: behavior is strongly presumed to reflect 
freely willed, preference-satisfying individual choice. But as dispositionists, we 
are both consistent and consistently wrong. 
1. Dispositionism in (Law and) Economics 
Dispositionism is very familiar to scholars and students who have studied the 
"rational actor" model of law and economics, the now-dominant legal-theoretic 
paradigm.15 Many complaints have already been leveled about the lack of 
realism in that model, most of which focus on the apparent limits of "rational­
ity" in human decisionmaking.16 We will review that literature below, but we 
want to highlight at the start that even as they now vigorously debate the degree 
or kind of "rationality" that human agents display, economists seem virtually 
unanimous in assuming that people are preference-driven choosers (that is, 
dispositionists).17 
Richard Posner, a standard-bearer of the law and economics movement, 
insists that law and economics does not depend on people thinking "rationally" 
1 3. See id. at 32-43. 
14. See Hanson & Ybsifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 152 n.2. 
15. See id. at 1 39-49 (describing dominance of law and economics in legal scholarship). 
16. See id. at 140--4 1  (reviewing early critiques of the lack of realism in law and economics). 
17 .  See id. at 1 59-65 (describing the dispositionism of the rational actor model of humanity that is 
typically employed by legal economists). 
2004] THE SITUATIONAL CHARACTER 9 
in the sense of being logical, calculating, and accurate; but it does depend upon 
their being dispositional in the sense of choosing their own ends: "Rationality 
means little more to an economist than a disposition to choose, consciously or 
unconsciously, an apt means to whatever ends the chooser happens to have.,,18 
For the legal economist, the ultimate line of defense for the rational actor is 
dispositionism. Whether a person actually "rationally" thinks through his or her 
decisions, or even whether people make decisions "consciously or uncon­
sciously" is not, according to Posner, pivotal. To be sure, most legal economists 
have presumed that their model agents are far more than mere choosers, but the 
rational actor model itself need not be premised on more than the proposition 
that choices are just that, the chooser's choices. 19 As Milton Friedman, the 
Nobel Prize-winning economist and intellectual forerunner of the law and 
economics movement put it: "[E]very individual serves his own private interest 
. . . . The great Saints of history have served their 'private interest' just as the 
most money-grubbing miser has served his private interest. The private interest 
is whatever it is that drives an individual.,,20 
Economically oriented analysts, in the words of Gary Becker (another Nobel 
Prize winner), have applied the "combined assumptions of maximizing behav­
ior, market equilibrium, and stable preferences, . . .  relentlessly and unftinch­
ingly.,,21 Despite their claim to social science, economists in general and legal 
economists in particular have indeed applied dispositionist assumptions unflinch­
ingly-that is, without the self-suspicion and rigorous inspection that social 
science would demand. This is no doubt because their dispositionist assump­
tions seem so intuitively plausible, and so fundamental to our sense of our­
selves, that they are beyond question?2 And perhaps this may also help explain 
18 .  RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 17 (5th ed. 1 998). 
19. See id. ; see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 16-17 (2d. ed. 1997) 
("The construction of the economic model of consumer choice begins with an account of the 
preferences of consumers. Consumers are assumed to know the things they like and dislike and to be 
able to rank the available alternative combinations of goods and services according to their ability to 
satisfy the consumer's preferences. This involves no more than ranking the alternatives as better than, 
worse than, or equally as good as one another."). 
20. Milton Friedman, The Line We Dare Not Cross: The Fragility of Freedom at "60%", ENCOUNTER, 
Nov. 1 976, at 8, II .  This strong disposition ism enjoys a long pedigree in economics. John Stuart Mill, 
for example, had the same starting place: "The only freedom which deserves the name is that of 
pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or 
impede their efforts to obtain it." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 72 (Penguin Classics 1 975) (1 859). 
2 1 .  GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC ApPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5 (1976). Becker and fellow 
Nobel Prize-winning economist George Stigler famously defended these basic assumptions of the 
economic approach in George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. 
ECON. REv. 76 (1 977). The Latin t itle summarizes well the basic dispositionist perspective of econo­
mists. Its translation is: ''There's no accounting for taste." 
22. See infra text accompanying notes 664-675 (summarizing Kreps's and Sens's arguments that the 
dispositionism of economics is based on a leap of faith that itself is justified, not by the evidence, but by 
intuitive plausibility). 
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why Stanley Milgram never won the Nobel Prize?3 
2. Dispositionism in Classic Liberal Political Theory 
As we emphasized in our previous article, the sweep of dispositionism 
extends far beyond the whipping post of law and economics and the rational 
actor model. Indeed, the dispositionism of law and economics should be seen as 
a kind of juiced-up version of the dispositionism that has been at the core of 
every one of our society's most influential legal and social theories. Far from 
being simply an artifact of a highly stylized and, to some, easily dismissed legal 
theory, dispositionism of various forms has long been emblazoned on the 
banner of classic liberal political theory itself. 
John Locke's conception of the human animal, as expressed in his famous 
Second Treatise on Government, for example, starts here: 
[W]e must consider what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of 
perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and 
persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature; without 
asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man. A state also of 
equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having 
more than another . . .  . Man in that state has an uncontrollable liberty to 
dispose of his person or possessions . . . .  24 
Such dispositionist assumptions-that by their very nature humans enjoy the 
freedom to order their actions as they see fit-are the heart of Locke's contrac­
tual theory of society, much as they are the heart of legal economists' familiar 
calls for the expansion of, and deference to, contracts and markets and, more 
generally, the cornerstone of classic liberal political theory. 
A generation after Locke, the French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau, in 
his signature work The Social Contract, relied on dispositionism to make his 
claim that freedom was the natural condition of humanity: 
This common liberty results from the nature of man. His first law is to provide 
for his own preservation, his first cares are those which he owes to himself; 
and as soon as he reaches years of discretion, he is the sole judge of the 
proper means of preserving himself, and consequently becomes his own 
master. 25 
23. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 34 1 -42 (discussing how Milgram's 
findings may, in fact, have hurt his career); see also infra notes 38 1-87 and accompanying text 
(describing how Daniel Kahneman's work may have earned him a Nobel Prize in part because it is 
dispositionist). 
24. JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 1 01-02 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) 
( 1690). 
25. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACf 2 (Charles Frankel ed., Hafner Library of 
Classics 1 947) ( 1762). 
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The human animal, in this classic liberal picture, is  its "own master," "the 
sole judge of the proper means"-the "apt" means, to use Posner's tenn--of 
pursuing its own interests. It is of particular importance that both Locke and 
Rousseau, like the legal economists of today, begin their famous political tracts 
with initial claims about the sources or nature of human behavior. Those 
foundational axioms are presumed self-evident, and their truth is taken for 
granted throughout. The assumptions are not, in other words, the demonstrated 
conclusion of a philosophical or scientific inquiry. 
Now is as good a time as any to pause and emphasize, as we did in our 
previous article and will again, that dispositionists do not assume that human 
beings are immutable or complete in their self-possession. Indeed, it was 
Rousseau's view that, while humans were by nature all equal, some could 
become severely twisted by extreme situational disadvantage. Inverting what he 
took to be the classic view that slaves were by their very essence slave-like, for 
example, Rousseau asserts that the dispositionist attribution is wrong for miss­
ing the situation-that slavery wrought slave-like behavior and not the other 
way around: 
Aristotle [who held the essentialist view of slaves] was right; but he took the 
effect for the cause. Nothing can be more certain than that every man born in 
slavery is born for slavery. Slaves lose everything in their chains, even the 
desire of escaping from them: they love their servitude . . . . If then there are 
slaves by nature, it is because there have been slaves against nature. Force 
made the first slaves, and their cowardice perpetuated the condition.26 
Rousseau sees situation, as dispositionists tend to, where it is highly salient­
such as in the institution of slavery, or in the modern dispositionist cliche, when 
there is "a gun to the head." That situation is recognized where it is highly 
visible is the exception that proves the rule: situation, unless obvious, is 
irrelevant, leaving only disposition?7 
In the same generation as Rousseau, on the other side of the Atlantic, Thomas 
26. [d. at 3. 
27. Even in the condition of slavery, however, where Rousseau seems to recognize the influence of 
situation, his recognition still takes the form of a kind of dispositionism, for although he claims that the 
qualities of slaves have been produced by the institution of slavery, he considers those qualities to have 
grown stable and part of the slaves' own self-conception. As we outlined in The Situation, there were 
several dispositionist justifications of slavery-for example, some assumed that Africans were a 
different species and others assumed that they were at a different developmental stage. See Hanson & 
Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 308-27. Also, Rousseau's recognition of the situational forces 
of slavery was widespread in Europe, particularly in France, where there was strong opposition to the 
international slave trade. It was partially in response to that opposition that Thomas Jefferson sought to 
defend slavery by dispositionalizing slaves as naturally inferior to whites and therefore appropriate for 
slavery. See id. at 3 1 2-17  (reviewing Thomas Jefferson's writings on the topic). The tendency to 
dispositionalize is often exacerbated by the motive to legitimate one's own social system in response to 
perceived threats to the system. See infra text accompanying notes 479-503 (summarizing the influence 
of "system threat" and the widely held motive of system affirmation). 
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Jefferson embraced a similarly dispositionist view of humanity, and acted on it. 
Jefferson, by any standard a leading proponent of classic liberal political theory, 
opened the American Declaration of Independence with a statement of human 
nature that echoed Rousseau's. It was "self-evident," Jefferson wrote, that "all 
men are created equal . . . are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
rights, [and] that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.,,28 
Individual liberty is not just a political goal, but also a self-evident self­
conception. That such liberty would be exercised to pursue happiness was, for 
Jefferson, also self-evidently grounded in a dispositionist presumption. When 
Jefferson took the reins of the government he helped to fashion, dispositionism 
remained integral to his vision of the state and the citizen. In his first inaugural 
address, he stated that 
[A] wise and frugal government, which shall restrain men from injuring one 
another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of 
industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the 
bread it has earned. This is the sum of good government . . . .  29 
Though Jefferson was directing his comments to his Federalist political 
opponents, his words nonetheless reflected a widely shared vision of humanity. 
Those words have echoed off of that shared vision through successive genera­
tions. Jefferson's ideas, according to the historian Richard Hofstadter, were 
rooted not so much in a particular "system of economics or politics, but an 
imperishable faith expressed in imperishable rhetoric.,,30 That faith is a faith in 
dispositional man, and it is a faith that has reverberated in our political 
discourse throughout this country's history. While our political tradition has 
been laced with conflict, there has also been, a shared "ideology of self-help, 
free enterprise, competition, and beneficent cupidity . . .  . However much at 
odds on specific issues, the major political traditions have shared a belief in the 
rights of property, [and] the philosophy of economic individualism . . .  as 
necessary qualities of man. ,,3 1  
And that ideology is at least as strongly shared i n  our day. Ronald Reagan, 
for example, made statements in his farewell address that echoed precisely the 
sentiments Jefferson expressed in his inaugural address nearly two-hundred 
years before: "And I hope we have once again reminded the people that man is 
28. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
29. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1 80 1 ), reprinted in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF 
THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1 3, 1 5-16 (Gov't Prtg. Office 1 989). 
30. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POUTICAL TRADmON AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT 42 (2d ed. 
1 973). 
3 1 .  [d. Hofstadter's views about "consensus" in the American political tradition have been heavily 
debated by generations of American historians. See, e.g., SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLmcs: THE 
PROMISE OF DISHARMONY (1981) (describing some of the limitations of the consensus theory). Our only 
interest here is in highlighting the basic dispositionist view of humanity in the American political 
tradition, a view that is not seriously at stake in that historiographical debate. 
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not free unless government is limited. There's a clear cause and effect here that 
is as neat and predictable as a law of physics: as government expands, liberty 
contracts. ,,32 
Dispositionism does indeed promise "neat and predictable" causal attribu­
tions. So long as we see our behavior as reflecting free, preference-satisfying 
choices, social policymaldng becomes as clear as a law of physics-just as one 
should get out of the way of a falling apple if one wants to avoid being hit on 
the head, one need only remove all obvious situational constraints from con­
sumer and citizen choice to ensure human liberty (and humanity's best hope for 
happiness).33 Such a neat and predictable theory may be as attractive as it is 
common, but as we hope to show in this Article, dispositionist presumptions are 
no more laws of human reality than the presumption that the sun revolves 
around the earth is a law of astronomy. 34 
3. Dispositionism in the Law 
a. Contract Law 
As surely as apples don't fall far from their trees, the fruit of dispositionism 
defines, not only our common sense and our legal and political theories, but also 
our laws. While this may not be surprising, it should be troubling. As if we are 
trapped in a kind of self-conception fun house, this false image of ourselves 
infects almost all of our institutions and systems, including our system of 
justice. 
Consider the law of contract, on which so much of our legal apparatus rests. 
For the most part, the law of contract mirrors our basic dispositionist self­
conceptions. It is concerned with the enforcement of promises.35 When prom­
ises are perceived as freely made, they are generally enforceable.36 And when 
32. Ronald Reagan, Farewell Address to the Nation (January 1 1 , 1 989), in 2 PuB. PAPERS 1 7 1 8, 1 721. 
See generally Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modem 
Policy and Corporate Law, 1 03 MICH. L. REv. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of 
Law] (describing the emergence of today's similarly dispositionist, pro-market, and anti-regulatory 
meta schemas to policymaking). 
33. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 288-92 (describing the relationship 
between dispositionism and policies advocating laissez-faire social policies). 
34. See our discussion of geocentrism, dispositionism, Galileo, and deep capture in Hanson & 
Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 202-30. 
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § I (198 1 )  (defining contract as "a promise or a set of 
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some 
way recognizes as a duty.") There are of course many theories of what contract law is. The discussion 
here is a simple positive one that makes no pretense to nuance, except insofar as we think a more 
nuanced exposition would further bear out our point. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 
5, at 285-97 (examining the dispositionism of contract law and contract theory, with special reference 
to Professors Llewellyn, Fried, and Rakoff). 
36. Enforcement may take many forms (e.g., the required payment of the promisee's expected 
benefit of the promise, or the requirement of specific performance of the promised conduct). See E. 
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1 2  (3d ed. 1 999) (discussing different kinds of contract remedies). Of 
course, some promises, though freely made in the eyes of the law, are nevertheless unenforceable (such 
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contract law sees behavior manifesting a promise-such as signatures or other 
affirmative expressions of assent-it usually sees them as having been freely 
made. This follows from dispositionism-human conduct is presumptively 
understood as the free expression of individuals' preferences and will. Only 
very narrow doctrines, such as "duress" or "undue influence," are available for 
those rare instances when that presumption might be rebutted. The narrow 
exceptions arise, predictably, only where the most palpable and powerful situ­
ational forces are in play. The First Restatement of Contracts defined the kind of 
duress that could make a contract voidable as a "wrongful threat of one person 
by words or other conduct that induces another to enter into a transaction under 
the influence of such fear as precludes him from exercising free will and 
judgment.,,37 
The starting place is the dispositionist will, which is presumed to be the usual 
and proper cause of a person's behavior. The concept of duress does not depart 
from the dispositionist view. It is only a particular kind of experience that will 
excuse a promise under the doctrine: dispositionally experienced fear. 
[D]uress consists of threats that cause such fear as to induce the exercise of 
volition, so that an undesired act is done . . . .  The question is . . .  did it put one 
entering into the transaction in such fear as to preclude the exercise by him of 
free will and judgment. Age, sex, capacity, relation of the parties, attendant 
circumstances, must all be considered. Persons of a weak or cowardly nature 
are the very ones that need protection. The courageous can usually protect 
themselves; timid persons are generally the ones influenced by threats, and the 
unscrupulous are not allowed to impose upon them because they are so 
unfortunately constituted. 38 
Even in the exceptional, backwater doctrine of duress, the focus of contract 
law remains resolutely dispositionist-the will of the victim must be overcome 
in order for the doctrine to be implicated. And because we see most behavior as 
resulting from individual will, it is only the very palpable situational force of an 
unscrupulous person making a fear-inducing threat that can trump the presump­
tion that it is an individual's will in charge. Even then, it is primarily the 
"unfortunately constituted" "[p ]ersons of a weak ...  nature" who are vulnerable 
to such obvious situational threats. There is little or no recognition in this 
doctrine of the power of less conspicuous situation over virtually all of us, 
as a promise to sell oneself into slavery, which is forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution); others are actually illegal to make (such as a promise to sell heroin, which is forbidden 
by statute). See generally id. § 5 (discussing unenforceable contracts). There are many areas of social 
life that are removed from the realm of contract altogether (for example, minimum wages for labor, the 
adoption of children, the transfer of body parts from one person to another, etc.). The relative place of 
disposition and situation in our self and social conception can be observed quite clearly in the contours 
of contract in our social systems. 
37. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 492(b) (1932). 
38. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACfS § 492 cmt. a (1932). 
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though this would seem to be the first place, if any, where situation should be 
taken into account.39 Under this approach, the situational pressures created in 
Stanley Milgram's laboratory would surely not be seen as duress. 
b. Tort Law 
A similar conception of human beings pervades the law governing noncontrac­
tual harms-tort law. Long before the rational actor began making the rounds of 
the law reviews, tort law's reasonable person was a dispositionist mainstay.4o 
Just as contract holds people accountable for their promises, tort law holds them 
responsible for their wrongful harms. Under the basic negligence standard, a 
person is liable for the harms that a reasonable person would have prevented in 
similar circumstances.41 The standard speaks to the disposition of the tortfeasor, 
as well as to the disposition of the reasonable person against whom the 
tortfeasor is to be judged: 
The actor is required to recognize that his conduct involves a risk of causing 
an invasion of another's interest if a reasonable man would do so while 
exercising 
39. The Second Restatement alters the definition of duress to the following: "If a party's manifesta­
tion of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no reasonable 
alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) 
(1981). The revised section attempts to eliminate any mention of will because of the confusion it 
induces, but it nevertheless seems clearly to rely on the notion without naming it: 
It is sometimes said that the threat must arouse such fear as precludes a party from exercising 
free will and judgment or that it must be such as would induce assent on the part of a brave 
man or a man of ordinary firmness. The rule stated in this Section omits any such requirement 
because of its vagueness and impracticability. It is enough if the threat actually induces assent 
on the part of one who has no reasonable alternative . . . .  
In order to constitute duress, the improper threat must induce the making of the contract .. . .  
No special rule for causation in cases of duress is stated here because of the infrequency with 
which the problem arises. A party's manifestation of assent is induced by duress if the duress 
substantially contributes to his decision to manifest his assent .. . .  All attendant circumstances 
must be considered, including such matters as the age, background and relationship of the 
parties. Persons of a weak or cowardly nature are the very ones that need protection; the 
courageous can usually protect themselves. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmts. b, c (1981) (internal cross-references omitted). In any 
event, it appears that many jurisdictions continue to employ the explicit overbearing of the will 
language reflected in the First Restatement. See, e.g., Ruane v. Jancsics, 2001 Mass. App. Div. 103, 105 
(2001) ("To avoid a contract on the basis of duress, a party must show that conduct by the other party 
caused him to enter into the contract 'under the influence of such fear as precludes him from exercising 
free will and judgment.' ') (quoting Convey v. President & Tr., CoIl. of the Holy Cross, 445 N.E.2d 136, 
140 (Mass. 1983)). 
40. The classic statement of the reasonable person standard is contained in OUVER WENDELL HOLMES, 
JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (Little, Brown & Co. 1990) (1881) ("The law considers, in other words, 
what would be blameworthy in the average man, the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, and 
determines liability by that."). 
41. The tort of negligence involves four elements: duty, breach, causation, and damages. RESTATE­
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1981). The reasonable person standard is generally seen as an aspect of 
the second element, though it plays a part in the other elements as well. 
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(a) such attention, perception of the circumstances, memory, knowledge of 
other pertinent matters, intelligence, and judgment as a reasonable man would 
have; and 
(b) such superior attention, perception, memory, knowledge, intelligence, 
and judgment as the actor himself has.42 
The person conceived in the reasonable person standard here is a disposi­
tional actor. The law is concerned primarily with the tortfeasor's-or the 
reasonable person's-dispositional qualities: her conscious thoughts (her "atten­
tion"), her perceptions, her memories, her intelligence, and, finally, the culmina­
tion of all of those features, her judgment. Situational influences are not entirely 
ignored. In fact, more so than with contract and many other areas of law, 
situational forces can be important to the outcomes in tort litigation. When 
applying the reasonable person standard, for instance, juries are asked to 
determine if a litigant's behavior was reasonable in the actor's situation. And, to 
be sure, a fair amount of the litigation process can be devoted to framing and 
debating causal attributions. It is not unusual, therefore, for at least one side to 
emphasize certain salient situational considerations. Insofar as that occurs, 
however, the anchor of dispositionism still significantly biases the factual and 
legal assessments of wrongfulness and liability.43 
Relatedly, tort law doctrine recognizes situational influences only where they 
are so palpable as to make themselves clear to the reasonable dispositionist. As 
in contract law, there are exceptional doctrines in tort law that can rebut the 
basic dispositionist presumption, but they are only the most palpable situational 
forces. A sudden tempest, for example, may excuse a wayward sailor's use and 
damage of a stranger's dock, under the doctrine of necessity.44 Even there, 
however, the law focuses less on the situation itself, and more on the reasonable­
sness of the actor's choice given that palpable situation. And, as the Restate­
ment indicates, such situations are rare.45 Circumstances that would warrant the 
42. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 (l98\). 
43. Dispositionism influences tort doctrines, the parties considered relevant in any given case, and 
the attributions of the factfinders. That claim and evidence for it are more fully fleshed out in other 
work. See, e.g., Jon Hanson, Ana Reyes & Daniel Schlanger, Attributional Positivism: The NaIve 
Psychology Behind Our Laws (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) [hereinafter 
Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism] (examining how people make attributions of 
causation, responsibility, and blame, and describing how attribution theory influences law and legal 
theory); Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Costs of Dispositionism: The Premature Demise of 
Situationist Law and Economics, 64 U. MD. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Benforado & 
Hanson, Costs of Dispositionism] (examining history of efficiency-based tort theory and comparing the 
relatively situationist approach of Guido Calabresi to the relatively dispositionist approach of Richard 
Posner and the influence of the two approaches). 
44. "One is privileged to commit an act which would otherwise be a trespass to a chattel or a 
conversion if the act is or is reasonably believed to be necessary for the purpose of avoiding a public 
disaster." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 262 (1981). 
45. Most state courts' leading statements on excuse doctrines in tort law, such as duress or necessity, 
are voiced in cases where the doctrines are found to be inapplicable. Cf Hanson & Yosifon, The 
Situation, supra note 5, at 300-01 (discussing cases). 
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application of the doctrine of necessity, for instance, include those in which a 
defendant wanted "to protect against a public enemy, or to prevent or mitigate 
the effect of conflagration, flood, earthquake, or pestilence.,,46 Consider another 
exceptional tort doctrine: incapacitation. Tort law holds that if "an actor" causes 
some harm because of a sudden incapacitation-such as an unexpected epileptic 
fit or a heart attack while driving a car, the actor will be considered negligent 
only if the incapacity was reasonably foreseeable to them.47 The first draft of 
the Third Restatement notes that "the modern cases are impressively unanimous 
in accepting" the principle that an unexpected incapacity is a defense to 
negligence.48 And this is not surprising-an epileptic fit or a heart attack makes 
a stunning case that the defendant had not dispositionally willed his allegedly 
tortious behavior. But making this showing of "incapacitation" is the defen­
dant's burden; the presumption is that the actor's conduct was an expression of 
dispositional free Will.49 And the burden is a high one. 
The situational clarity of an epileptic fit or a heart attack yields again to 
situational invisibility just as soon as disposition can once more plausibly 
account for behavior. Within its discussion of incapacity, the Third Restatement 
compares the condition of incapacity to that of "mental illness," which gener­
ally does not provide an excuse to negligence or otherwise alter the standard of 
conduct.50 That is because, according to the Second Restatement, "limited or 
moderate mental disorders . . . ordinarily are not especially important as an 
explanation for conduct.,,5 1  Without sudden incapacity, the most important 
explanation for conduct is expected to be, and in the eyes of tort law almost 
irrebutably is, dispositional choice. On the outside, only a calamitous situation 
such as a fire or a storm is seen to trump the presumption that people behave 
dispositionally. On the inside only total incapacitation is. Tort law's reasonable 
person is, no less than the rational actor or classical liberal theory's natural man 
is, a dispositional actor. 
This basic dispositionist perspective in tort law was succinctly stated recently 
in a federal judge's order dismissing a claim seeking to hold McDonald's liable 
in some measure for the obesity (and concomitant health problems), of some of 
its customers: 
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 262 cmt. b (198 1 ). 
47. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 1  (b) (Tentative Draft No. I ,  2001 )  ("If an actor engages in 
substandard conduct because of sudden incapacitation or loss of consciousness brought about by 
physical illness, this conduct constitutes negligence only if the sudden incapacitation or loss of 
consciousness was reasonably foreseeable to the actor"). "Sudden incapacitation can be caused by a 
heart attack, a stroke, an epileptic seizure, diabetes, or other medical conditions." Id. cmt. d. The 
epileptic fit is a favorite trope of the torts restatement, and excuse for conduct performed under such an 
occurrence shows up in many settings. 
48. Id. cmt. d. 
49. See id. (noting that the cases are agreed that the incapacitation is an affirmative defense to 
negligence which must be pled and proved by the defendant). 
50. See id. § l l(b). 
5 1 .  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 262 cmt. b .  
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As long as a consumer exercises free choice with appropriate knowledge, 
liability for negligence will not attach to a manufacturer. It is only when that 
free choice becomes but a chimera-for instance, by the masking of informa­
tion necessary to make the choice, such as the knowledge that eating Mc­
Donalds with a certain frequency would irrefragably cause harm-that 
manufacturers should be held accountable. 52 
The presumption is that human behavior reflects dispositional choice and, 
more specifically, that those eating frequently at a fast-food establishment 
"irrefragably" (that is, indisputably) have "appropriate knowledge" of the harms 
they will encounter by so doing. No liability will attach "as long as" this 
presumption holds out. And it holds out a long time. Instances where behavior 
will not be seen as evidencing free choice-such as where a manufacturer has 
"mask[ed]" information necessary to the choice-are the rare exception. Such 
instances, in fact, are "chimeras" of the expected experience of free will.53 The 
world of humans, the real world that we think we perceive correctly, is the 
world of free choice. Tort law is as certain of this as was Rousseau or 
Jefferson.54 It leaves little room for the possibility that our dispositionism may 
itself be the chimera. 
c. Criminal Law 
In criminal law too, dispositionism dominates. Again, it is not that situational 
considerations play no role. They do. Indeed, they may play as great a role here 
as they do in any area of law. The law does not look just to outcomes and 
behavior, it also attempts to assess a defendant's state of mind when engaging in 
a particular act.55 In that quite dispositionist inquiry, situational considerations 
are often brought to light by defense counsel in an effort to limit the defendant's 
52. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 5 12, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The court continued 
with the punchline: "Plaintiffs have failed to allege in the Complaint that their decisions to eat at 
McDonalds several times a week were anything but a choice freely made and which now may not be 
pinned on McDonalds." Id. 
53. See infra text accompanying notes 620-634 (discussing the illusion of conscious will and the 
human tendency to dispositionalize even inanimate objects). 
54. For a more extended discussion of the role of dispositionism in the fast-food cases and in tort 
law, see Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson, & David Yosifon, Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in 
America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1 645 (forthcoming Fall 2004) [hereinafter Benforado, Hanson & Yosifon, 
Broken Scales]. 
55. Reflecting the law's dispositionism are the principles of voluntary action, and mens rea, the 
guilty mind. Just as with tort law, there are areas of criminal law where liability is strict and mens rea is 
not particularly relevant. In those areas, deterrence or other regulatory goals overshadow the signifi­
cance of individual guilt, as for example with statutory rape laws (which in many states are per se, 
meaning that the perpetrator's perception of the victim's age, no matter how reasonable, is irrelevant). 
See generally Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 1 2  STAN. L. REV. 731 
( 1960). Such cases are not the norm, however, nor do they necessarily represent a more situationist 
approach to criminal law (though, depending upon the justification offered, they do). It is also true that 
the state of mind that will satisfy the guilty mind requirement is not always intent. Often it is 
recklessness, and sometimes, negligence. As we suggest just above with respect to tort law, however, all 
of these liability standards are committed to a more or less dispositionist view of the human actor 
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apparent culpability. Still, the process i s  closely tethered t o  the situational 
insensitivity of the doctrine and the dispositionist presumptions of the factfind­
ers.56 The Model Penal Code states: "A person is not guilty of an offense unless 
his liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the omission to 
perform an act of which he is physically capable.,,57 The depth of the Code's 
dispositionism is illustrated by how broadly it construes volition. 
The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning of [the standard set 
forth above]: 
(a) a reflex or convulsion; 
(b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep; 
(c) conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion; 
(d) a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort or 
determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual. 58 
In other words, a person's behavior will only rarely be understood as the 
result of some force other than voluntary choice. 
The doctrines of duress, heat of passion, mental disorder, and diminished 
capacity are as impoverished in criminal law as are their cousin doctrines in 
contract and tort law. The Model Penal Code's basic approach to excuse 
doctrines is summarized well in its formulation of duress: 
It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to 
constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat 
to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, that a 
person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to 
resist.59 
Again, the only kind of situation that is recognized is a threat of force, a 
highly palpable situational influence. An actor will be excused only for those 
situational forces that a reasonable person, that is, a dispositional person, would 
see as overtaking free will. As one court cited by the Code put it: "Duress 
consists in [sic] forcing a person to act against his or her own will. It does not 
exist when a person can choose whether he or she will perform the act said to 
have been done under duress.,,6o 
The excuse of mental illness is similarly narrow: 
(recklessness, for example, involves a knowing disregard of a high probability that one will cause 
harm). 
56. For an excellent, and more complete, discussion of disposition ism in criminal law, see Lee Ross 
& Donna Shestowsky, Contemporary Psychology 's Challenges To Legal Theory and Practice, 97 Nw. 
U. L. REV. 1081 (2003). 
57. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (1962). 
58. [d. 
59. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) ( 1962). 
60. State v. Fogarty, 607 A.2d 624 (N.J. 1992) (citations omitted). 
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A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct 
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law.61 
The strong presumption is that people, absent highly conspicuous situational 
constraints, enjoy substantial capacity to conform their conduct to law. Determin­
ing conduct, after all, is what the will is all about. As a practical matter, 
defenses of mental incapacity are almost never successful-a verdict of not 
guilty by reason of insanity, for example, succeeds in only one-tenth of one 
percent of all felony cases.62 The dispositionist presumption that pervades our 
common sense, and which is at the heart of the criminal law, is nearly irrebut­
table.63 
D. THE HIGH STAKES OF DISPOSITIONISM-AND OF OUR ARGUMENT 
Our point should by now be clear: dispositionism is more than just a 
fundamental axiom of law and economics; dispositionism lies at the heart of our 
self-conceptions, our political and legal theories, and our laws. None of what we 
have said thus far should be surprising. Dispositionism is, as we have empha­
sized, the stuff of common sense. Our purpose in reviewing a parade of 
dispositionism is to raise the stakes of what probably will come as a surprise: 
the dominant attributional schema informing our self-conceptions, our lay and 
social theories, and our laws, is, in important ways and to significant degrees, 
6 1 .  MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.0 1 ( 1 )  ( 1962). 
62. See Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You From Me ": The Insanity Defense, 
The Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1 375, 
1 377 (1 997). Professor Perlin recounts that in response to public outrage after President Ronald 
Reagan's would-be assassin John Hinckley was found not guilty by reason of insanity, Congress and 
many states passed legislation imposing some version of the traditional M 'Naghten rule for insanity 
defenses, which is even more unforgiving than the Model Penal Code's·approach. /d. at 1 380-83. The 
M'Naghten rule exonerates a defendant on the basis of mental illness only if he did not know the nature 
of his act, or whether the act was right or wrong. See id. at 1 376. The Model Penal Code's approach 
accepts that one might know his act is wrong but still be unable to stop himself from doing it. The 
distinction is not directly relevant to our argument here. 
63. Professor Perlin quotes a Florida judge's revealingly dispositionist explanation of his resistance 
to allowing social psychological testimony in a case before him (here concerning evidence of the 
unreliability of witness identifications): 
[I] am no blind partisan of the academic discipline concerned. Indeed, I should admit to a 
certain quarrel with the social "sciences" in general and psychology in particular. They are, it 
seems to me, founded on an almost indefensible premise: that one can fairly deduce some 
truths about an individual by what classes of human beings do in the aggregate. That seems to 
me so at odds with the human free will that any conclusions founded on the premise are 
intrinsically unreliable. 
Id. at 1424 (quoting McMullen v. State, 660 So. 2d 340, 342-43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (Farmer, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added» . Notice that the judge is himself relying on the even more "indefensible 
premise" that one can ignore what social science teaches about human beings' behavior "on the 
aggregate" and that from the unsubstantiated presumption of "free will" "one can fairly deduce some 
truths about an individual." 
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wrong. We look in the mirrors all around u s  and we see ourselves pursuing 
preferred ends as rational actors or reasonable persons or, at the very least, 
agents with determinative control over our cognitions and behaviors. We see 
reflections and affirmations of our dispositionist selves, but those mirrors are 
distorting. 
The stakes of dispositionism are huge-and they are, in our view, stakes we 
are losing and will continue to lose if we persist in ignoring the extent of our 
self-deception. Our sense of ourselves is wrong not just in the details or on 
average, or in some bounded way.64 Rather, it is monumentally wrong, or so 
suggests the best available social science. 
Our critical realist purpose in what follows will be to explore a sample of 
evidence indicating the flaws and illusions of dispositionism, and to offer the 
best alternative conception of the human animal that social science (rather than 
intuition, common sense, faith, or tradition) can provide. We ask our readers to 
move back with us several steps to a decisive, though unseen, analytic moment 
that takes place before most legal scholarship begins, to the basic assumptions 
concerning the nature of the human agent. We ask our readers to focus on the 
very question that most legal scholarship-indeed, most people-generally treat 
as beyond question. Usually, when sound science is applied in legal-academic 
writing, it is applied only after dispositionism is already firmly, implicitly, in 
place. Our readers should therefore brace for the kind of elaborate analysis 
typical of any law and economics text or other social scientific legal study, but 
the analysis in this instance will begin where we believe it always should 
begin-at the beginning. 
Many of the studies and findings we report below are as fun as they are 
fascinating. Often, though, they can also be quite threatening. The theories and 
evidence that we highlight defy our dispositionist presumptions and thus chal­
lenge our most basic expectations and beliefs about our systems and institu­
tions, about the groups to which we do and don't belong, and about ourselves. 
There is still more at stake. In The Situation, we sketched the basic outlines 
of a theory that we call "deep capture.,,65 There and elsewhere we have argued 
that a dispositionist conception of the human animal is generally extremely 
valuable to large commercial enterprises, which share an interest in expanding 
free markets, private property, and contract, in inhibiting profit-reducing regula­
tion, and in justifying a normative conception of business enterprises as profit­
maximizers. Where behavior is presumed to be a manifestation of free choice, 
and where choices are presumed to reveal dispositional preferences, then mar-
64. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 147 1 (1998) (explicating the conception of "bounded rationality, " which 
endeavors to employ some insights of behavioral economics in a manner which can improve upon but 
not fundamentally challenge the conventional law and economics paradigm). But see infra Part V.C.4 
(describing limitations of Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler 's  approach). 
65. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 202-30 (explicating the deep capture 
hypothesis). 
22 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 93:1 
kets and free contracting appear to be a far more reliable means of increasing 
personal and social welfare than are the best guesses of regulators, and profit 
maximization (or shareholder primacy) seems to be similarly desirable because 
of its tendency to maximize consumer choice, and thus social welfare.66 If the 
depth of our dispositionism can be influenced by situation-and social psychol­
ogy demonstrates that it can be-then profit-maximizing firms will exercise 
their power over situation to promote it. Just as conventional capture theory 
predicts that profit-maximizing enterprises will work to capture the political and 
regulatory system, "deep capture" theory predicts that they will endeavor to 
influence the much broader situation that encourages a dispositionist outlook. 
We will not review the arguments concerning "deep capture" in any depth here, 
though we encourage readers to review our outline of it in The Situation67 and 
to anticipate further elaboration of it in other work.68 The purpose of this Article 
is to substantiate and elaborate a central premise of critical realism, that 
although we think we are dispositional actors, we are better understood as 
situational characters. Evidence that human animals are situational characters 
implicates and threatens to deligitimate, not only our favored self-conception, 
but also our laws, legal theories, and indeed, most of our social systems. So 
brace yourself.69 
II. MISSING THE SITUATION AND SEEING DISPOSITION 
Much of the rest of this Article is dedicated to fleshing out the situational 
character, who we believe should retire the "rational actor" and its dispositionist 
brethren in our other conventional legal theories, social policies, and common 
66. See Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 32; see also Jon Hanson & Adam Wright, 
In the Driver's Seat: Why Promoting Dispositionism Is Good Business (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with authors) [hereinafter Hanson & Wright, In the Driver's Seat] (providing a more complete 
description of the connection between dispositionism and pro-market and anti-regulation policy presump­
tions). 
67. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 225-68 (briefly describing incentives of 
commercial interests to promote dispositionism and providing some examples). 
68. See, e.g. , Benforado, Hanson & Yosifon, Broken Scales, supra note 54 (revealing how disposition­
ism has been employed by food, diet, and fitness industries); Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law, 
supra note 32 (describing how macro script of corporate law and meta scripts of policymaking both 
reflect and reinforce deep capture); Hanson & Wright, In the Driver's  Seat, supra note 66 (describing in 
more detail the value of disposition ism to business interests generally). 
69. Although we believe that the implications of what follows are dramatic, it is important that we 
not be misunderstood as claiming more than we are. We will underscore this point several times, 
because some previous readers have mistakenly placed our arguments into familiar-though inapposite­
categories. We are not arguing that there is no such thing as free will. And we are not taking a firm 
position on the age-old determinism debate or embracing a new form of behaviorism. Our claim is that 
widely held, Western lay conceptions of the human animal or attributions regarding human behav­
ior-as well as the related legal-theoretic conceptions, including that of law and economics-are, in 
particular ways, largely incorrect. We are moved far more by forces that we do not appreciate than we 
realize and far less by forces to which we attribute behavior than we realize. 
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sense.70 
A. TWO SOURCES OF DISPOSITIONISM 
1 .  A Basic Source of Dispositionism 
"[ C ]ompare the effect of education and the lack of it upon our human 
nature to a situation like this: imagine men [and women] to be living in an 
underground cave-like dwelling place . . . .  The [women and] men have been 
there from childhood, with their neck and legs in fetters, so their bonds 
remain in the same place and they can only see ahead of them, as their bonds 
prevent them from turning their heads . . . . .  Do you think, in the first place, 
that such men [and women] could see anything of themselves and each other 
except the shadows which the fire casts upon the wall of the cave in front of 
them?-How could they, if they have to keep their heads still throughout 
life? " 
23 
In a sense, we are living in Plato's cave. We perceive in our world people 
acting, and we presume that we are seeing the whole of what's happening. In 
fact, we are looking at merely a shadow of the vast world of situational 
influence occurring outside our narrow purview. A basic explanation of the 
fundamental pattern that is at the root of dispositionism is that we are, so to 
speak, only human-we have limited perceptual and cognitive capacity, and a 
limited time in which to do our thinking. Because of those human limitations 
we are "cognitive misers," getting by on the conceptual cheap-making use, in 
most contexts, of that which is palpable, focused, and easy to understand. We 
see disposition in part because it is salient and easy. Conversely, we miss 
situation because it is neither.72 In short, seeing and not appreciating unseen 
situation is dispositionist believing. 
70. There may be some circumstances in which the rational actor model remains an illuminating 
tool. For instance, when an actor's situation creates robust pressure for the actor to behave as if rational, 
the model may prove useful as a means of predicting and influencing that actor's behavior. As will 
become clear below, however, those circumstances are less common than dispositionists tend to 
suppose. Moreover, even in such circumstances the model lacks normative significance. 
71. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC *514-15 (G.M.A. Grube trans., 1974) (c. 380 B.C.E.). 
72. The "cognitive miser" explanatory starting place has been an influential one in social psychol­
ogy. See, e.g., HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 1977); KUNDA, supra 
note 6; SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION (2d ed. 1991); PHILIP ZIMBARDO & 
MICHAEL LEIPPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDE CHANGE AND
- SOCIAL INFLUENCE (1991). The metaphor 
itself embraces a kind of dispositionism, one is left almost with the impression, right from the start, of 
the rational actor all over again, wily making efficient allocations of resources in the individual interest. 
But this impression is mistaken-as we will describe, the miserliness of our cognitions is a situational 
condition, an interior situational reality, the dynamics of which are not usually seen in our narrow 
conscious conception of our own thought processes. Moreover, interior situation is subject to exterior 
situational manipulation; what efficiency there is in our cognitive poverty may not always yield benefits 
to ourselves. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 225-32. 
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The cognitive limitations explanation of the fundamental attribution error is 
evidenced also by the fact that it is true of people across cultures. And yet, the 
depth of its grasp on our imagination of ourselves-the extent of the tendency 
to emphasize disposition and overlook situation-varies across situations. In 
some ways, it is more pronounced in the West than it is in the East. 73 Moreover, 
dispositionism deepens intergenerationally among immigrants to a new, more 
dispositionist culture.74 Our dispositionism is thus, to a significant degree, 
culturally contingent.75 It is, in our terms, highly situationa1.76 Those variations 
notwithstanding, the fundamental attribution error appears to wield significant 
influence across all cultures.77 We are all, in some sense, in the same cave. 
2. A Deeper Source of Dispositionism 
Beyond our perceptions of the world, there is another, deeper source of 
dispositionism that helps to explain its power within us.78 To see it, we would 
like to distinguish between two types of fundamental attribution errors. The first 
is the sort that we have focused on thus far and is what social psychologists 
have meant by the term. We will call that the exterior fundamental attribution 
73. See RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THOUGHT: How ASIANS AND WESTERNERS THINK 
DIFFERENTLY . . .  AND WHY 40-45 (2003). 
74. See id. 
75. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 250-60. 
76. Indeed, the fact that dispositionism can be influenced-promoted-by situation is an important 
premise and piece of evidence for our deep capture thesis, which was one of the central conclusions of 
our introductory article and an important piece of this project. See id. at 1 57-78. 
77. See id. There is considerable debate within social psychology about the variable patterns of 
dispositionism across cultures; it has been a lively area of research and debate. See NISBETT, supra note 
73, at 1 0-13. Nevertheless, we feel the claims we make here occupy the heartland of social psychologi­
cal thinking, and that our case rests on mostly noncontroversial propositions about humanity within 
social psychology. We want to make clear that the situational character, as we conceive of it through 
critical realism, must be subject to constant revision, both because new evidence will continue to come 
in from social psychology and related fields about who we are and because who we are will continue to 
change as our situations change over time. There is a vast literature in not only social and cultural 
history, but also in cultural anthropology, addressing how basic ideas of what it means to be human 
differ across cultures and over time. See, e.g., Clifford Geertz, On the Nature of Anthropological 
Understanding, 63 AM. SCI. 47 ( 1975); Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and the Self: 
Implications of Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation, 98 PSYCHOL. REv. 224 (1991). These are valuable 
and robust findings from sophisticated social sciences, and a complete conception of the situational 
character-that is, of ourselves-should make use of them. While this situational contingency in the 
quality of our dispositionism is, again, absolutely central to our broader thesis, through much of what 
follows we will emphasize the deeply wired nature of our dispositionism, and the basics of its operation 
in all humans. 
78. In that, there are numerous explanations, all of which contribute to the overall effect. Several 
interior situational sources of dispositionism are described below. See, e.g., infra text accompanying 
notes 523-29 (naIve realism); 444-7 1  (self-affirming motive); 472-78 (group-affirming motive); 
479-503 (system-affirming motive); see also Benforado, Hanson & Yosifon, Broken Scales, supra note 
54 (describing numerous sources of dispositionism); Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, NaiVe Cynicism: 
Some Mechanisms of Dispositionism and Other Persistent Attributional Errors in Policy Debates 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) [hereinafter Benforado & Hanson, NaIve Cynicism] 
(summarizing those situational sources and describing some seemingly dispositional sources of disposi­
tionism). 
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error. When humans look at any external setting and make causal attributions, 
certain key features of that setting-most importantly the observable actions of 
individuals--exert disproportionate influence over their evaluations. We see 
what "pops out" at us and tend to miss most everything else. The second 
fundamental attribution error concerns what we see of ourselves or, more 
precisely, what we see of our interiors. This interior fundamental attribution 
error is subtler, but, as we have suggested, is often true and no less important 
than the first. 
B .  THE INTERIOR FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTION ERROR 
"The inner world cannot be observed with the aid of our sensory organs. 
Our thoughts, wishes, feelings, and fantasies cannot be seen, smelled, heard, 
or touched. They have no existence in physical space, and yet they are real, 
and we can observe them as they occur in time: through introspection in 
ourselves, and through empathy (i.e., vicarious introspection) in others. " 
� Heinz Kohut 79 
"There s an old story about two men on a train. One of them, seeing some 
naked-looking sheep in a field, said, Those sheep have just been sheared. ' 
The other looked a moment longer, and then said, They seem to be-on this 
side. ' It is in such a cautious spirit that we should say whatever we have to 
say about the workings of the mind . . . . .. 
� John HoltSO 
The primacy of dispositionism reflects what we call the "interior"sl fundamen­
tal attribution error. That error, which is analogous to its exterior counterpart, is 
the tendency to "see," and to attribute a powerful causal role to certain salient 
features of our interior lives that actually wield little or no causal influence over 
our behavior, while simultaneously failing to see those features of our interiors 
that are in fact highly influential. Those elements of our interior experience that 
are clearly felt help to make possible, if not likely, a theory of ourselves in 
which dispositions play the dominant role in our behavior. We are primed by 
our felt interior experience and the resultant pre-theoretic axioms to see disposi-
79. Heinz Kohut, Introspection, Empathy, and Psychoanalysis: An Examination of the Relatinoship 
Between Mode of Observation and Theory, 7 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS'N 459 ( 1 959), reprinted in 
THE SEARCH FOR THE SELF: SELECTED WRITINGS OF HEINZ KOHUT, 1950-1978, at 205, 205-06 (Paul H. 
Ornstein ed., 1 978). 
80. JOHN HOLT, How CHILDREN LEARN, at x ( 1 967). 
8 1 .  Our definition for this term will become clearer below when we look more closely at some of the 
interior situational forces. For now, it is sufficient to understand "interior" as "inside of us." Cf JOHN 
SABINI, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2 1 0  (2d ed. 1 995) ("Behaviors that psychologists are interested in are 
caused by the interplay of things outside the skin (stimuli) and things inside the skin (the central 
nervous system). So all behavior . . .  has sources both inside the skin and outside it."). 
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tions and to overlook potentially more significant influences. In other words, the 
interior fundamental attribution error contributes significantly to the exterior 
fundamental attribution error. Below, we will summarize some of the unappreci­
ated, but highly influential, interior forces that social psychologists have identi­
fied. But the remainder of this section will describe those familiar aspects of our 
interiors that, while ultimately a woefully incomplete picture, are the most 
readily "observed" aspects of our interiors. 
When we seek--consciously or not-to understand what we are or why we behave 
as we do, we tend to attribute a vast majority of the causal weight to certain key 
mechanisms. AI> with the exterior, we see-or, as Heinz Kohut describes it, introspect­
only a small part of what moves US.82 Only a fraction of our interior setting seems 
vivid and abiding, while the greater portion is pallid and evanescent. Indeed, there are 
facets of our perceived interior experience that are so prominent that our sense of 
ourselves is completely dominated by them, and our existence apart from them is 
difficult to conceive. These basic features can be roughly described in four categories 
of felt inner experience: thinking (that is, self-conscious, articulable evaluation); 
preferring (which includes a variety of perceived interior sources of choice proclivi­
ties, such as our dispositions, wishes, goals, values, feelings, attitudes, and tastes); 
willing (the experience of consciously choosing or intending); and, the most visible of 
all, acting (our sense of the culmination of our thoughts, preferences and will, in our 
behavior).83 
That basic schema, which, if we are right, should be more or less familiar to 
readers from their own experience of their own inner lives, is loosely depicted 
in Figure 1 :  
Think 
Will 
.J.. Act 
Prefer 
Figure 1. 
Social psychologists who have studied self-conceptions across cultures sum­
marize this Western person schema as follows: 
82. See supra text accompanying note 79. 
83. One might add one or more of a number of other features, such as talents or abilities, without 
altering the thrust of our point. 
2004] THE SITUATIONAL CHARACTER 
The person is believed to consist of a set of "internal," "personal" attributes 
such as . . .  personality traits, preferences, subjective feeling states, beliefs, 
and attitudes. These attributes are thought to be internal and personal in the 
sense that they come from within and characterize the person regardless of the 
situation (that is, a person's attributes are not generated by or relative to 
current social context). Taken together, these attributes define each person as 
an autonomous, freely choosing, special individual. Within this social system, 
a human being is a person by virtue of being distinguishable from others on 
the basis of these attributes, which collectively constitute the person's social 
identity. 
The independent cultural model that prevails in North America and in much 
of Europe emphasizes certain features of the person as natural, necessary, 
"healthy," and good. The person 
• is a bounded, coherent, stable, autonomous, "free" entity . 
• "possesses" a set of characteristic identifying attributes-preferences, mo­
tives, goals, attitudes, beliefs, and abilities-that are the primary forces that 
enable, guide, or constrain actions.84 
27 
And, as Daniel Wegner writes, "[ w]e each have a profound sense that we 
consciously will much of what we do, and we experience ourselves willing our 
actions many times a day.,,85 
The four basic, salient elements of our interior-thinking, preferring, willing, 
and choosing (or acting) -significantly shape the parameters, the building 
blocks, and the pre-theoretic axioms of our self-conceptions and our theories 
and, in tum, shape how we construe and evaluate our environs.86 Those features 
84. Alan Page Fiske, Shinobu Kitayama, Hazel Rose Markus & Richard E. Nisbett, The Cultural 
Matrix of Social Psychology, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 9 1 5, 920 (Daniel T. Gilbert, 
Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1 998) (emphasis added). As that quotation indicates, 
our description of our perceived interiors is informed by, and largely consistent with, social psychologi­
cal evidence on the "conceptual self." See also Chie Kanagaw, Susan E. Cross, & Hazel Rose Markus, 
"Who am I?" The Cultural Psychology of the Conceptual Self, 27 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 
90, 9 1  (200 I )  (summarizing the Western view of the self "as a more-or-Iess integrated whole composed 
of abilities, values, personality attributes, preferences, feeling states, and attitudes"); NISBETI, supra 
note 73, at 47-78 (contrasting schemas of the human animal in "Western" and "Eastern" cultures); 
DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL 2 ( 1992) (describing our perception of "will"). 
But our assertions are also based in part on our own observations of what others seem to find obvious 
and incontestable as well as on our own naIve introspection. As will be detailed throughout this Article, 
others have similarly found many of the features we mention to be obvious and incontestable. 
It is important to emphasize that we are--our thesis is-not wed to the details of this already rather 
stylized description of the interior fundamental attribution error, but we do stand by our claim that a 
process analogous to the exterior fundamental attribution error is occurring in our interiors (and 
probably for similar reasons). Our goal here is simply to sketch a simple account of our oversimplified 
perceived interiors. As will become clear in Part Y, even if the description provided in this section 
oversimplifies the widely held, oversimplified self-conceptions, there is no disputing that our interiors 
remain uncharted mysteries to most of us even as we maintain the belief that our interiors are well 
understood. 
85. WEGNER, supra note 84, at 2. 
86. Cf Claude M. Steele, The Psychology of Self-Affirmation: Sustaining the Integrity of the Self, in 
2 1  ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 261 ,  295 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1 988) (explaining 
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are especially "visible" and influential, because they themselves can be, and 
typically are, understood as causally connected.87 We "know" that we have 
preferences, which we "know" are revealed and informed through our thinking 
and acting; we "know" that we think about our options and decide according to 
our preferences and will our acts accordingly.88 Those known features and their 
connections are, we suspect, too common, too self-evident, too salient, and too 
widely shared to be discounted in favor of the many interior features, explored 
below, that are less easily seen or experienced. 
1 .  Thinking and Being 
Take thinking. Most of us understand thinking-that is, the thinking that we 
are conscious of-as one of the primary occupations of life. As a species, we 
have designated ourselves "homo sapiens" (Latin for "thinking beings") for a 
reason. The story of Adam and Eve's eating of the apple from the forbidden 
Tree of Knowledge can be understood as a story about how we humans gained 
our characteristic ability (or curse) of reflective thinking. When Descartes 
announced the seemingly incontestable "I think therefore I am" as the founda­
tion of human understanding, he was beginning the modem philosophical 
project with our most basic experience of ourselves. He was articulating, among 
other things, a widely shared sense of what it means to be alive (as a human, at 
least): 
From this I knew that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is 
solely to think, and which does not require any place, or depend on any 
that the idea "that the 'self is a concept about oneself' . . .  has taken firm hold in social psychology, 
along with the tendency to explain self-phenomena as stemming from the operations of this knowledge 
structure. These structures heighten subjects' sensitivity to self-relevant stimuli . . .  , facilitate the 
processing and memory of these stimuli . . .  , foster resistance to information that is incongruent with 
the structure . . .  , and foster assimilation of congruent information . . . .  "). 
87. People tend to embrace plausible "causal" theories even when wrong precisely because they are 
plausible causal theories. See generally Timothy De Camp Wilson & Richard E. Nisbett, The Accuracy 
of Verbal Repons About the Effects of Stimuli on Evaluations and Behavior, 41 Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 1 8  
( 1978). For a more recent and thorough treatment of this tendency and its causes, see Timothy Wilson's 
fascinating book, Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious (2002). 
88. Cj. Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Eldar Shafir, The Interaction between Reasoning and Decision 
Making: An Introduction, 49 COGNITION I ,  1-2 ( 1993) (describing the "folk" psychology of reasoning 
and decision making-"the view that most individuals in our culture accept about mental life"-as 
follows: "Human beings have desires and needs, and they use their knowledge to decide what to do and 
to infer how best to achieve their goals. They reason in order to make decisions and to justify them both 
to themselves and others; they reason in order to determine the consequences of their beliefs and of 
their hypothetical actions; they reason to work out plans of action. They make decisions about what 
values to treat as paramount; they make decisions about what actions to take; and they make decisions 
about what information to base their reasoning on."); Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins & Samuel 
L. Popkin, Beyond Rationality: Reason and the Study of Politics, in ELEMENTS OF REASON: COGNITION, 
CHOICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY I ,  I (Arthur Lupia et al. eds., 2000) ("[Clhoice is the product 
of reason, where reason is the human process of seeking, processing, and draing inferences from 
information."). 
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material thing, in order to exist. Accordingly, this "I"-that is, the soul, by 
which I am what I am-is entirely distinct from the body . . . . 89 
29 
The Cartesian insight is so powerful because, at some level, it seems obvi­
ously right. Thinking seems pretty good evidence of being. Thinking about 
thinking seems better still. And there is little meaning in (human) being without 
thinking. Everyone reading this article knows what it means to be and to think, 
and probably understands each as a key, perhaps necessary, feature of the other. 
2. Preferences and Identity 
Similarly, most of us know what it means to prefer oranges to apples (or, 
perhaps, apples and self-awareness to a heavenly garden of ignorance) and to 
choose one or the other, even if we have trouble comparing them. Much of our 
thinking experience pertains to being struck by, and reacting to, the things, 
people, and experiences that we like and those that we do not. While our 
Cartesian experience of thought assures us of our existence, our perceived 
preferences help inform us about our particular identity in the broader backdrop 
of being. That which we like and do not like, or value and dis value, and our 
relative rankings of the particulars among them, go far, it seems, in creating our 
identities. Our perceived similarities to, and dissimilarities from, those people 
around us are based significantly, though by no means solely, on our perceptions 
of our shared and distinct tastes, values, preferences,9o and dispositions. And 
those identities are commonly, perhaps increasingly, "expressed" through our 
choices-work choices, if such are available, and particularly these days our 
consumption choices.9 1  
89. RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD Pt .  IV (1 637), reprinted in DESCARTES: SELECTED 
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 20, 36 (John Cottingham et al. trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988). 
90. As indicated earlier, our identities depend importantly on all the features of our perceived 
interiors, and not just our preferences. And, of course, they depend as well on aspects of ourselves that 
have little to do with our perceived interiors. As William James wrote in 1890: 
In its widest possible sense . . .  a man's Self is the sum total of all that he can call his, not 
only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife [or husband, or 
partner] and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works . . . .  If they wax and 
prosper, he feels triumphant, if they dwindle and die away he feels cast down. 
WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 291-92 (Encyclopaedia Britannica 1952) (1890). The 
naive account of our interiors, it should be clear now if it wasn't before, strongly reflects the cultural 
(and, thus, sometimes patriarchal) lens through which we view our interiors. In addition, our identities 
tum importantly on features of ourselves that are often perceived as fixed or given by nature or some 
larger external influence: abilities, talents, genetics, race, gender, age, appearance, health, ethnicity, 
language, social class, and so on. 
9 1 .  See generally MARYE C. THARP, MARKETING AND CONSUMER IDENTITY IN MULTICULTURAL AMERICA 
(2001) (describing the disintegration of the "mass market" and the construction of individual identities 
through distinctive consumption choices). This vision, like the others, is likely more or less culturally 
contingent. See, e.g., id. at I ("In multicultural America, your age, address, language and accent, skin 
color, or shape of eyes, as well as the music you listen to, whom you have sex with, and where you 
work, are the tools with which American consumers construct, communicate, and change social 
identity. Rather than lifetime, fixed definitions of ourselves, these self-made, chosen identities are built 
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3. Willing, Acting, and Freedom 
We "see" ourselves thinking, we "see" our preferences, and perhaps most 
decisively to our dispositionist sense of ourselves, we experience ourselves 
intentionally willing the tangible result of the whole process, our resultant 
actions. As Harvard psychologist Daniel Wegner puts it, the "conscious will 
explanation" of our own conduct has a "deep[] grip on our imagination.,,92 
We can't possibly know (let alone keep track of) the tremendous number of 
mechanical influences on our behavior because we inhabit an extraordinarily 
complicated machine. So we develop a shorthand, a belief in the causal 
efficacy of our conscious thoughts. We believe in the magic of our own causal 
agency.93 
Thus, "[ w]e have a profound sense that we consciously will much of what we 
do, and we experience ourselves willing our actions many times a day.,,94 
Saying much more about this sense of our own will is especially hard, and the 
challenge of its fuller elaboration has occupied artists and writers for genera­
tions.95 In the interest of making explicit our common-sense experience of the 
human interior, it suffices to say that we feel within ourselves, associated with 
our own behaviors, "a kind of internal 'oomph' that somehow certifies authenti­
cally that one has done the action.,,96 And so it is that "most people believe that 
their conscious feelings and judgments control their actions.,,97 We see our­
selves making choices among options, and the choices reflect our particular 
identity as against the rest of the world and the options not taken. Thus our 
actions, to the extent that they are perceived as freely taken, are seen as 
manifestations of our thinking, preferring, and willing. We often experience 
such actions as exercised freedom, our ability actually to manifest in the world 
the being and identity that we otherwise know makes us who we are in our 
upon a constantly changing foundation of personal characteristics and behaviors. It is a lifetime project, 
always in flux, never finalized, but frequently expressed by how we spend our money and time." 
(emphasis added»; see also Douglas A. Kysar, Kids & Cul-de-Sacs: Census 2000 and the Reproduction 
of Consumer Culture, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 853, 890-94 (discussing the role that consumption plays in 
our self-definition in a culture that provides few alternatives); id. at 891 ("Individuals no longer receive 
their place in the world from authoritarian dictate or historical happenstance; instead, they must fashion 
it themselves from some combination of available cultural and material resources. The claim of 
consumer culture theorists is that individuals in the modem world (and particularly in the United States) 
have sought to satisfy this obligation of self-definition through the medium of consumption."); J. 
McManus, Tapped In, Tapped Out, AM. DEMOCiRAPHICS, Dec. 1 988, at 6 ("The brand is merely a beacon 
for a set of values in the broad spectrum of choices."). 
92. WEGNER, supra note 84, at 2. 
93. /d. 
94. ld. 
95. For a great overview of generations of grappling with the question of will, see DANIEL DENNEIT, 
CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED ( 1 991).  
96.  WEGNER, supra note 84, at 4. 
97. Johnson-Laird & Shafir, supra note 88, at 2; cf id (adding that the "claim is a legacy of the 
Cartesian identification of the mind with consciousness"). 
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minds. 
4. Summary of the Interior Fundamental Attribution Error 
"A man need not, it is true, do this or that act,-the term act implies a 
choice,-but he must act somehow. " 
- Oliver Wendell Holmes, 1r.98 
3 1  
Just as the availability of human aCtiVIty tends to overwhelm our causal 
understandings of our exteriors, the availability of thinking, preferring, willing, 
and acting (and perhaps some other similarly salient, conscious features) over­
whelms our causal understandings of our interiors. We perceive ourselves 
thinking, we perceive our own dispositions or preferences, and we perceive 
ourselves acting freely in accordance with our cognitions, tastes, and free will. 
So it is that certain assumptions about our psychological processes are said to be 
"axiomatic, though generally implicit, in many modern Western cultures":99 
• Actions are freely chosen. 
• Choices imply a preference. 
• Preferences are stable over time. 
• Preferences implicate the identity of the self. 
• Outcomes are mostly controllable. 
• People are responsible for (and hence the self is implicated in) the 
choices they make and the resultant outcomes. 
• Smart (good) people make good choices, whose outcomes they are 
happy with. 1 00  
We assume, then, that actions reflect something within us-our choices. Those 
choices reflect a stable set of preferences, which themselves determine and 
reflect our "personality" or identity. Because our behavior reflects such choices, 
most of what happens is controllable-simply a matter of choice. And because 
outcomes are subject to a person's control, each person is responsible for the 
outcomes that define her circumstances. Furthermore, outcomes reflect some­
thing about the person making the choices: Good people enjoy good outcomes, 
and bad outcomes tend to happen to bad people. 
With that schema of the human animal in place, we are easily convinced that 
we are who we claim ourselves to be-free, autonomous, thinking, preferring 
actors-and there is very little cognitive space for considering the role of 
98. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 80 (Little, Brown & Co. 1 990) ( 1 88 1 ). 
99. Fiske, Kitayama, Markus & Nisbett, supra note 84, at 939. 
100. [d. ; see also Claude M. Steele, Thin Ice: "Stereotype Threat" and Black College Students, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1 999, at 44, 47 ("Ours is an individualistic culture; forward movement is seen 
to come from within."). 
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influences within us and around US. 101 In other words, what we "see" gives rise 
to fundamental attribution errors both externally and internally. 102 
These are the cliches of our self-understanding: seeing is believing, and out 
of sight, out of mind. 
5.  The Situation of Our Interiors 
"The more we examine the mechanism of thought, the more we shall see 
that the automatic, unconscious action of the mind enters largely into all its 
processes. Our definite ideas are stepping-stones; how we get from one to the 
other, we do not know: something carries us; we do not take the step. " 
- Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr. 103 
Our concern here is less with what so many of us, laypeople and theorists 
alike, find self-evident and more with what we do not. As was true exteriorly, it 
is the unavailable or less salient features of our interiors that often wield the 
most influence over us. It is, in the words of the elder Holmes, something "we 
do not know" that "carries us." Even Descartes' terse proposition about the 
unity of thinking and being is flawed in an illustrative way. The Cartesian 
insight imagines thinking as that cognitive process that we are aware of and that 
is independent from all else, including even the body in which that thinking 
occurs. That is the flaw that neuroscientist Antonio Damasio has dubbed 
"Descartes' Error" in his book of the same title. 104 Human cognitive processing 
is not simply the stuff of conscious thinking. Our thinking is situational, and is 
influenced outside of our awareness and control by everything from our bodies 
to our social environments: "Consciousness, the feature at the center of what 
makes humans unique, is the culprit [of our dispositionism] , for it permits a 
view of who we are (and what we are capable of that is independent of the . ,  
knowledge and feelings that may drive beliefs, attitudes, and behavior., , 105 But, 
101 . As we described in The Situation, the self-conceptions of many people in Eastern cultures 
render them less subject to some aspects of the fundamental attribution error. See Hanson & Yosifon, 
The Situation, supra note 5, at 250--60. 
102. It is worth noting that what we perceive about ourselves may depend on the perspective that we 
have of ourselves. Robert Wicklund, building on the work of George Mead, argues that we have two 
selves: the "I," which is the acting, behaving feature of ourselves that engages our environs according 
to our desires, values, and beliefs; and the "me," which is the self-reflective, self-aware feature of 
ourselves. The "me" emerges, for instance, when we see ourselves as others might. And "I" behavior 
can change to a "me" experience by placing ourselves in front of a mirror or a video camera. See Robert 
A. Wicklund, Objective Self-Awareness, in 8 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 223 (L. 
Berkowitz ed., 1 975). 
1 03. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., Mechanism in Thought and Morals: An Address Delivered Before 
the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Harvard University (June 29, 1 870). 
104. ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 249 (1 994). 
105. Mahzarin R. Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice, PSYCHOL. SCI. AGENDA, Jan.-Feb. 200 1 ,  at 8, 8 
[hereinafter Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice] ;  see also Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be 
Measured [hereinafter Banaji, Implicit Attitudes], in THE NATURE OF REMEMBERING: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
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as Damasio states: 
[T]he comprehensive understanding of the human mind requires an organis­
mic perspective; that not only must the mind move from a nonphysical 
cogitum to the realm of biological tissue, but it must also be related to a whole 
organism possessed of integrated body proper and brain and fully interactive 
with a physical and social environment. 106 
33 
Thinking may imply being, but our thinking is not what we experience it to 
be. The problem is, again, one of perceiving disposition and overlooking 
situation. That partial vision is, as we've argued, a key feature of being human 
and may be part of what Augustine was suggesting when he wrote: "Fall or ergo 
sum" (I am deceived, therefore I am) 107 or, in any event, it is what we mean 
when we write "I think dispositionally, therefore I am deceived." 
Our point in this discussion has been that there is more to the "situation" than 
what occurs outside of the human actor. Just as there is an unseen exterior 
situation that gives rise to the exterior fundamental attribution error, there is an 
interior situation-undetected but incredibly powerful-that gives rise to the 
interior fundamental attribution error. Our experiences are wrapped in two 
layers of situational influences. To better understand what moves us requires 
understanding them both; and to better understand the power of either requires 
understanding its relationship with the other. 
6. Situation Defined 
The bulk of this Article is dedicated to providing a more thorough examina­
tion of interior situation. Before proceeding with that, however, it may be 
helpful to offer a slightly more encompassing definition of situation. Situation, 
as we mean it, includes anything that influences our attitudes, memories, 
cognitions, emotions, behaviors, and the like in ways that we tend not fully to 
appreciate or control. The situation, then, is part of the human predicament it is 
in and around us, it is influencing us, and it is doing so in ways that we do not 
appreciate, do not understand, do not have a place for in our theories, and do not 
ROBERT G. CROWDER 1 17, 129 (H.L. Roediger, III et al. eds., 2001) (describing the problem earlier noted 
by William James in creating psychological constructs "that the knower and known are one and the 
same. For many constructs like memory, attitude, or consciousness, the knower and known have a close 
relationship, a condition ripe for delusions that derive from intuitive notion of what memory, attitude, or 
consciousness ought to be. Among the most invidious of traps when investigating mental constructs 
with which one's own thinking apparatus has intimate familiarity is the demand that the constructs 
ought to feel 'real,' even to the scientist."). 
106. DAMASIO, supra note 104, at 252. 
107. [d. at 249. Darnasio quotes St. Augustine but does not make the same point we are making. 
Interestingly, Damasio himself, and other neuroscientists, have recently been criticized for, in effect, 
replicating the Cartesian error. See M.R. BENNETT & P.M.S. HACKER, PHn.OSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
NEUROSCIENCE (2003); Dennis Patterson, Book Review, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REVIEWS (Sept. 10, 2003) 
(reviewing BENNETT & HACKER, supra), at http://ndpr.icaap.org/contentJarchives/2003/9/patterson_ben­
netChacker.htmL 
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individually or dispositionally control. Although that may strike many as an 
unorthodox understanding of situation, 108 it is designed to upend the unexam­
ined orthodoxy by emphasizing not just that we humans are blind, but that we 
are blind to our blindness. 109 
III. GETTING TO KNow THE SITUATIONAL CHARACTER 
A. INSIDE THE SITUATIONAL CHARACTER 
"Consciousness of the mind is precisely the same as consciousness of 
kidney function. Both the brain and the kidney are organs that result in bodily 
processes . . . .  For both, we can observe the states that result from activity in 
the system, but we have no special access to how either works. We have only 
the evident products of each to consider and from which to fabricate models 
of process. Naive theoretical models result from observations of the products 
of the system and scientific models (right or wrong) result from scientific 
methods. " 
- Robert Crowder I 1 0 
1 .  Flies, Rats, and Science 
Where do flies come from? What about rats? Fish? Microorganisms? "From 
the time of the ancient Greeks until well into the 1 9th century, it was common 
'knowledge' that life could arise from nonliving matter." I I I This was the idea of 
"spontaneous generation." Flies were born of rotting meat, rats from stinking 
rubbish, fish from water-covered mud, and microorganisms from almost any­
thing. The theory was intuitive and seemed consistent with the evidence. Get rid 
of the rotting meat, the flies disappear. Clean up the trash, no more rats. 
There was really no reason to reject what seemed so obvious. Then, in the 
late Renaissance, Italian scientist Francesco Redi noted a connection between 
1 08. Webster's defines situation as "the way in which something is placed in relation to its 
surroundings." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICITONARY 1098 ( lOth ed. 1 998). That is only part of 
what we mean by the term. 
1 09. To be clear, our definitions of related concepts are similarly unorthodox. Social psychologists 
traditionally use the term "disposition" to indicate something internal, like personality, preferences, 
desires, moods, and so on, as opposed to "situation," by which social psychologists often mean 
something external, like environmental cues, time constraints, social pressures, and the like. The 
"fundamental attribution error," as social psychologists typically use the term, refers to the tendency to 
over-attribute to disposition, thus defined, and under-attribute to situation, thus defined. When we write 
of "dispositionism" in this Article, we are mostly referring to the particular causal schema generally 
employed by Westerners to explain behavior: that is, stable (person-specific) preferences combined with 
some thinking and will. The "fundamental attribution error," as we use the term, is therefore more 
profound (indicating a failure to appreciate the role of both the exterior situation and the interior 
situation in explaining behavior) than that imagined when the phrase is conventionally used. We will 
refine that terminology in future work, but those definitions should be adequate for present purposes. 
1 10. Robert Crowder, The Brain, the Kidney, and Consciousness (unpublished manuscript, c. 1 990), 
in Banaji, Implicit Attitudes, supra note 1 05, at 1 30. 
I I I . NElL A. CAMPBELL & JANE B. REECE, BIOLOGY 5 1 6  (6th ed. 2002). 
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squirming white maggots and flies and decided to try to test the theory of 
spontaneous generation. He cleverly placed meat in two jars in the open air with 
a mesh cover over one to allow air in, but not flies. We can skip the particulars 
of the "discovery," because, today, spontaneous generation is so obviously 
wrong, so inconsistent with our intuitions and the evidence, that there is no need 
to review them. Redi's findings put a fly in the ointment of spontaneous 
generation, but still the idea persisted-indeed, thrived-among scientists and 
lay people well into the 1 800s. At last, in the midst of intense scientific 
controversy, Louis Pasteur settled the matter in an award winning set of 
experiments, which, again, we needn't review for our audience. I 12 
But little of what Redi and Pasteur showed reduces the predictive power of 
spontaneous generation. It remained, one might say, a powerful positive theory 
of fly genesis: flies act as if they spontaneously generate from old meat. If you 
don't believe us, leave some out. And the hold of spontaneous generation as an 
explanatory theory comes from the fact that it is true that we find flies where we 
find rotting animals, it is true that we find fish where we find mud, and it is true 
that we find rats where we find garbage. The associations are accurate. It is just 
that those associations do not explain the phenomena. There is more to the 
situation. 
The point is a general one. In attempting to understand our worlds, we 
commonly create theories from the features of our environment that we observe 
or to which we have comparatively easy access. Good science allows (some­
times forces) us to look again and more closely at that environment. It permits 
us to see illusion where we once saw truth and inspires a search for a new truth 
(and, if possible, a broader truth that also explains the associations underlying 
the illusion). 
The purpose of this section-and the bulk of this Article-is to demonstrate 
how social psychology, social cognition theory, cognitive psychology, and 
cognitive neuroscience have shattered the illusions that most of us experience as 
truths about ourselves and what moves us. This science has been necessary to 
pierce our self-illusions precisely because while it is true that we experience 
ourselves thinking, true that we experience ourselves preferring, true that we 
1 1 2 .  See EVELYN Fox KELLER, MAKING SENSE OF LIFE: EXPLAINING BIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT WITH 
MODELS, METAPHORS, AND MACHINES 22-49 (2002); Russell Levine & Chris Evers, The Slow Death of 
Spontaneous Generation (1668-1859), at http://www.accessexcellence.orgIRClABIBClSpontaneous_Gen­
eration.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2004) ("The theory of spontaneous generation was finally laid to rest 
in 1 859 by the young French chemist, Louis Pasteur. The French Academy of Sciences sponsored a 
contest for the best experiment either proving or disproving spontaneous generation. Pasteur's winning 
experiment . . . . boiled meat broth in a flask, heated the neck of the flask in a flame until it became 
pliable, and bent it into the shape of an S. Air could enter the flask, but airborne microorganisms could 
not-they would settle by gravity in the neck. As Pasteur had expected, no microorganisms grew. When 
Pasteur tilted the flask so that the broth reached the lowest point in the neck, where any airborne 
particles would have settled, the broth rapidly became cloudy with life. Pasteur had both refuted the 
theory of spontaneous generation and convincingly demonstrated that microorganisms are everywhere­
even in the air."). 
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experience ourselves willing, and true that we experience ourselves choosing, 
there is, in fact, more to the situation. 
2 .  A Closer Look at the Interior Situation 
What many people describe as "thinking," social psychologists would call 
"cognitions." Cognitions, succinctly defined, are the mental activities associated 
with acquiring and processing information and are associated with some forms 
of perceiving, conceiving, reasoning, judging, remembering, and imagining. 
What we experience as "preferences," social psychologists would label "atti­
tudes,, 1 1 3_"a categorization of a stimulus along an evaluative dimension" I 14 or 
"[a] learned predisposition to react to a given situation, person, or other set of 
cues in a consistent way.,, 1 1 5 Social psychologists would label what we com­
monly see as choices as "behavior." Behavior refers to actions that individuals 
take, such as voting, buying, shocking, and doing legal theory. It also refers, less 
obviously, to actions that individuals do not take. 1 1 6 
Social psychology thus recognizes the self-evident features of our interiors, 
though it uses slightly different terms to represent them. I 1 7 But social psychol­
ogy and its sister disciplines have not been satisfied with our intuitive self­
understandings. Social psychology has attempted to understand the nature of 
our interior situations-the aspects of our experience that elude our conscious 
awareness. 1 1 8 And it has discovered a great deal about our interior situations 
that is both surprising and troubling. I 19 Among other things, it has found that 
"[ 0 ]ur minds contain knowledge of which we are unaware. Our feelings can be 
impervious to the assertion of conscious will. Our behaviors subsume acts that 
are unintended, even opposed to those that are intended or consciously de­
sired." 1 20 
1 1 3. Preferences might also be labeled "affective responses," a concept we discuss below. See infra 
Part lILC.3. 
1 14. FiSKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 463. 
1 15. RAy CORSINI, THE DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 76 (2002). 
1 16. ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE, supra note 72, at 32. 
1 17. Social psychology has had somewhat less to say about the felt experience of "the will," but 
what work there has been is, we think, incredibly revealing, and we will tum to it towards the end of 
this Article. See infra Part III.E.2 (discussing the illusion of conscious will). 
1 1 8. The distinction between situational and dispositional is sometimes a difference in degree rather 
than a difference in kind. Some interior situational factors, like those on the exterior, can often be 
seen-with some effort. They are situational because we humans tend not to see them. They are 
typically nonreflective and automatic. 
1 1 9. It is revealing, we believe, that the assumptions now made by economists resemble those once 
made by early social psychologists. See infra Part III.B.2.b (summarizing early attributionists); infra 
Part III.C. l .a (discussing traditional view that attitudes were stable); see also FiSKE & TAYLOR, supra 
note 72, at 465. It was only through testing those assumptions that social psychologists came to 
discover the flaws in their intuitively appealing theories. The point here is not to criticize economists 
for failing to test their pre-theoretic axioms (we will make that criticism below, see infra Part VA-B), 
but to provide more evidentiary support for our claim about the naiVe view of our interiors that most of 
us, including those who set out to study our interiors, tend to hold, at least initially. 
1 20. Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice, supra note 105, at 8. 
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Figure 2. 
Although we may find intuitive the bold boxes and bold causal connections 
depicted in Figure 2, it is the effect of less salient features of our interiors (the 
ovals in Figure 2) on our interiors and the effect of our largely unseen exterior 
on those interior attributes that are more responsible for our behavior. 
The balance of this Part will employ the lessons of social psychology to tum 
dispositionism on its head. To do so, it will highlight some of the many ways in 
which we are moved by what we do not see and in which what we do see is 
illusion. Section B summarizes what social science has revealed about the 
unseen features of our "thinking" or cognitions. Section C reviews key unseen 
aspects of our "preferences" or attitudes. Section D examines some surprising 
evidence of how our "choices" do not always follow from our thinking, 
preferring, and willing. And Section E reviews evidence that our "will" can 
itself be illusion. Not only does each section demonstrate the fallacies of our 
self-schemas, 1 2 1 it also helps to make clear how each element of our interior 
situation renders us vulnerable to exterior situational manipulation. 
B. UNSEEN COGNITIONS (VS. "THINKING") 
Take thinking. There is an immense gulf between the way we think and the 
way we think we think. 1 22 Our cognitions are often not conscious, and, of 
1 2 1 .  See supra text accompanying notes 84-88 (reviewing the conventional Western schemas for 
human behavior). 
1 22.  See Johnson-Laird & Shafir, supra note 88, at 2 ("Individuals are often not aware of how they 
reason, having at best only glimpses of the process. They are aware of the results, not the mechanism. 
What they say about their reasoning does not tally with its real nature . . . .  "); id. at 3 ("[I]ntrospection 
is not a direct route to understanding mental processes, and, as far as we know, there is no direct 
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course, we tend to have very little sense of what we are thinking when it is not 
conscious. Just as we are at any given moment in tune with none or, with the 
help of some electronic device, just a tiny fraction of the broadcast signals and 
electromagnetic frequencies enveloping our exteriors, so it is with the cognitive 
signals enveloping our interiors. And often even our attempts to tune in one 
single wavelength are likely to meet with some crossed signals and iffy recep­
tion. 
Do you doubt this? If so, can you avoid thinking of a chocolate chip cookie 
right now?123 And if you are not thinking of a chocolate chip cookie, what 
devices are you using to avoid it? 124 How strong are those devices? How do you 
explain your occasional inability to rid your mind of a song or advertising 
jingle? And, when that happens, do you ever remember the moment in which 
that hard-to-shake ditty quits playing in your head or does it just fade away 
without your knowing? Has your mind snagged on something you have read in 
this article so far? Did it blanch, for instance, when it came to the phrase 
"squirming white maggots?" If so, were you aware of it as it happened, or did it 
take our question now to "remind" you that, yes, it had happened. Have you 
ever arrived at work not remembering anything about your trip to get there­
even when you were driving? More seriously, consider the thoughts about the 
desires, images, or worries moving in your mind that you try to silence but 
sometimes cannot, the thoughts that distract you, occupy you, or leave you 
restless. Conversely, consider the times when you want to focus on a topic or 
idea, perhaps our argument here, or something about your life, but find it 
difficult or impossible to do so. 
In short, a little casual empiricism, in the form of introspection, makes fairly 
obvious something of which most of us tend usually to be unaware. Even the 
most central features of our interior seem at times recalcitrant and at other times 
uncontrollable. Regardless of whether we are cognizant of or whether we can 
control our cognitions, social psychologists have identified a plethora of interior 
situational features that bias or influence those cognitions and, in tum, our 
attitudes. We will focus on two general types of cognitive biases: choice biases 
and process biases. 
route."); Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal 
Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REv. 23 1 ( 1 977); J. St. B .  T. Evans, D.E. Over & K.I 
Mantelow, Reasoning, Decision Making and Rationality, 49 COGNITION 1 65 ( 1 993). 
1 23. In other words, can you prevent the image or idea of a chocolate chip cookie still warm from 
the baking pan, perhaps next to a glass of cold milk, from coming to mind? There is evidence that our 
attempts to suppress a thought often backfire, making the thought more prominent in our consciousness. 
Daniel Wegner has labeled this effect the "ironic reversal." WEGNER, supra note 84, at 4; see also 
KUNDA, supra note 6, at 299. Kunda refers to that effect as the "hyperaccessibility of suppressed 
thoughts." [d. at 300-{)l . 
1 24. According to Fiske and Taylor, "[t]he only way out, as successful dieters and practiced 
meditators know, is to find a substitute thought," a solution that is harder than it sounds. See FISKE & 
TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 279-80; see also KUNDA, supra note 6, at 300. 
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1 .  Choice Biases 
We begin with "choice biases" because, of the innumerable interior situ­
ational features that social psychologists have discovered, these have received 
the most attention from economists and legal theorists. As we will explain 
below, the reason for this situational foot in the door of economics stems from 
the fact that these biases most clearly influence (and challenge economists' 
typical assumptions regarding) people's choices; and to economists and legal 
economists, choices are the most significant of dispositional interior features. 1 25 
Thus, by "choice biases," we are referring to the growing body of evidence of 
"heuristics" and "biases" that, according to economic behavioralists, lead to 
systematic anomalies to the basic "rational actor model." Partially because they 
are now quite fashionable in academic policy literatures, we can spare the 
reader a substantial review of choice biases. 1 26 We briefly describe a sample of 
two types of choice biases: intra-temporal biases (of which we will highlight 
three) and inter-temporal biases. 
a. Intratemporal Effects 
Most of the best-known choice biases occur within a precise time period and 
largely without relation to temporal considerations. In this subsection, we briefly 
consider three of them: heuristics, endowment effects, and framing effects. 
i. Heuristics 
People, for good reason, are cognitively frugal. Some say, as we noted earlier, that 
humans are cognitive misers. 127 Because cognitive capacity is scarce, comer cutting is 
not just useful, it is necessary. People engaging in inferential tasks "virtually always" 
rely on judgmental strategies-termed heuristics-that help them reduce complex 
problems into manageable ones. 128 Such strategies "probably produce vastly more 
correct or partially correct inferences than erroneous ones, and they do so with great 
speed and little effort." 129 Still, there are significant problems with such mental rules 
of thumb. First, "[a]lthough these heuristics often lead to effective reasoning, they also 
1 25.  See infra text accompanying notes 658-87. 
1 26. For a more comprehensive review, see Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioral· 
ism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 632, 646-67 ( 1 999) [hereinaf­
ter Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously /]; Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 64, at 
I 47Cr-79; Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. EcON. Lrr. 1 1  ( 1 998). For examples of 
scholars using choice biases to enhance policy analysis, see BEHAVIORAL LAW AND EcONOMICS (Cass R. 
Sunstein ed., 2000). For useful overviews of choice biases by social psychologists, see JUDGMENT 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 
1 982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY] and SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND 
DECISION MAKING ( 1 993). 
1 27.  See supra text accompanying notes 72-77 (noting cognitive limitations as one cause of the 
fundamental attribution error). 
1 28. FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 39 1 .  
1 29. RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL 
JUDGMENT 1 8  ( 1980). 
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lead to systematic biases and errors." 130 Second, we nonnally do not realize we have 
these biases, leaving us undefended against their harmful effects. 13 1 And, third, for the 
same reasons, our cognitive shortcuts leave us susceptible to exterior situational 
manipulation. 1 32 
Availability, for example, "is a heuristic that is used to evaluate the frequency 
or likelihood of an event on the basis of how quickly instances or associations 
come to mind." 1 33 This shortcut may not mislead us, but it often does. "There 
are many factors uncorrelated with frequency . . .  [that] can influence an event's 
immediate perceptual salience, the vividness or completeness with which it is 
recalled, or the ease with which it is imagined." 1 34 So it is that in experimental 
surveys people have evaluated the risk of homicide as greater than the risk of 
death by stomach cancer, when, in fact, the reverse is true. Indeed, the latter is 
"17 times more common." 1 35 This heuristic can thus have tragic social conse­
quences. And so, "[b ]ecause members of minority groups who perform unusual 
behaviors are especially distinctive, people may form illusory correlations 
between group membership and the unusual behavior,, 1 36-that is, incorrect 
stereotypes . 
Mentioning or asking about an event can itself increase its availability-just 
as mentioning "chocolate chip cookie" can increase the extent to which people 
visualize such a delight. 1 37 And like the jingle that has overstayed its welcome, 
when something is on our mind, it can be hard to get it off. For instance, 
"random and irrelevant starting points can have a dramatic impact on judg­
ment.,, 1 38 Tversky and Kahneman, seminal authorities on heuristics, identified 
what they tenn the anchoring bias based on a series of experiments demonstrat­
ing that "[i]nitial starting points, even totally irrelevant ones, seem to serve as 
1 30. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 56. 
1 3 1 .  See NISBElT & Ross, supra note 1 29, at 1 8. 
1 32. See Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note 126, at 672-87; see also 
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market 
Manipulation, 1 12 HARV. L. REV. 1 420, 1425-27 ( 1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavior­
alism Seriously II] . 
1 33.  FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 384. 
1 34. NISBElT & Ross, supra note 1 29, at 19.  
1 35. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 91 (citing P. Slovic et aI., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding 
Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 126, at 436). 
1 36. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 59 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1 30-33 (explaining that we "see" 
illusory correlations when "rare and distinctive individuals," who therefore "capture our attention" 
engage in certain behaviors); infra Part III.B.2.a.i (discussing this and other sources of stereotypes). See 
generally Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on 
Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 106 (2004) [hereinafter Chen & Hanson, Categorically 
Biased] (describing in detail the process by which stereotypes are created and activated). 
1 37 .  For a review of the evidence, see Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously II, supra 
note 1 32, at 1532-34; see also KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 23 ("Merely asking participants to analyze the 
reasons for their behavioral predictions made them view the behaviors as more likely."). 
1 38 .  KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 02. 
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anchors."139 "[O]nce we have made an intuitive estimate, even i f  we are told 
that we are wrong, we still keep the initial rough estimate as an implicit 
baseline. We are anchored to it. We are unwilling to neglect it completely and 
start afresh.
,, 140 
Similarly, we cannot seem to shake what we know did happen when estimat­
ing what we would have predicted would happen. As Baruch Fischhoff discov­
ered, "[rJeporting an outcome's occurrence increases its perceived probability of 
occurrence; and . . .  people who have received outcome knowledge are largely 
unaware of its having changed their peceptions . . . . ,, 141 And on top of this, 
people even overestimate the accuracy of predictions that they actually made. 142 
This hindsight bias, which has been demonstrated for a wide range of events, is 
one of the interior situational influences that we observe in others (but not in 
ourselves) often enough to give rise to the common phrase "hindsight is 20/20." 
ii. Endowment Effects 
Another interior situational influence that profoundly affects our thinking 
outside our awareness is a phenomenon social psychologists have dubbed the 
endowment effect. 143 This term stands for the well-documented tendency of 
humans to value things they have (or believe they have) already, over that 
which they do not have (or do not believe they have). An early study demonstrat­
ing this pattern has become somewhat familiar in legal-theoretic references to 
the lessons of "behavioralism"-the Cornell coffee mug study. 144 In that study, 
subjects, who were given a coffee mug, valued the mug more than did students 
who were not given the mug. The subjects' willingness to pay and willingness 
to accept money for the same item was influenced significantly by the initial 
endowments. 
Beyond demonstrating the basic contours of the endowment effect, the coffee 
mug studies also nicely show how this bias operates in a seemingly automatic 
fashion; subjects valued what they had more than what they did not have even 
when the item was relatively meaningless and had only been "theirs" for a very 
1 39. Id. (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty; Heuristics and 
Biases, 1 85 SCIENCE 1 124 ( 1974)). See generally Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, 
supra note 126, at 667-69 (reviewing some of the experiments). 
140. MASSIMO PIATELLl-PALMARlNI, INEVITABLE ILLUSIONS: How MISTAKES OF REASON RULE OUR MINDS 
7 1 -72 ( 1 994). 
1 4 1 .  Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight oF Foresight; The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment 
Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:  HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288, 288 ( 1 975). 
142. See KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 84; Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra 
note 1 26, at 660. 
143. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, The Endowment Effect, Loss 
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 1 93,  1 97-20 1 ( 1 99 1 ) ;  see also Hanson & Kysar, 
Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note 1 26, at 673-76 (summarizing social psychological 
findings concerning the endowment effect). 
144. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1 325, 1 330 ( 1 990) (describing the Cornell 
coffee mug study, and several variations of it, in detail). 
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short time. Other variations of the coffee mug experiment highlight the uncon­
scious nature of the effect by showing that subjects in an ex ante perspective 
underestimate the effect that a hypothetical endowment would have on their 
valuation of an item. 145 Still other studies have demonstrated the presence of the 
endowment effect in more important areas of social life, such as in the patterns 
of workers' valuation of health care benefits. Research indicates that workers 
will value particular health benefits more when they are mandated, and thus 
presented as an endowment, than they do when the same benefits are not 
presumptively endowed. 146 
The robust findings concerning the influence of the endowment effect thus 
should undermine our confidence in the reality of the thinking-preferring­
choosing model of human thinking. What is perhaps even more troubling about 
this cognitive pattern, however, is not just that it happens, but that like other 
interior situational influences, the operation of the endowment effect is subject 
to exterior situational influences that can frame our sense of what we presently 
have and do not have. Cues in the environment can, without anyone noticing, 
orient the burdens of proof, persuasion, and negotiation. 
iii. Framing Effects 
And more generally, the way in which an issue is presented to us significantly 
influences how we perceive it. Psychologists have dubbed this the framing 
effect. Even minor alterations in the presentation of options that are substan­
tively identical seem to influence our perceptions and attitudes regarding the 
options. 147 Kahneman and Tversky, the cognitive psychologists who identified 
and named the phenomenon, describe it as "both pervasive and robust." It is "as 
common among sophisticated respondents as among naIve ones . . . . In their 
stubborn appeal, framing effects resemble perceptual illusions more than compu-
1 45. See George Loewenstein & Daniel Adler, A Bias in the Prediction of Tastes, 1 05 EcON. J. 929, 
93 1 ( I  995}. 
1 46. See Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 AM. ECON. REv. 622 
( l 994). Gruber's study found that the imposition of mandatory maternity benefits caused the wages of 
workers to fall by at least the cost of providing the insurance, but that the hours worked and the 
probability of the workers' being employed did not change or was only slightly lower with the 
endowment in place. According to Gruber, "[tlhe findings consistently suggest shifting of the costs of 
the mandates on the order of 1 00 percent, with little effect on net labor input." Id. at 623; see also Jolls, 
Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 64, at 1 506--07 (discussing Gruber's findings as inconsistent with 
conventional economic analysis but consistent with social psychological studies concerning the endow­
ment effect). For other "real world" findings concerning the endowment effect that sweep beyond 
coffee mugs, see Ward Farnsworth, Do Panies to Nuisance Lawsuits Bargain After Judgment? A 
Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND EcONOMICS, supra note 1 26, at 302; Kahneman, 
Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 1 43. 
1 47. See Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note 1 26, at 644, 684-87 
(reviewing several key studies). Consider, for example, the very different response supermarkets are 
likely to elicit from their customers when they label their beef as being "eighty-five percent fat free," 
rather than "fifteen percent fat," or that filling stations are likely to inspire when they frame their 
cash-based prices as "discounts" rather than advertising that they charge a premium for purchases on 
credit. 
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tational errors.,, 1 48 As another decision theorist has explained, the power of the 
phenomenon results from our "tendency to accept problem formulations as they 
are given . . .  [to] remain, so to speak, mental prisoners of the frame provided to 
us by the experimentalist, or by the 'expert, ' or by a certain situation.,, 1 49 More 
succinctly, "framing" is one identified piece of the manipulable situation. 
iv. Summary 
There is something familiar about the source of these well-documented 
heuristics. They are different ways of talking about the same basic phenomenon. 
They are all just manifestations in different contexts of what we have been 
describing throughout this Article and its companion: we see the vivid and we 
miss the pallid. Small pieces of the picture tend to dominate our assessment of 
the whole image. We readily see what is available, anchored, and presently 
normal, all according to how it had been framed, and we find it difficult to see 
much else. As Ziva Kunda puts it, these choice biases "may be viewed as a kind 
of mental contamination . . . .  Even though we do not want our judgments to be 
contaminated in this manner, it is very difficult to eliminate the contamina­
tion.,, 1 5o 
That difficulty, we believe, is largely the consequence of our interior situa­
tions. We do not see these biases at work. We do not see, in other words, that we 
do not see. This inability to see our interior situation is the source of the interior 
fundamental attribution error. And our interior myopia helps give rise to the 
exterior fundamental attribution error. People's behavior, like news of a homi­
cide, is available. Their situation, like statistics on stomach cancer, generally is 
not. We are dispositionists because of what comes to mind most easily-and, 
once in our minds, anchors our attributions. 1 5 1 Interiorly and exteriorly, we 
humans miss the situational forest for the dispositional trees. 
In part because our exterior dispositionism is causally related to our interior 
disposition ism, our interior situation can be easily exploited through the manipu­
lation of our exterior situation. Each study demonstrating a choice bias is itself 
indirect proof of that fact. Scientists were able to manipulate cognitions by 
manipulating the exterior situation. And the interior situation leaves open and 
unguarded the gates through which the Trojan horse of exterior situation freely 
enters, not as a trophy of our dispositional triumph, but as a hidden means of 
influencing our behavior. 1 52 
1 48 .  Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 34 1 , 343 
( 1 984). 
149. PIATELLl-PALMARINI, supra note 140, at 30. 
1 50.  KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 06. 
15 1 .  See KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 04 (discussing George Quattrone's work suggesting that "anchor­
ing may play a role in producing the [exterior] fundamental attribution error") (citing George Quat­
trone, Overattribution and Unit Formation: When Behavior Engulfs the Person, 42 J. PERSONALITY & 
Soc. PSYCHOL. 593 ( 1982» . 
152. For a related discussion of "the problem of manipulation," see Hanson & Kysar, Taking 
Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note 1 26. 
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b. Intertemporal Effects 
Psychologists and economic behavioralists have discerned a general category 
of choice bias that results from the effect of time. Consider the following 
thought experiment. Would you rather receive a prize of $100 today or a prize 
of $200 two years from now? If you are like most people, you opted for the 
smaller amount of money today. And even those who choose to wait for the 
bigger prize find the choice a tough one. I S3 
Now, which would you choose if the options were $100 in six years or $200 
in eight years? That's an easy one, even for people who have just answered the 
first question. Almost everyone we ask unhesitatingly opts for the larger, 
delayed prize. Some are struck (even embarrassed) to realize that the choices 
are exactly the same, except for the time frame. The second pair of options is 
just the first pair, six years later. 1 54 So, are you willing to wait two years for an 
extra $100 or not? Somehow the choices in the two proposals seem different. 
There is considerable evidence that people find it difficult to delay gratification 
and very easy to delay displeasure. 1 55 More generally, people attach greater 
significance to outcomes-good or bad-that are close by than those that are far 
away. 1 56 
If you want $100 today instead of $200 in two years, but would prefer $200 
in eight years to $100 in six, you are probably responding to the exterior 
situational salience of money today, in your pocket, ready to spend on all the 
items that likewise are comparatively available. Any of the other sums at future 
times are far less immediate, as are the items you might purchase. Thus, when 
faced with the second pair of options, the options are fungible in availability 
terms, making the larger sum more attractive. In other words, money is not 
fungible where the situational frame is not. 1 57 That people do not anticipate 
those differences and that theorists have difficulty explaining that tendency 
1 53. We have ourselves conducted this experiment in a number of different settings, and each time 
we have seen that the formal renditions of the experiment predicted the results. For the formal versions 
of the hyperbolic discounting experiments, see George Ainslie & Nick Haslam, Hyperbolic Discount­
ing, in CHOICE OVER TIME 57, 69 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992); see also Shane 
Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical 
Review, J. EcoN. LIT. 35 1 ,  360--6 1 (2002) (summarizing similar studies including some done on 
pigeons). 
154. If you didn't experience the apparent reversal in attitudes, try reducing the sums to, say, $10 
and $20. 
I SS.  See, e.g. , Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 153,  at 36 1 ;  see also Ted 
O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now or Later, 89 AM. EcoN. REv. 103, 103 ( 1 999) ("People 
are impatient--they like to experience rewards soon and to delay costs until later."). But see Dan Ariely 
& George Loewenstein, When Does Duration Matter in Judgment and Decision Making?, 1 29 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 508 (2000) (describing some exceptions); Drazen Prelec & George loewen­
stein, The Red and the Black: Mental Accounting of Savings and Debt, 17 MARKETING SCI. 4 ( 1 998) 
(same). 
1 56. This evidence contradicts the conventional discounted utility model of neoclassical economics 
that has long been the dominant normative and positive model of intertemporal decision-making. See 
infra text accompanying notes 339-80. 
1 57.  See generally VIVIANA ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY ( 1 997). 
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illustrates the power of our interior situation. 1 5s And that we humans are 
unaware of this power renders us especially vulnerable to manipulation through 
external situation. 
Although social psychologists have not recently focused closely on this 
particular choice bias, their general findings about our cognitive processes 
predict and explain it. Time variations are really just variations on the theme 
that we have been developing and that social psychologists discovered decades 
ago-situation matters. And temporal proximity is part of the situation. 1 59 
One does not need to be terribly well-versed in social psychology to find 
examples of broader phenomena that would include the time effects that 
economic behavioralists have highlighted. In addition to the many studies 
discussed elsewhere in this Article, consider, for example, a Wilson and Nisbett 
experiment in which subjects were asked in a bargain store to judge which one 
of four nylon stocking pantyhose was the best quality. 1 60 The subjects were not 
told that the stockings were in fact identical. Wilson and Nisbett presented the 
stockings to the subjects hanging on racks spaced equal distances apart. As 
situation would have it, the position of the stockings had a significant effect on 
the subjects' quality judgments. In particular, moving from left to right, 1 2% of 
the subjects judged the first stockings as being the best quality, 17% of the 
subjects chose the second pair of stockings, 3 1  % of the subjects chose the third 
pair of stockings, and 40% of the subjects chose the fourth-the most recently 
viewed pair of stockings. 1 61 When asked about their respective jUdgments, most 
of the subjects attributed their decision to the knit, weave, sheerness, elasticity, 
or workmanship of the stockings that they chose to be of the best quality. 1 62 
Dispositional qualities of the stocking, if you will. Subjects provided a total of 
eighty different reasons for their choices. 1 63 Not one, however, mentioned the 
position of the stockings, or the relative recency with which the pairs were 
viewed. l64 None, that is, saw the situation. In fact, when asked whether the 
position of the stockings could have influenced their judgments, only one 
subject admitted that position could have been influential. 1 65 Thus, Wilson and 
Nisbett conclude that "[w]hat matters . . .  is not why the [position] effect occurs 
but that it occurs and that subjects do not report it or recognize it when it is 
158. Even the more creative explanations that economic behavioralists provide, such as "mental 
accounts," are actually just somewhat ad hoc and narrow versions of highly developed and expansive 
theories that social psychologists have long been refining, but the lessons of which go far beyond what 
economists recognize in their provisional categories. See, e.g., infra Part III.B.2.a. (discussing role of 
knowledge structures). 
159. Cf TODD RAKOFF, TIME (2002) (analyzing the role of law in structuring people's conception and 
experience of time). 
1 60. See Wilson & Nisbett, supra note 87, at 1 23. 
1 6 1 .  ld. 
162. [d. at 124. 
163. ld. 
164. ld. 
165. /d. 
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pointed out to them.,, 166 
Consider, again, Stanley Milgram's classic studies. Social psychologist Roger 
Brown reanalyzed the twenty-one variations of Milgram's studies in terms of 
the concept of immediacy, which he defines as "proximity in space or time and 
presence or absence of barriers.,, 1 67 Brown appreciated that there were two 
people exerting a situational force on the subject (the "teacher"): the "experi­
menter" and the "learner." Brown then ranked the experiments according to the 
"net immediacy" of those two forces and identified seven variations along a 
spectrum of immediacy. 1 68 
At one extreme, the experimenter was present as described in our summary 
above, 1 69 but the "learner" was in another room and could neither be seen nor 
heard. Thus the experimenter was, relative to the "learner," very immediate to 
the subject. Under that design, one hundred percent of the subjects shocked to 
the limit of 450 volts. At the other extreme, the "learner" pounded the wall and 
screamed as we described earlier but the experimenter gave no orders at all, 
leaving the teacher free to choose shocking levels. In that variation, then, the 
suffering "learner" was, relative to the experimenter, very immediate. There, 
only one of forty teachers shocked to the limit and the mean maximum shock 
was only forty-five volts. 
In between those extremes, Brown analyzed the immediacy effects of bring-
166. /d. For more examples of the powerful role of the situational influence of proximity, see Nisbett 
& Wilson, supra note 1 22. Wilson and Nisbett's analysis was, particularly initially, met with consider­
able criticism. See, e.g., Eliot R. Smith & Frederick D. Miller, Limits on Perception of Cognitive 
Processes: A Reply to Nisbett and Wilson, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 355 ( 1 978) (asserting that Nisbett and 
Wilson's claim that people have no direct access to their mental processes is overstated); Peter White, 
Limitations on Verbal Reports of Internal Events: A Refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bem, 87 
PSYCHOL. REV. 105-1 2  ( 1 980) (criticizing Nisbett and Wilson's interpretations and methodologies); 
Peter Wright & Peter D. Rip, Retrospective Reports on the Causes of Decisions, 40 J. PERSONALITY & 
Soc. PSYCHOL. 601 ( 198 1)  (claiming that Wilson and Nisbett's conclusion that people have no 
awareness or retrieval abilities of their mental processes is overstated); Robert E. Kraut & Steven H.  
Lewis, Person Perception and Self-Awareness: Knowledge of Influences on One 's Own Judgments, 42 
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 448 ( 1 982) (finding that judges' self-reports about what influences their 
judgments are moderately accurate at estimating the actual influences on their judgments); George A. 
Quattrone, On the Congruity Between Internal States and Action, 98 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3 ( 1 985) (arguing 
that self-report effects are significant and congruent with behavior more frequently than indicated by 
Wilson and Nisbett). More recently, however, Nisbett and Wilson's arguments and conclusions are 
enjoying greater support. See, e.g., Mirjam Sprangers et aI., A Constructive Replication of White's 
Alleged Refutation of Nisbett and Wilson and of Bem: Limitations on Verbal Reports of Internal Events, 
23 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 302 ( 1 987) (finding that observers' causal reports are no more 
accurate than actors' causal reports on judgment processes); Charles K. Turner, Don 't Blame Memory 
for People 's Faulty Reports on What Influences Their Judgments, 14  PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 622 ( 1 988) (finding that memory decay is not attributable to people's inability to accurately 
report on judgment processes); Banaji, Implicit Attitudes, supra note 105. 
167. ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 20 (2d. ed. 1986). The following summary of Brown's work 
comes from id. at 20-24. 
1 68. Milgram himself adjusted the experimental setting to examine the effect of the "closeness of 
the victim" and "closeness of authority." See BROWN, supra note 1 67, at 2 1 .  Brown was therefore just 
building on Milgram's intended design. 
169. See supra text accompanying notes 8-13 .  
2004] THE SITUATIONAL CHARACTER 47 
ing the "learner" into the same room with the teacher and even of requiring the 
teacher to force the victim's hand down onto a shock plate. He found that the 
net immediacy of the various manipulations perfectly explained the variance in 
the percentage of teachers who shocked to the limit. The "willingness to shock a 
victim, though always the same in its supposed ultimate effect, declines . . .  as 
the person administering the shock becomes more immediately and intimately 
acquainted with the suffering he believes he is producing.,, 1 7o 
Thus, the Milgram experiments reveal the same tendency-more broadly 
understood as immediacy-that economic behavioralists have struggled to ex­
plain under the heading of intertemporal dynamics.  But even that description 
understates the narrowness of economic behavioralists' theorizing. Immediacy 
is thus another manifestation of the far more general phenomenon that we have 
been describing: the human tendency to see the accessible, vivid, and immedi­
ate, and to miss all else, the situation. 17 I Often, the obvious eclipses the 
influential. 
Consider another dramatic demonstration of the power of "recency" in the 
situational character's perception of its experience. Many individuals have 
experienced the discomfort of routine colonoscopy examinations. Social psy­
chologists Donald Redelmeier and Daniel Kahneman conspired with doctors to 
perform a variation of that routine to help better understand human memory and 
perceptions of pain. During and just after a basic colonoscopy, patients were 
surveyed about the quality of the "unpleasantness.,, 1 72 In the control group, the 
exam was performed in the usual way, under routine conditions in which the 
doctor left the examining instrument, the source of the discomfort, inside of the 
body for only as much time as was needed to safely perform the colonoscopy. 
With a second group of subjects, the same routine examination was performed, 
except that after the examination was otherwise complete, the doctors left the 
spectroscope in the anal sphincter for a short time, without moving it around, 
before finally pulling it out. 1 73 
1 70. BROWN, supra note 167,  at 22. 
1 7 1 .  Cf id. ("[I]t seems reasonable to extend immediacy so as to give it psychological sense such as 
salience in consciousness . . . . "); NISBETT & Ross, supra note 1 29, at 62 ("People give inferential 
weight to information in proportion to its vividness. Vividness is defined as the emotional interest of the 
information, the concreteness and imaginability of information, and the sensory, spatial, and temporal 
proximity of information."). 
172. Donald A. Redelmeier & Daniel Kahneman, Patients ' Memories of Painful Medical Treat­
ments: Real-Time and Retrospective Evaluations of Two Minimally Invasive Procedures, 66 PAIN 3 
( 1 996). Redelemeier and Kahneman's study fits into an extensive body (no pun intended) of social 
psychological study of memory. See, e.g., D. Thomas & E. Diener, Memory Accuracy in the Recall of 
Emotions, 59 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. \091 ( 1 998) (finding that people's memories of 
emotional experiences are often inaccurate). 
173. At some level this study was more invasive than even Stanley Milgrim's, in that the experiment­
ers actually inflicted pain for experimental purposes on the second group of patients. Without elabora­
tion, Redelmeir and Kahneman noted that "[n]o colonoscopy . . .  was performed solely for research 
purposes and all patients gave informed consent." Redelmeier & Kahneman, supra note 1 72, at 4. 
There is no word on the situation within which the consent was given. We have already seen from 
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Both groups of patients rated the different periods of the examination the 
same in terms of the degree of "unpleasantness" they were experiencing when 
asked-both rated the height of the examination, when the spectroscope was 
moving, as the most painful. Both groups also rated moments in which the 
scope was inside the body but not moving as painful, but far less painful than 
the moments when the instrument was moving. Common sense would hold that 
the second group experienced more total pain or displeasure than did the control 
group. 1 74 
But common sense tends to miss the situation: just after the examination was 
completed, when the subjects were asked to evaluate the overall experience on a 
scale of unpleasantness, the second group rated the experience as less unpleas­
ant overall than did the first group. 17S The additional, but more recent lower 
amounts of pain that the experimental group endured apparently overshadowed 
their memory of the intense pain (that, again, they experienced in equal measure 
with the control group) and altered their perception of the whole experience. 1 76 
Studies like this one 1 77 demonstrate the situational power of recency in our 
evaluative process. What is most recent to us is, other things being equal, 
closest to us and most prominent in our minds. While the study seems to 
contradict common sense, it resonates easily with the tenets of social psychol­
ogy. As the authors point out, "[t]he discrepancy between people's real-time and 
retrospective evaluations is not surprising given the limitations of human memory 
and judgment." 178 
Like many such studies, the colonoscopy findings can have both particular 
and parabolic implications. With respect to medical-care concerns, Redelmeier 
and Kahneman explain that their findings do not counsel a clear policy: 
If the objective is to reduce patients' memory of pain[,] . . .  [g]radual relief 
may be preferable to abrupt relief if patients retain a less aversive memory 
[through the delayed relief approach] . . . . In contrast, if the objective is to 
reduce the amount of pain actually experienced, conducting the procedure 
Milgram's work that the question of "informed consent" is perhaps just that, a question, and not one 
that can be answered in the form of a simple waiver like the one indicated here. In a later publication in 
which he discussed this experiment, Kahneman drops a footnote and writes: "The ethical justification 
for the experiment was the observation of poor compliance among patients who have had a painful 
colonoscopy and are instructed to schedule another." See Daniel Kahneman, Experienced Utility and 
Objective Happiness: A Moment-Based Approach, in CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES 673, 676 n.2 (Daniel 
Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000). 
1 74. Redelmeier & Kahneman, supra note 172, at 4-5. 
1 75. [d. at 6. 
1 76. [d. at 6-7. 
1 77. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Evaluation By Moments, in CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES, supra 
note 1 73, at 693, 694-99 & fig.38. 1 (B) (reporting similar patterns in overall evaluations by control 
subjects who hear a sharp unpleasant sound as compared to the evaluations of a group of subjects who 
heard the same sharp unpleasant sound followed by several other somewhat less sharp but still 
unpleasant sounds; the latter group rated the overall experience as less unpleasant than did the first). 
178 .  Redelmeier & Kahneman, supra note 1 72, at 7. 
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swiftly may be appropriate even if doing so increases the peak pain intensity 
and leaves patients with a particularly aversive memory. 1 79 
49 
Their findings nevertheless counsel a clear theoretic prescription to consider 
the profound role that situation plays in how humans perceive their own 
experience, both immediately and retrospectively. Such findings present "com­
plex ethical issue[s],,, 1 80 not only for medicine, but for any enterprise that 
purports to be devoted to human welfare. 1 8 1 The "natural limitations of human 
memory,, 1 82 are likely always in play in our assessments. Thus, as another team 
of social psychologists noted, Redelmeier and Kahneman's "results have both 
humane and Orwellian implications and suggest enormous possibilities for 
decision engineering." I 83 
Encouraging lawmakers and legal theorists to confront those possibilities is, 
of course, a primary goal of this Article. Before evaluating the "Orwellian 
implications" of our predicament, however, legal theorists must first be willing 
to distrust their own perceptions and common sense. 
2. Process Biases 
While the previous section focused on several choice biases, this section 
focuses 'on a pair of process biases that similarly operate out of sight within our 
interiors. The distinction between the two general types of biases is not in their 
situational source but in the scope of their influence over our thinking and 
behavior. Choice biases are treated as having only task-specific implications 
related to instances of judgment or decisionmaking. Process biases, in contrast, 
are more systemic tendencies of human cognition that influence individuals 
across a vast range of cognitive experience. 
So what are "process biases"? Social psychologists have taken to construing 
and portraying �ople as intuitive scientists. 1 84 And for with good reason: All 
people, not just those who occupy academic and scientific institutions, have a 
deep urge to understand and make sense of themselves and their worlds. 1 8s 
Indeed, those institutions reflect a more general human urge and set of pro-
1 79.  /d. 
1 80. Id. 
1 8 1 .  Kahneman has recently delved more deeply into providing a utility analysis model that 
comports with his and others' findings about pain and memory. See Kahneman, supra note 1 73. 
1 82. Redelmeier & Kahneman, supra note 172, at 7. 
1 83. See B.A. Mellers, A. Schwartz & A.DJ. Cooke, Judgment and Decision Making, 49 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 447, 455 ( 1 998). 
1 84. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 1 67, at 133-68; FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL 
RELATIONS ( 1958); KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 1 1-60 (examining how "we test particular hypotheses 
about the world"); Ross & NISBETI, supra note 6, at 2; Harold H. Kelley, Attribution Theory in Social 
Psychology, in 15 NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 1 92 (David Levine ed., 1967). 
185 .  See infra Part m.e.2.a (describing the motive to understand). 
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cesses. 1 86 And for now-familiar reasons, those general processes are often 
biasing for lay and professional scientists alike. This section summarizes three 
systems of information processing and their biasing effects: knowledge struc­
tures, causal attributions, and counterfactual thinking. Because those systems 
are being described in detail in contiguous work, 1 87 we can again spare our 
readers an extended review. 
a. Knowledge Structures 
"Out of time we cut 'days ' and 'nights, ' 'summers ' and 'winters. ' We say 
what each part of the sensible continuum is, and all these abstract whats are 
concepts. 
The intellectual life of man consists almost wholly in his substitution of a 
conceptual order for the perceptual order in which his experience originally 
comes. " 
� William James I 88 
"By such mental operations we simplify the world of phenomena, but we 
cannot avoid falsifying it in doing so . . . . " 
� Sigmund Freudl 89 
Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross define knowledge structures as the "intuitive 
implements" that "allow the individual to define and interpret the data of 
physical and social life., , 1 90 Ziva Kunda has more recently explained, similarly, 
that our knowledge structures or conceptsl91  "help[] us make sense of our social 
worlds and guide our social judgments.,, 1 92 They are "the building blocks of 
cognition,,, 1 93 or the "tools of construal,, 1 94 whose many crucial functions 
"include classification, inferring additional attributes, guiding attention and 
1 86. Cf Harold H. Kelley, The Process of Causal Attribution, 28 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1 07 ( 1 973); 
Leslie Ann McArthur, The How and What of Why: Some Determinants and Consequences of Causal 
Attribution, 22 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 7 1  ( 1 972). 
1 87. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 36; Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger, 
Attributional Positivism, supra note 43 (examining how people make attributions of causation, responsi­
bility, and blame, and describing the relevance of attribution theory for law and legal theory). 
1 88. WILLIAM JAMES, SOME PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY: A BEGINNING OF AN INTRODUCITON TO PHILOSOPHY 
( 1 9 1 1 ), reprinted in WILLIAM JAMES, WRlTlNGS 1 902- 1 9 1 0, at 1 008-09 (Bruce Kucklick ed., 1 987). 
1 89. SIGMUND FREUD, ANALYSIS TERMINABLE AND INTERMINABLE ( 1 937), reprinted in 23 THE COMPLETE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 209, 228 (James Strachey ed., 1 986). 
1 90. NISBETT & Ross, supra note 1 29, at 6-7. 
1 9 1 .  Terminology here is a little up for grabs and somewhat context dependent. What Kunda refers 
to as concepts are sometimes referred to as "mental representations," "schemas," "theories," or 
"categories," among other names. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 36, at 1 1 3 1  
& n. 1 1 1 . 
1 92. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 5 .  
1 93. 1d. at I 6. 
1 94. Ross & NISBETT, supra note 6, at 1 2 .  
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interpretation, communication, and reasoning." 195 
When we encounter objects or experiences or ideas or people or behavior, we 
classify them, as best we can, within our existing concepts, which then allow us 
to obtain understandings that go well beyond those we would obtain were we 
forced to rely solely on a present instance alone. And when we enter any 
exterior situation, the concepts in our interior situation-and the "wealth of 
causal information" they contain l96-give us a filtering system for narrowing 
our focus to the information we will use to make sense of what we encounter. 
By way of analogy, imagine searching for a particular definition in a dictio­
nary with the sole strategy of reading random sections or of reading from 
beginning to end until you encounter the target word. Knowing to pick up a 
dictionary is an important start, but more is needed to make processing the 
information contained in the dictionary feasible. The alphabetical arrangement 
of words in dictionaries is a schema, and one that is a huge time-saving device. 
Similarly, imagine searching web pages for particular information without the 
aid of search engines or links . . .  or even a shared language. 
Those exterior schemas, which we tend to take for granted and rarely, if ever, 
clearly examine, are analogous to (and sometimes reflect and influence) our 
interior schemas, of which we are even less aware and which we are therefore 
less likely to scrutinize. We process stimuli "through preexisting systems of 
schematized and abstracted knowledge-beliefs, theories, propositions, and 
schemas. These knowledge structures label and categorize objects and events 
quickly and, for the most part, accurately. They also define a set of expectations 
about objects and events and suggest appropriate responses to them.,, 197 
Thus, the benefit of such knowledge structures is that they provide us, often 
automatically, with a way of understanding our world so that we can operate 
reasonably well within it, at the same time that they free up cognitive capacity 
to cope with other pressing issues. 1 98 Similarly, the concepts, insofar as they are 
shared, allow us to communicate efficiently with those around US. 1 99 In short, 
without the knowledge structures "[w]e would be unable to extract meaning 
from the huge amount of information that surrounds us, unable to generalize 
from one experience to another, and unable to communicate effectively with 
each other. ,,200 
But those benefits are not without costs: "A price is paid for this mental 
economy.,,20 1 The alphabetical arrangement of a dictionary is little help when 
1 95 .  KUNDA, supra note 6, at 17 .  
1 96. Id. at  52; see also id. at 36-4 1 .  
1 97.  NISBElT & Ross, supra note 129, at 7 .  
198. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 36, at 1 1 39-77. 
1 99. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 20. The field of cognitive linguistics demonstrates a similar role for 
metaphor. See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLmcs: How LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK (2d 
ed. 2002); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By (1 980). 
200. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 17 .  
20 1 .  NISBElT & Ross, supra note 1 29, at 7 .  
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you want to know, precisely, how to spell the word that sounds like "siekol­
lojee." "The knowledge structures themselves are not infallible guides to the 
nature of physical or social reality."zoz 
Some beliefs, theories ,  and schemas are relatively poor and inaccurate repre­
sentations of the external world. Furthermore, objects and events are not always 
labeled accurately and sometimes are processed through entirely inappropriate 
knowledge structures,z03 "Without these structures stored in memory, life would 
be a buzzing confusion, but the clarity they offer is helpful only in proportion to 
their validity and to the accuracy with which they are applied to the data at 
hand."zo4 And when that is not the case, they can be misleading and harmful. 
Indeed, that is the main point that this Article is making about the dominant 
self-schema: dispositionism. We are not who our knowledge structures tell us 
we are. 
i. The Stereotypical Knowledge Structure 
At a time when the world as a whole suffers from panic induced by the rival 
ideologies of the east and west, each comer of the earth has its own special 
burdens of animosity. Moslems distrust non-Moslems. Jews who escaped 
extermination in Central Europe find themselves in the new state of Israel 
surrounded by anti-Semitism. Refugees roam in inhospitable lands. Many of 
the colored people of the world suffer indignities at the hand of whites who 
invent a fanciful racist doctrine to justify their condescension. The checker­
board of prejudice in the United States is perhaps the most intricate of all. 
While some of this endless antagonism seems based upon a realistic conflict of 
interests, most of it, we suspect, is a product of the fears of the imagination. 
-Gordon W. AIlportZ05 
Gordon Allport's now-classic description of group stereotypes was an impor­
tant step toward explaining the cognitive mechanisms behind the senseless 
hatred and prejudice that have reverberated throughout human history. Although 
the consequences of such ethnic- and race-based knowledge structures seem as 
evident today as they were fifty years ago when Allport wrote, parts of his 
message seem to have taken root. 
Indeed, the best known-indeed, for many, the only known-example of the 
operation of interior schemas is the group-based stereotype.Z06 "[S]tereotypes 
202. /d. 
203. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 36, at 1 1 55- 1 2 1 8  (detailing the often 
distorting effects of our categories and schemas). 
204. See N rsBETI & Ross, supra note 1 29, at 7. 
205. GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE, at xiii ( 1 954). 
206. It is to avoid the pejorative associations of "stereotyping" with racism that some social 
psychologists have adopted different names for the broader tendency to categorize people in the same 
way as we categorize all things. See, e.g., Nisbett & Ross, supra note 1 29, at 35 (explaining why they 
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are typically viewed as cognitive structures that contain our knowledge, beliefs, 
and expectations about a social group . . . .  ,,207 They are described as "culturally 
shared, indeed hackneyed, notions,,208 about those groups. Here is where the 
human tendency to rely on knowledge structures has come to be understood as 
an inherently pernicious process, instead of as a necessary and often helpful 
one?09 Stereotypes, in other words, are the stereotype of what we are calling 
"knowledge structures." 
To see more clearly the role of stereotypes and, more generally, schemas, 
consider this classic experiment. White subjects were shown a videotape of a 
purportedly unscripted conversation between two men. At several points during 
the video a beep sounded, prompting the subjects to characterize the conduct of 
the men they were watching into one of several possible categories (for ex­
ample, "dramatizes," "gives information," "asks for opinion," "playing around," 
"aggressive behavior," and "violent behavior").2 10 The videotaped conversation 
becomes increasingly heated and the men begin to say things like "you must be 
crazy," and "you're just too damned conservative." Finally, one man pushes the 
other, at which point subjects were beeped again and asked to characterize the 
push?l I 
Different versions of the video were shown to different subjects, using 
different combinations of black and white men in the conversation. Where a 
black man pushes a white man, seventy-five percent of the subjects character­
ized the push as "violent behavior.,,2 12 Where a white man pushes a black man, 
only seventeen percent of the subjects categorized the push as "violent behav­
ior."2 13  Another forty-two percent of the subjects characterized the white man's 
behavior simply as "dramatiz[ing)" or "playing around.,,2 14 
prefer the "concept of persona" to the concept of stereotype even though the two are "not essentially 
different"). In other words, social psychologists are understandably concerned about the influence of 
schemas on our understanding of schemas. 
207. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 3 1 5. 
208. NISBETI & Ross, supra note 1 29, at 35. 
209. Through our knowledge structures, we automatically process new information into familiar 
groupings, categories or schemas. Stereotypes are just one of the many consequences of that interior 
situational process. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 36, Part II. People form 
stereotypes of social groups at a very young age and have difficulty suppressing their automatic 
schemas when they encounter a member of the stereotyped group, even when they do not desire to see 
that person in a prejudicial way. See Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and 
Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 1 1 6 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1 1 7, 
1 26-27 ( 1 994). Indeed, actively trying to suppress stereotypic responses can increase the frequency of 
such responses. See id. at 127. Those automatic prejudices and stereotypes, therefore, constitute a form 
of "mental contamination" that affects how people come to understand and view certain social groups. 
Id. 
2 1 0. Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: Testing 
the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 590, 593-94 ( 1 976). 
2 1 1 .  Id. at 593. 
2 1 2. Id. at 595. 
2 1 3. Id. 
2 14. /d. 
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The same subjects were also asked to indicate the extent to which the action 
of the pusher should be attributable to situational forces, to the pusher person­
ally, to the issue discussed in the conversation between the two men, or to some 
combination of those factors. Subjects tended to attribute the black pusher's 
behavior to his disposition, and the white pusher's conduct to his situation, 
revealing how motivation can sometimes overcome our dispositionist pre sump­
tion.215 
The dynamics of our stereotypical thinking are driven by the interaction of 
our interior and exterior situation. Stereotypes that are prominent in our culture 
meet with a cognitive situation within us that is poised to confirm them. We 
tend to test a hypothesis by asking questions about whether there is evidence to 
confirm it and forgetting to ask whether there is evidence that would disconfirm 
it. That unbalanced positive-test strategy and the resultant confirmatory bias2 16 
occurs, not only for hypotheses that we generate ourselves, but also for any 
hypotheses or schemas that occupy our interiors. Thus our minds automatically 
search for, and disproportionately emphasize, evidence in the world that will 
tend to confirm our racial or sexual stereotypes (be they negative or positive, 
conscious or implicit). 2 1 7  
The tendency i s  heightened by the fact that as a consequence of this bias in 
our mental processing, social psychologists have suggested that encouraging 
reflection about stereotypes, without more, may perversely result in the search 
and location of further confirmatory evidence for the stereotype under re­
view? 1 8 More attention, in other words, may not counteract the confirmation 
bias; it may simply give it more to work with.2 19  That pattern, troublingly, 
suggests other opportunities for the situational manipulation of our mental 
process. For instance, those who can influence what theories are readily avail­
able in our cultural situation can influence what theories we tend to test and 
seek to confirm.220 
ii. Cognitive Groupism 
These findings about the operation of stereotyping have been replicated for 
other group schemas, including those for gender, age, professions, and social 
2 1 5. See id. at 596; see also infra Part III.C.2 (summarizing interior situational motivations and their 
influence). See generally Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra note 43 (summa­
rizing numerous situational sources of situationism); Benforado & Hanson, NaIve Cynicism, supra note 
78 (same). 
2 1 6. See KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 1 1-15 ,  123-30. 
2 1 7. See id. 
2 1 8. See id. 
2 1 9. See id. This is an example of why it is not enough to reduce our calculus of mental processes 
simply to the amount of energy or time that is allocated to an inferential task. There is not a singular 
correspondence between the amount of energy given to a question and the accuracy or reliability of our 
answer. 
220. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 202-3 1 (describing the problem of deep 
capture). 
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class.z2 1 In one experiment, a group of subjects viewed one of two videotapes of 
a fourth-grade girl and then were asked to evaluate her academic ability. One 
videotape showed the girl in an urban, low-income setting, and the other 
showed her in a middle-class, suburban area. Next, a portion of the subjects 
seeing one of those videos was shown another-this time of the girl responding 
to achievement-test problems. The girl's performance on those problems was 
intentionally ambiguous. 
Subjects who saw that last video, but neither of the first two, tended to rate 
the child's academic ability roughly on a par with her known school grade 
levee22 However, those subjects who had viewed the child in either the low or 
high socioeconomic setting rated her abilities as appearing to be either below or 
well above her grade level, respectively.z23 Thus, as Ziva Kunda summarizes, 
"[i]t appears that when behaviors are somewhat ambiguous, the identical behav­
ior will be understood quite differently when performed by individuals who 
belong to differently stereotyped groupS.,,224 So it is that our knowledge struc­
tures "color our reality.,.z25 As we will review below, they also can change our 
reality by coloring the experience and altering the performance of those being 
stereotyped, and by reassuring us that inequalities and outcomes that might 
otherwise appear illegitimate are, in fact, just. 226 
The operation of group schemas need not be related to cultural stereotypes. 
Indeed, "any given 'us' category is liked better than any given 'them' category, 
under most circumstances.,,227 Muzafer Sherif, in a classic set of experiments in 
the 1 950s and 1 960s, discovered some of the ways that group schemas are 
generally created, as well as some of their basic effects.228 Sherif and his 
collaborators ran a summer camp229 in which boys, at the beginning of the 
summer, were divided into two groups: the Rattlers and the Eagles. Throughout 
the summer, the boys were subtly asked to rank friendships and to make other 
"sociometric" designations about each other. 230 
In the first stage of the experiment, the groups were kept apart and behaved as 
221 .  See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 1 24; KUNDA, supra note 6, at 347. 
222. John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling Effects, 44 J. 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 20, 25 ( 1983). 
223. Id. at 24-25. 
224. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 347. 
225. Id. at 19.  
226. See infra text accompanying notes 253-65 (summarizing evidence of stereotype threat and 
disidentification). 
227. FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 1 33. 
228. See Ross & NISBEIT, supra note 6, at 39. 
229. Yes, they actually ran a summer camp, and did so for several years, to conduct their 
experiments-these were the Milgram days of social psychology, before human subjects committees 
regulated social psychological studies. See MUZAFER SHERIF ET AL., INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND COOPERA­
TION: THE ROBBERS CAVE EXPERIMENT 27-68 ( 1 96 1 ). Today the federal government has promulgated 
extensive regulations governing the use of human subjects in psychology experiments. See generally 
Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.P.R. pt. 46 (2003). 
230. See BROWN, supra note 167, at 6 1 1  (revisiting Sherif's study). 
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typical campers might behave, with only weak out-group aversion or in-group 
solidarity?3 1 In the second stage, the groups were pitted against each other in 
various competitions for prizes.232 In that situation, each group posed a realistic 
threat to the other's advantage,233 and members of each group wanted nothing 
to do with members of the other group. More specifically, both out-group 
animosity and in-group solidarity increased dramatically as the competitions 
continued, and the resultant stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination that 
followed were robust:234 
[M]ere informational campaigns, even those couched in appeals in moral 
values, were universally unsuccessful in reducing enmity. Sunday religious 
services that interrupted the period of competition with especially pointed 
appeals for brotherly love, forgiveness of enemies, and cooperation had no 
impact. The campers solemnly departed from the services and then, within 
minutes, returned to their preoccupation with defeating or harassing the 
detested out_group.235 
Put differently, appeals to dispositional change came up empty. Similarly, 
placing the groups in various noncompetitive settings together-taking meals, 
filling out surveys, shooting off fireworks, and so on236 --did little to ameliorate 
the two groups' out-group animosity, as subsequent food fights demonstrated?37 
Only after the experimenters placed the campers in numerous situations of 
mutual dependence and cooperation did the groups begin to alter their "us 
versus them" schema. For example, a bus transporting both groups to dinner 
«broke down," forcing the hungry campers to cooperate. With a rope that had 
once been used in the tug-of-war competition, the groups worked to jointly push 
and pull the bus to restart it.238 Operating under such cooperative ("common 
enemy") conditions over time, the campers �hanged their group-based views of 
one another and intergroup friendships em�rged "between erstwhile rivals and 
even former enemies.,,239 
By the end of the summer, "the twenty boys themselves proposed that they 
return to Oklahoma City in a single bus, and the self-chosen seating did not 
reflect the Eagles['] and the Rattlers[ ' ]" group identities.z40 By that time the old 
stereotypes between the two groups had dissipated significantly, as measured by 
23 1 .  See SHERIF ET AL., supra note 229, at 74-83. 
232. See id. at 96-1 13.  
233. Sherif's famous experiments became a favorite example in an early, significant theory of 
stereotyping known as realistic group conflict theory. See SUSAN T. FISKE, SOCIAL BEINGS: A CORE 
MOTIVES ApPROACH TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 436 (2004). 
234. See id. at 1 1 7-49. 
235. Ross & NISBETT, supra note 6, at 40. 
236. SHERIF ET AL., supra note 229, at 1 5 1-58. 
237. [d. at 158. 
238. [d. at 1 70-7 1 .  
239. Ross & NISBETT, supra note 6 ,  at 39. 
240. BROWN, supra note 167, at 6 1 1 ;  see also SHERIF ET AL., supra note 229, at 1 82. 
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Sherif's surveys: 
Rattlers now thought that almost all Eagles had become like the Rattlers 
themselves: brave, tough, and friendly. The Eagles said as much for the 
Rattlers. There were no more sneaky, smart-aleck stinkers . . . .  [T]he boys as 
observers of one another saw personality change as the cause of the new 
order, but Sherif, of course, knew better. He knew that the boys had changed 
their thoughts and feelings because of a succession of situations designed to 
require cooperative effort.24 1 
57 
What caused the Rattlers to be "sneaky, smart-aleck stinkers" was not 
disposition, as prevalent schemas and attributions would have it, but forces 
hidden in the situation. Sherif, by manipulating the situation, was the real 
"sneaky . . .  stinker." 
Much has been learned since Sherif's important work to confirm, refine, and 
expand upon what the campers taught about the operation of group schemas.242 
For example, more recent studies have shown that the actual threat that one 
group poses to another is unimportant. It is the perception of threat that 
generates the intergroup hostility?43 Even merely random group designations, 
without any intergroup competition or other distinguishing features, can elicit 
in-group and out-group sentiments. "In other words, even the most arbitrary and 
seemingly inconsequential group classifications can provide a basis for discrimi­
natory behavior.,,244 
We will not review any more of the studies here?45 They prove a point that 
all of us, upon reflection, should already see as central and deep-seated in the 
human experience. The influences-good, bad, and otherwise--of the "us and 
them" schema, or what we will call groupism, are all around us. One needn't 
look beyond the loyalty of sports fans to their favorite teams and their derision 
of rival teams to find these influences in many people's daily lives. A favorite 
player-a Roger Clemens-becomes a hated turncoat (itself a telling expres­
sion) by changing his uniform and moving 250 miles southward. A ridiculed 
rival, for those on the other side of the move, becomes a local hero by so 
changing his uniform and address. Similarly, a World Series sweep (Red Sox 
over Cardinals) is less meaningful and rewarding than the preceding conference 
241 .  BROWN, supra note 1 67, at 6 1 3. 
242. For reviews of the more recent work, see id. at 543--6 1 ;  FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 
133-34. 
243. Thus, Susan Fiske has proposed renaming realistic group conflict theory as perceived group 
conflict theory. FISKE, supra note 233, at 437. 
244. See, e.g., Ross & NISBETT, supra note 6, at 40; see also BROWN, supra note 1 67, at 543-5 1 
(reviewing some of the studies); FISKE, supra note 233, at 437 (same). For an interesting recent study of 
how Jewish and Arab subjects reacted to the acts of Jewish and Arab groups, see Raanan Lipshitz, Ziv 
Gilad & Ramzi Suleiman, The One-oj-Us Effect in Decision Evaluation, 1 08 ACTA PSYCHOLlGlCA 53 
(2001 ). 
245. See infra Part III.C.2.b.ii-iii (discussing further various group-serving motivations and biases). 
58 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 93: 1  
series comeback victory over a long-term and ml,lch-despised rival (Red Sox 
over Yankees). 
The "us and them" process, and, just as revealingly, its situational malleabil­
ity, characterizes all levels of competitive activity. The phenomenon is not 
limited in the least to campers and athletes. Cross-town high-school rivals 
graduate and end up cheering for the same college mascot. College rivals move 
on to become close business associates, and business competitors merge to 
become a bigger "us" to out-compete a newly defined "them." And the dynam­
ics and their effects can be far more serious. As we write this, Boston is 
experiencing a re-ignition of neighborhood gang battles. Although the dynamics 
of the situation are complex, the group affiliations are strikingly schematic: "us" 
and "them" is defined largely by the happenstance of residence?46 The schema 
is evident, too, in the way some groups refer to America as "Satan" and the way 
that many Americans refer to those groups as "evil." Those labels dispositional­
ize the enemies, contributing to and justifying the anger and desire for retribu­
tion that both seem to feel. More generally still, the in-group and out-group 
situation is felt in ethnic and national wars throughout the world and throughout 
history.247 Every reliance on this cursory us-them cognitive structure operates to 
excuse ourselves from the burden of exploring the much more complex, though 
more significant, situational influences behind the circumstances we despise. 
Put differently, groupism provides a motive for dispositionism, and disposition­
ism encourages groupism. 
Finally, the group dynamic can be seen in the legal-theoretic debate we are 
joining here. For example, groupism very clearly seems to be behind Milton 
Friedman's claim, reviewed below, that people who question markets are all in 
the same out-group of anti-freedom stinkers as "a Galbraith . . .  , a Nader . . .  , a 
Marx or an Engels or a Lenin,,,248 and behind Richard Posner's claim that the 
"sociology of law is . . .  entirely dominated by scholars of left-liberal bent" 
whose politics are "[s]o uniform . . .  that they may unconsciously regard 
liberalism (in its modem, 'welfare state' sense) as part of the definition of their 
field.,,249 And it similarly lies behind the stereotype of legal economists as 
right-wing conservatives.25o And then, of course, there is the "mushy middle.,,25 1 
246. See generally Fox Butterfield, Killing of Girl, 1 0, and Increase in Homicides Challenge 
Boston s Crime-Fighting Model, N.Y. TIMES, July 1 4, 2002, at A 14. 
247. See generally SAM KEEN, FACES OF THE ENEMY: REFLECfIONS OF THE HOSTILE IMAGINATION ( 1 986) 
(collecting hundreds of political cartoons, posters, and artwork showing how enemies have been 
depicted in twentieth century war propaganda). 
248. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, BRIGHT PROMISES, DISMAL PERFORMANCE: AN ECONOMIST'S PROTEST 89 
(William R. Allen ed., 1972). 
249. Richard A. Posner, The Sociology of the Sociology of Law: A View from Economics, 2 EuR. J.L. 
& ECON. 265, 274 ( 1 995) (emphasis added). 
250. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., An Appeal for the "Liberal " Use of Law and Economics: The 
Liberals Fight Back, 67 TEX. L. REV. 659, 661 ( 1 989) (reviewing ALAN S.  BLINDER, HARD HEADS, SOFT 
HEARTS: TOUGH-MINDED ECONOMICS FOR A JUST SOCIETY ( 1 987»; Posner, supra note 2499, at 274. 
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(iii) Stereotype Threat and Some Exterior Situational Consequences of 
Knowledge Structures 
59 
Our attention, thus far, has been on how knowledge structures make up part 
of our interior situations without our knowing it. Yet its influence on our lives is 
powerful. Consider the issue of standardized testing-a subject that provides a 
vantage from which to view several of the topics that we have already touched 
on in this section: stereotypes, groupism, and interpretation of academic perfor­
mance. 
For several decades, scholars, educators, policymakers, and commentators 
have debated the significance, meaning, and possible biases of the standardized 
tests that our society routinely and increasingly relies upon to help determine 
educational and career opportunities. As a sorting device, the implications of 
these exams are undeniably immense-and their use only seems to be increas­
ing as politicians push for inexpensive ways to compare educational curricula 
and pedagogical techniques. 
One attraction of such tests is that, as their name underscores, they are 
standardized-and thus appear to be objective and fair. Everyone has to take the 
same test, which is graded anonymously by computer. That seems pretty fair. 
Such a view appears to underlie a general public acceptance of the exams as the 
primary, sometimes the sole, means of measuring intelligence or aptitude?52 
The exams and their widespread use provides some evidence of our disposition­
ism-for the exams are implicitly premised on the notion that we each are born 
with or acquire through our academic choices and efforts a stable dispositional 
quality called "intelligence" which, like the wattage of a light bulb or the 
horsepower of an engine, is measurable through simple tests yielding hard 
numbers. 
Some controversy has emerged over the tests, however, in response to the 
fact that the results have tended to vary significantly across different social 
groups. Numerous explanations have been offered. The easiest conclusion-and 
the one that many conservative groups tend to reach-is that the variation is 
attributable to dispositional or essentialist influences, including both genetics 
and acculturated dispositions.253 But critics of the exams (or of the weight given 
to the exams) have attributed the variations to harder-to-see exterior situational 
factors, including social, economic, and environmental conditions and opportuni-
25 1 .  For a more complete discussion of the influence of groupism in academia and across groups 
that identify with certain ideas or worldviews, see generally Benforado & Hanson, Naive Cynicism, 
supra note 78. 
252. For the best history of intelligence testing and its cultural, scientific, and political context, see 
STEPHEN lAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN ( 1 98 1 ). 
253. See, e.g., RICHARD 1. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND 
CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE ( 1 994). 
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ties?54 Yet even those variables cannot fully explain the disparate perfonnance 
of different groups. As Claude Steele recently summarized, "virtually all aspects 
of underperfonnance-Iower standardized-test scores, lower college grades, 
lower graduation rates-persist among students from the African-American 
middle class. This situation forces on us an uncomfortable recognition: that 
beyond class, something racial is depressing the academic perfonnance of these 
students.,,255 
Professor Steele and numerous other social psychologists have thus begun 
looking where we dispositionists have been least apt to look (indeed, have not, 
because of our knowledge structures, thought to look): to the interactive and 
reinforcing roles of interior and exterior situations. According to Steele's basic 
thesis, when a person belonging to a stereotyped group suspects that her 
perfonnance at some task could confinn a negative stereotype about that social 
group, that person experiences stereotype threat?56 Such a threat is posed to 
anyone whose identity is connected to one or another social category or group 
(whether that group be defined by age, race, ethnicity, profession, ideological or 
political affiliations, religion, sexual preference, looks, gender, income bracket 
or whatever). 
Put differently, no one-not even groups or individuals that we tend to think 
of as powerful-is immune to the risk of being negatively stereotyped or to the 
behavioral consequences that such a threat poses. For example, Catholic priests, 
under the threat of a newly salient stereotype, have gone to some lengths to 
avoid providing any indication that they are pedophiles. Republicans, in the 
wake of Senator Trent Lott's remarks valorizing the segregationist efforts of the 
late Senator Strom Thunnond, went out of their way to avoid being seen as 
racist or as supportive of racism?57 And legal scholars, under the threat of being 
254. Another criticism, of course, is that the exams measure intelligence and aptitude along, at best, 
an extremely narrow dimension-as a free-throw competition would measure aptitude for basketball. 
See Steele, supra note 1 00, at 54. 
255. Steele, supra note 1 00, at 46. 
256. See id. at 47. 
257. See Adam Clymer, Bush Rebukes Lott Over Remarks on Thurmond: G.O.P. s 40 Years of 
Juggling on Race, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2002, at A I ;  Adam Nagourney & Carl Hulse, Bush Rebukes 
Lott Over Remarks on Thurmond: Sharp Shift in Strategy by the White House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1 3, 
2002, at A I .  
The strong negative reaction to Trent Lott's barely ambiguous and deeply troubling endorsement of 
Senator Strom Thurmond's (pro-segregationist) presidential platform is pretty unusual and, we suspect, 
the consequence of numerous factors, including the fact that this was by no means the first time that 
Lott made such comments. See A Closer Look: A Primer of Senator Lott s Quotations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
1 3, 2002, at A22. More typically, in our view, calling someone a "racist" or alleging that they support 
"racist" policies is viewed as more damaging and inappropriate than doing or saying something that is 
ambiguously racist. Though we will not defend this claim here, we believe that a major force behind the 
"politically incorrect" movement and the recent widespread use of what we call the "race card-card" is 
an attempt by individuals and groups attempting to weaken the felt threat of being stereotyped as racist. 
Cf James Boyle, The PC Harangue, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1457 ( 1 993) (reviewing DEBATING P.c.: THE 
CONTROVERSY OVER POLITICAL CORRECfNESS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES (Paul Berman ed., 1992)). They have 
done so by, for instance, reinforcing definitions of racism that ensure that only the most egregious, 
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viewed as  "advocates" or polemicists, rather than as  "neutral, objective social 
scientists," often avoid evocative issues or conclusions and seem often to steer 
for a compromise or a moderate position, even as their logic would seem to 
push them toward a more extreme position. 
Now suppose that the stereotype involves not pedophilia, racism, or polemi­
cism, but intelligence. Few of us want to be perceived as unintelligent. And 
many of us know the frustration of being in a situation in which we want 
desperately not to "look dumb" and of feeling the resultant anxiety that itself 
seems to tum us into babbling fools. Interviewing for that "perfect job," or 
making conversation with a celebrity are two scenarios where desire to do well 
can be counterproductive. Similarly, calling someone to whom we feel attracted 
to ask out on a first date is, stereotypically, an immense hurdle-we feel 
intensely the threat that by our behavior we may confirm what we fear the 
recipient suspected all along: that we belong to that class of those with whom 
no one in their right mind would want a date. 
Social psychologists have shown that when people care about appearing 
intelligent and are at risk of being stereotyped as unintelligent, they tend to react 
in very much that way.258 A significant and still growing body of evidence 
reveals that stereotype threat heightens a person's performance anxiety and, 
when the task or test is sufficiently challenging, the presence of stereotype 
threat causes the person to perform less well-thereby confirming the stereo­
type. 
In one of the seminal experiments revealing that tendency, black and white 
Stanford students took a challenging, thirty-minute verbal exam that should 
have been equally difficult for each group, based on their common experiences 
and knowledge bases.259 However, the groups' performance turned significantly 
upon how the test was framed. When the test was presented to the subjects as a 
test of ability, white students performed far better than black students. Yet when 
the test was presented as a means of understanding how people solve certain 
sorts of problems, and subjects were told that the test was not a measure of a 
person's intellectual ability, the two groups performed almost identically?60 
This study and many like it reveal how stereotypes-a feature of our interior 
intentional, and hate-inspired acts count and by making the mere mention of "race" as a causal factor in 
social outcomes a violation of appropriate norms of discourse (except, perhaps, when "reverse racism" 
is said to be involved). 
258. That is, as unintelligent. The more we care about it the greater the threat. See Claude M. Steele 
& Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Test Perfonnance of Academically Successful African 
Americans, in BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 401 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1 998); 
cf KUNDA, supra note 6, at 470-7 1 (explaining how individuals with greater numbers of identifying 
characteristics-that is, great "self-complexity"-are less threatened by failures in one area of the self, 
because the fai lure tends to be confined to that one area, while the other areas of the self, like eggs in 
other baskets, remain intact). 
259. Steele & Aronson, supra note 258, at 402. 
260. More specifically, the black students performance improved significantly (reflecting stereotype 
threat) and the white students' performance actually worsened (reflecting the absence of their previ­
ously enjoyed stereotype lift), such that both groups performed at the same level. See id. at 4 1 0  fig. I 1 -2. 
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situations--exist "in the atmosphere" and thus influence us as part of the unseen 
exterior situation. Unlike the nervous and tongue-tied date-seeker, struggling to 
find the right words and to adopt the proper demeanor, neither the anxiety 
created by stereotype threat nor its source is likely to register consciously on the 
part of the test taker. But stereotype threat does indeed create the performance­
harming anxiety.26 1 
Black students taking the test under stereotype threat seemed to be trying too 
hard rather than not hard enough. They reread the questions, reread the 
multiple choices, rechecked their answers, more than when they were not 
under stereotype threat. The threat made them inefficient on a test that, like 
most standardized tests is set up so that thinking long often means thinking 
wrong, especially on difficult items . . . .  262 
Researchers have also discovered that black students engaging in a challenging 
task have significantly higher blood pressure when under stereotype threat than 
when not under stereotype threat (and have higher blood pressure under both 
conditions than do white students).263 
It is important to recognize that this phenomenon is not occurring because of 
a person's overall level of self-esteem or some other stable dispositional quality. 
When mathematically inclined white male students, a group thought to enjoy 
high levels of self-esteem, were given a challenging math test, they performed 
significantly less well on it when they were told that Asians generally scored 
better than whites on the exam, than they did when not met with such a 
stereotype threat.264 The phenomenon occurs, not because of the dispositional 
qualities of the test-takers, but rather because of exterior situational influences­
that is, the threat of being stereotyped. 
So it is that we can perceive (and to some extent measure) dispositional 
features that may themselves both reflect and obscure the already hard-to-see 
situational features that permeate and largely define our existence. And so it is 
261 .  See, e.g., id. at 415 & fig. 1 l -3 (reporting that black subjects about to take the test in the "ability 
frame" condition were more likely to fill out blanks in word fragments to create race-related words and 
to eschew preferences for sports and music associated with African-Americans than were black subjects 
in the "unrelated to ability" frame condition). 
262. Steele, supra note 1 00, at 5 1 .  
263. See J. Blascovich et aI., Racism and Racial Categorization, 72 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 
1 364 (2003);  see also Jim Blascovich & Wendy Berry Mendes, Challenge and Threat Appraisals: The 
Role of Affective Cues, in FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECf IN SOCIAL COGNITION 59, 67 
(Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000) (summarizing studies on physiological responses to threats) ;  Joe Tomaka et 
aI., Cognitive and Physiological Antecedents of Threat and Challenge Appraisal, 73 PERSONALITY & 
Soc. PSYCHOL. 63 ( 1 997). 
264. See David M. Marx et aI., Allport 's Legacy and the Situational Press of Stereotypes, 55 J. Soc. 
ISSUES 491 , 496 ( 1 999) (citing Joshua Aronson et aI., When White Men Can 't Do Math: Necessary and 
Sufficient Factors in Stereotype Threat, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCH. 29 ( \ 999)). 
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that stereotypes are, in that way among others, often self-fulfilling.265 
b. Attributional Processes 
i. Causation, Responsibility, and Blame 
There is a second "fundamental process underlying much of social perception 
and action" that has long been understood by social psychologists, but not by 
the rest of us: namely, the process of making causal attributions?66 People are 
eager to understand the causes of salient outcomes and actions in their environs 
and have fairly deeply ingrained schemas (using the term broadly267) for 
identifying those causes. Fritz Heider introduced the concept of attributions in 
the middle of the last century, and since then probably no feature of cognitive 
process has received more attention from social and cognitive psychologists?68 
In the late 1960s, Harold Kelley hypothesized that lay scientists rely on the 
same inferential mechanisms as professional scientists do for understanding 
causation?69 Kelley's theory was both normative, regarding how people should 
make causal attributions, and descriptive, regarding how people actually do 
make causal attributions?70 Particularly early on, the evidence seemed to 
confirm the theory as a descriptive matter?7 1 From those ambitious and promis­
ing origins, several important literatures have since developed?72 
First, social psychologists went on to discover a number of systematic biases 
in people's attributional processes-including the actor-observer bias,273 the 
false consensus effect,274 the self-centered bias,275 attributional schemas,276 
265. See generally FISKE, supra note 233, at 42 1-22 (briefly reviewing studies on "self-fulfilling 
prophecies," "expectancy confirmation," and "behavioral confirmation"). 
266. See NISBETT & Ross, supra note 129, at 5. For a much more extensive discussion of the 
relevance of attributional process to law and legal theory, see Hanson, Reyes, & Schlanger, Attribu­
tional Positivism, supra note 43. 
267. Social psychologists sometimes indicate that knowledge structures and schematic processes are 
inconsistent with attributional processes. But that point is typically directed at the statistically based 
normative version of attribution theory proposed by its early proponents. See, e.g. , Edward E. Jones & 
Keith E. Davis, From Acts to Dispositions: The Attribution Process in Person Perception, in 2 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2 1 9  (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1 965); Kelley, supra note 
1 86. It does not apply to much of the more recent attributional work; indeed, it only stretches the 
concept of "knowledge structures" a little to claim, as we do, that common attributional processes 
reflect a widely held knowledge structure. The discussion below will help make that clear. 
268. See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 57; Eliot R. Smith, Social Cognition Contributions to 
Attribution Theory and Research, in SOCIAL COGNITION: IMPACT ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 77, 77-80 
(Patricia G. Devine et al. eds., 1994). 
269. See generally FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 23-95 (summarizing the origins and evolu-
tions of attribution theory); Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra note 43 (same). 
270. See PLOUS, supra note 1 24, at 1 74. 
27 1 .  See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 23-95. 
272. See sources cited in supra note 269. 
273. See supra note 1 88. 
274. See infra notes 536-39. 
275. See Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra note 43. 
276. See id. ; see also FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 60 (noting the role of knowledge structures 
in people's causal inferences). 
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and, most important, the fundamental attribution error?77 There is little need, in 
light of our discussion above (and below), to further describe those sorts of 
biases or their sources. They are all manifestations of the more general phenom­
ena that we are highlighting in this Article: our perceptions and construals are 
skewed by what we tend to see, which tends to be only a small piece of the 
whole picture. For example, instead of relying on covariation principles of the 
sort that Kelley imagined, people too readily rely more on temporal and spatial 
contiguity and salience in making causal attributions.278 
For those sorts of reasons, Kelley's preliminary hypothesis is now understood 
to have significant shortcomings, at least as a descriptive model. This leads to 
the second significant development in attribution theory. Numerous scholars 
have worked to develop more successful descriptive models of people's attribu­
tional processes?79 For example, Bernard Weiner, with some of his colleagues, 
has shown that people tend to focus on three (or four) causal dimensions: locus, 
stability, control, (and, in some models, intent)?80 In his early work, which 
focused on how people made attributions in terms of these categories with 
respect to achievement efforts, he focused on three dimensions: whether the 
cause was stable or temporary, whether the locus of the cause was internal or 
external to the individual, and whether the person had control over the cause?8 1 
A little introspection-or a careful read through the newspaper headlines­
should confirm that we humans are indeed focused on those dimensions when 
examining causation for all sorts of surprising outcomes that we encounter. 
Furthermore, as this line of research shows, our reactions (affective and behav­
ioral) vary significantly depending on how we perceive a cause along those 
dimensions. Thus, the destruction caused by a forest fire seems different to us 
when it was caused by a person, rather than a bolt of lightening (locus). 
Likewise, it matters if the person had control over the outcome (controllability), 
whether the person has created several such fires in the past (stability), and 
whether the person was a careless camper or a profiteering arsonist (intent). 
Weiner's basic attributional model has enjoyed considerable empirical support 
and has been expanded to apply in numerous settings.282 
And that leads to the third major development in attribution theory since 
Kelley's initial effort. Social psychologists, including Weiner, have constructed 
more refined theories to capture not just how people make causal attributions, 
but also how they assign responsibility and blame based on those causal 
277. See supra text accompanying notes 8 1-1 06. For useful summaries of those and other attribu­
tional biases, see BROWN, supra note 167, at 1 69-94; Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional 
Positivism, supra note 43. 
278. See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 58-59. 
279. See id. at 57-66 (reviewing some examples). 
280. See, e.g., Bernard Weiner, Attribution, Emotion, and Action, in HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND 
COGNITION 28 1 (Richard M. Sorrentino & E. Tory Higgis eds., 1986). 
28 1 .  See Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra note 43; see also FISKE & 
TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 52-53 (summarizing Weiner's work). 
282. See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 53-54. 
2004] THE SITUATIONAL CHARACTER 65 
attributions. Kelly Shaver has argued that people tend to assign responsibility 
for harmful outcomes when, roughly, the harm was foreseeable and when the 
person acted volitionally and without justification.283 And people assign blame, 
a more punitive designation, when the harmful outcome was intended?84 In 
Shaver's words, "An assignment of blame is . . .  a particular sort of social 
explanation. It is the outcome of a process that begins with an event having 
negative consequences, involves judgments about causality, personal responsibil­
ity, and possible mitigation.,,285 Again, there is considerable evidence to support 
those attributional theories?86 
ii. Lay Judges 
That leads to the most recent development in attribution theory. There is 
significant evidence that many of our legal institutions reflect people's attribu­
tional impulses (and not, for example, a means of promoting efficiency or 
wealth maximization). Put most simply, just as people want to identify causa­
tion, they likewise want to, when attributionally appropriate, assign responsibil­
ity and blame. Moving from causal attributions to attributions of responsibility 
or blame, the lay scientist turns in her lab coat for a judicial robe. As Bernard 
Weiner explains: 
In [such] situations, an appropriate metaphor to capture the reactions of the 
involved observer is that he or she is a judge presiding in a courtroom. The 
judge determines whether others are innocent or guilty and then passes 
sentences based on these beliefs and experienced emotions. Indeed, life may 
be considered a courtroom where dramas related to transgression are played 
out. The observer is a scientist in determining causal judgments, but then acts 
in a Godlike manner by reaching moral conclusions regarding right and 
wrong, good and evil. 287 
We would go further. Just as the habits of the professional scientist reflect 
the same urges and biases as the habits of the lay scientist,288 so do the 
judgments and sentences of the courtroom judge reflect those of the lay judge. 
And our legal system appears to reflect and, to a significant degree, satisfy our 
impulses to establish causation, assign responsibility, and lay blame.289 
283. See KELLY SHAVER, THE ATfRlBUTION OF BLAME: CAUSALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND BLAMEWORTIll-
NESS passim ( 1985). 
284. [d. 
285. [d. at 4. 
286. See id. 
287. Weiner, supra note 280, at 336-38; see also SABINI, supra note 8 1 ,  at 1 74 (discussing "man the 
lawyer"). 
288. See supra text accompanying notes 265-74. 
289. See Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra note 43. For a superbly 
executed analysis of the attributional tendencies of jurors in tort cases, see Neal Feigenson's important 
book, LEGAL BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS (2000). 
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iii. The Situation of Attributions 
Although attributional processes are situational, when pointed out they are 
easier for people to see (or accept) than many of the other interior situational 
processes. For example, we are not surprised to learn that "control" and 
"foreseeability" tend to influence our attributions of causation, responsibility, 
and blame. In some ways, such insights are commonsensical.290 
But, if they are not pointed out to us, our attributional processes begin and 
remain largely automatic and unconscious29 1 ;  they are experienced, if at all, as 
obvious and natural. In that way, our attributions manifest themselves more as 
conclusions than as a process or analysis that yields a conclusion. Like thinking, 
preferring and choosing, our attributional ascriptions appear to us as self­
evident and, in a sense, dispositional. We miss much of the situation out of 
which they emerge?92 Social psychologist Roger Brown attempted to capture 
something of the situational flavor of causal attributions this way: 
It appears to be the case that the rules of the causal [attributional] calculus are 
known and regularly used by all adults and also by very young children, by 
you and me . . . .  That is to say that you already know the causal calculus, but 
you know it tacitly or implicitly rather than explicitly. You know how to use it 
but not yet how to conceptualize it, think about it, and talk about it. 293 
A major contribution of attribution theorists has been to make explicit what 
Brown describes as tacit and what we call situational?94 That we can see our 
attributional conclusions does not mean that understanding their sources is easy, 
any more than seeing the effects of gravity implies that understanding precisely 
how it works or interacts with other forces is easy?95 As Brown writes: 
"Creating explicit knowledge where there was only tacit knowledge is far from 
290. See G. WEARY ET AL., ATTRIBUTION 6 ( 1989). 
29 1 .  See generally Peter A. White, Causal Processing: Origins and Development, 104 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 36 (1988) (reviewing research on the origins of causal processing and describing the function as 
"probably automatic"). 
292. There may be another reason why "seeing" our attributional process seems fairly easy. We tend 
to accept theories about ourselves that resonate with our institutions and values-as attribution theory 
tends to (not merely as a matter of coincidence). Many aspects of our interior and exterior situations do 
not share that advantage, and we are, in some sense, motivated to remain blind to them. See, e.g., supra 
text accompanying notes 227-35 (implicit attitudes) & 258-60 (system justification). 
293. BROWN, supra note 167, at 1 36; see also id. ("Explicit knowledge exists when someone can 
formulate a rule as well as act in accordance with it. Explicit knowledge brings new powers-the power 
to think and talk about rules. In the domain of language it is the difference between an untutored fluent 
native speaker (tacit knowledge only) and a linguist, a student of the structure of language; in 
attribution it is the difference between any layman and social psychologist who studies every day 
attribution."). 
294. Cf BERNARD WEINER, AN ATTRIBUTIONAL THEORY OF MOTIVATION AND EMOTION, at xi ( 1 986) ("I 
now identify myself simply as someone who arranges, classifies, and systematizes common sense. In 
doing so, I attempt to develop as broad and as parsimonious a conceptual system as possible to explain 
everyday social conduct."). 
295. See infra Part VI.B. 
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an effortless process. There is something pleasurable in it but also something 
difficult."296 But social psychologists help us see, not just the process, but also 
the biasing influence of that process-including, for instance, the fact that our 
attributions are often altered by the severity of the harm.297 
Like all interior situational influences, our attributions can be, and commonly 
are, influenced by exterior situation. Whether we perceive a person to be in 
"control" or to have acted "intentionally" are matters that can be framed and 
promoted.298 Is sexual preference within the control of gays and lesbians? Do 
guns kill people or do people kill people? What did the hierarchical authorities 
within the Catholic Church know about the pedophilic conduct of the priests 
serving its archdiocese, when did they know it, and what did they do about it 
when they knew? Are welfare recipients dispositionally lazy or situationally 
disadvantaged? Attributional stereotypes are part of our cultural landscape, and 
at the core of many cultural debates. There is obviously a great deal at stake in 
attributions. And there are many interests competing to shape our attributional 
presumptions and stereotypes. 
c. Counterfactual Thinking 
A small plane crashes in a remote northern province. Two of the passengers 
survive the crash and attempt to walk to safety. One of the two succumbs to the 
extreme cold seventy-five miles from the nearest town. The second trudges on 
but dies when she is just a quarter of a mile from the town. Tragic. Is the second 
more tragic than the first? Many people think SO?99 Even though both people 
died from the cold after a plane crash, we respond more strongly when someone 
comes so close to safety. This is an example of counterfactual thinking, another 
type of process bias that plays off of our pre-existing schemas.30o 
Our schemas define what we think is "normal." When a bad outcome appears 
to stem from abnormal circumstances the emotional impact is greater than when 
296. BROWN, supra note 1 67, at 136; see also WEARY ET AL., supra note 290, at 6. 
297. See FISKE, supra note 233, at 1 17 (summarizing evidence regarding "defensive attribution," 
which is the tendency to increasingly "perceive the individual actor to be responsible" as the serious­
ness of a harm or offense increases). 
298. For a brief discussion of how the tobacco industry manipulated attributions, see Hanson & 
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously //, supra note 1 32, at 1524-27, and Jon D. Hanson and Douglas 
A. Kysar, The Joint Failure of Economic Theory and Legal Regulation [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, 
The Joint Failure], in SMOKING: RISK, PERCEPTION, AND POLICY 229 (Paul Siovic ed., 2001). For a 
discussion of how our "policy scripts" tend to be influenced by outside sources, see generally Chen & 
Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 32, and Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 
230-84. 
299. See Dale T. Miller & Cathy McFarland, Counterfactual Thinking and Victim Compensation: A 
Test of Norm Theory, 12 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 5 1 3, 5 1 6-17 (1986) (finding that subjects 
recommended greater compensation for the family of the victim who died one quarter of a mile from 
town than for the survivors of the victim who died seventy-five miles away). 
300. See generally NEAL J. ROESE & JAMES N. OLSON, WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN: THE SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING ( 1995) (bringing together recent research and theory on 
counterfactual thinking). 
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the same outcome results from a familiar situation. A number of factors can lead 
us to think an outcome is abnormal .  For example, the closer the distance 
between the actual outcome and a potential "normal" outcome, the less abnor­
mal an outcome seems.30l Thus, a soldier's accidental death a few days after a 
war ends, but before news of it reaches the front lines, seems more regrettable 
than a combat death two days before the war ended. Outcomes that follow 
unusual actions also stand out as abnormal in our minds.302 So the plight of a 
plane crash victim who switched flights minutes before takeoff seems particu­
larly poignant. When a bad outcome results from events or behavior that is 
contrary to our schemas, scripts, or routines, it is easy for us to imagine a 
different outcome. The more available our expectations are, the more salient 
will be any deviation from them, and the more painful will be any harm that 
results from that deviation.303 Indeed, social psychologists have found that 
people tend to award greater compensation to victims of accidents in contexts 
where the victims' behavior prior to the injury had deviated from their normal 
behavior. Again, the availability of the easily imagined counterfactual appears 
to increase the sense of tragedy in the occurrence.304 
Our counterfactual patterns of thought are related to the same basic internal 
situation that drives the fundamental attribution error.305 For instance, both 
reflect the more general tendency to focus on what is easy to see and on what 
we expect to see?06 Moreover, counterfactual imaginings reflect and further 
301 .  Miller & McFarland, supra note 299, at 5 14. 
302. Id. 
303. See id. 
304. See KUNDA, supra note 6, at 149. For a sample of both laboratory and real-world evidence of 
that tendency, see Robert K. Bothwell & Kermit W. Duhon, Counterfactual Thinking and Plaintiff 
Compensation, 1 34 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 705, 705 ( 1994) (citing Miller & McFarland, supra note 299, but 
finding that the sense of tragedy decreased when blame was attributed to the victim); Patrizia Catellani 
& Patrizia Milesi, Counterfactuals and Roles: Mock Victims ' and Perpetrators ' Accounts of Judicial 
Cases, 3 1  EuR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 247 (2001);  Barbara A. Spellman & Alexandra Kincannon, The 
Relation Between Counterfactual ( "But For") And Causal Reasoning: Experimental Findings and 
Implications for Jurors ' Decisions, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241 (2001);  Richard L. Wiener et. aI., 
Counterfactual Thinking in Mock Juror Assessments of Negligence: A Preliminary Investigation, 12  
BEHAv. SCI. & L.  89 ( 1994). 
305. Individual behavior is usually easier to see. It is more readily available to our minds than are 
the myriad of situational influences that give rise to the behavior, and so we focus on individuals in 
explaining behavior. See supra text accompanying notes 72-102 (discussing the fundamental attribu­
tion error). 
306. When we encounter an event or an experience we do so through a particular conceptual 
framework (schema or script), comprised of event and norm expectations. When we encounter an event 
or an experience, that framework helps provide the meaning. When the new circumstance is seen, it is 
set against the norm expectation framework. Striving to make sense of a new circumstance, we "see" 
through the norms that we bring to the circumstance, and are relatively blind to those that we are not 
expecting. We give a meaning to the new circumstance based on our norms. The closer an experience 
approximates our schema-based expectations, the more normal it seems to us and, hence, the more 
difficult it is to imagine that the experience could have come out any other way. Counterfactual thinking 
is driven by the availability of imagined alternatives. The more abnormal an event is, the easier it is for 
us to cognitively undo what happened. See KUNDA, supra note 6, at 145. Exceptional situations are 
more mutable in our imagination than our normal ones, because of the greater availability of the normal 
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entrench the situational character's dispositionism. When we think of what 
might have been, we tend to focus on the individual actors and their actions, 
rather than on the situation in which they were acting. Because of our disposition­
ism, we are better able to imagine people acting differently than they did than to 
imagine that the situation could have been different than it was. Thus, because 
of the fundamental attribution error our counterfactuals tend to be dispositionist. 
And when we think about something bad that has happened to a person, even 
when we the thought is motivated by sympathy, our counterfactual thoughts 
tend to be oriented toward undoing or altering actions or choices on the part of 
the person.307 
Counterfactuals guide more than our reactions to recent happenings .  This 
pattern of the mind continues to influence our mental lives long after an event 
has transpired. Counterfactuals play a lasting role in our own self-conceptions. 
To understand how, it is helpful to understand another effect of counterfactual 
thinking-the omission bias. "[T]he availability of a close counterfactual"-an 
alternative and familiar path-"can increase the regret and disappointment that 
one feels after experiencing a bad outcome.,,308 And we alter our behavior in 
order to avoid such disappointment. For example, when choosing among poten­
tially bad outcomes, people tend to favor the inactive option over the option that 
requires action. That is true because "action is more regrettable than inaction 
because it is easier to undo action by mentally erasing it than it is to undo 
inaction by mentally adding the action not taken.,,309 
Do not be misled into seeing this as evidence of a stable-preferenced indi­
vidual, one that consistently prefers inaction over action. Our counterfactuals do 
not reflect a consistent dispositionist outlook; rather, they change as our situa­
tion changes. The basic pattern is this: we begin by thinking that we will regret 
situation. See id. at 150. Counterfactuals, however, not only guide our approach to our new happening, 
they linger and take new forms in our mental lives after the event as well. See infra text accompanying 
notes 308-19. 
307. See KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 5 1  ("A disturbing implication of these findings is that the more 
one identifies and emphasizes [sic] with a victim, the more likely one is to contemplate how the victim 
might have behaved otherwise and therefore to blame the victim."); see also Nyla R. Branscombe et aI., 
Rape and Accident Counterfactuals: Who Might Have Done Otherwise and Would It Have Changed the 
Outcome?, 26 J. ApPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1042 ( 1996); Christopher T. Burris & Nyla R. Branscombe, 
Racism, Counterfactual Thinking, and Judgment Severity, 23 J. ApPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 980 ( 1 993); 
Christopher G. Davis et aI., Self-Blame Following a Traumatic Event: The Role of Perceived Avoidabil­
ity, 22 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 557 ( 1996) (attributing respondents' self-blame for spinal 
cord injury to perceptions of avoidability); Michael W. Morris et. aI., Choosing Remedies After 
Accidents: Counterfactual Thoughts and the Focus on Fixing "Human Error", 6 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & 
REv. 579 (1999). 
308. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 145; see also, e.g., Victoria Husted Medvec, Scott F. Madey & Thomas 
Gilovich, When Less Is More: Counterfactual Thinking and Satisfaction Among Olympic Athletes, 69 J. 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 603 (1995). 
309. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 152 (discussing D. Kahneman & D.T. Miller, Norm Theory, Comparing 
Reality to Its Alternatives, 93 PSYCHOL. REV. 136 ( 1986»; see also Robert A. Baron, Counterfactual 
Thinking and Venture Formation: The Potential Effects of Thinking about "What Might Have Been, " 
15 J. Bus. VENTURING 79 (1999) (summarizing some of the causes and effects of omission bias). 
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action more than inaction. Over time, however, our perceptions and preferences 
seem to switch. In the realist words of Ziva Kunda, "In the short term our 
actions seem more regrettable, but in the long run our failures to act cause us 
the most grief.,,3 1 0  And this again can be explained by some of the same 
tendencies underlying the fundamental attribution error. After a bad outcome, 
our actions remain cognitively salient in our memories while any situational 
constraints that might have influenced those actions remain faded (or quickly 
fade).3 1 1  It becomes harder to counterfactually imagine not acting, so we 
experience less regret about the outcomes of those actions? 1 2  Similarly, when 
we remember a harmful event resulting from our inaction, what remains starkly 
available in our minds is our own failure to act. As the situational constraints 
grow more distant, so do our reasons for inaction, and our self-regret is more 
severe.3 1 3  "In retrospect, we think we could have handled with ease tasks that at 
the time seemed all but impossible.,,3 14 We do not, therefore, have a single, 
stable disposition across our changing evaluation of our own behavior. 
Unsurprisingly, social psychologists have found that we are susceptible to 
manipulation by those who want to situationally stoke the counterfactualizing 
cognitions that give rise to actions or inactions.3 15 As one social psychologist, 
introducing a journal issue dedicated to the topic, put it: 
Pointing out to individuals that they might have done something in the past 
that would make their present more desirable may motivate them toward 
decisions that would bring about more desirable states in the future. Or, 
pointing out how an action might have resulted in a worse state of affairs 
might motivate individuals toward a cautious outlook that minimizes the 
chances of future undesirable states. The manipulation of consumer emotions 
by marketers has long been a stable of successful advertising . . . .  [C]ounterfac­
tual thinking might be an effective tool for manipulating emotions . . . .  3 16  
3 10. KUNDA, supra note 6 ,  at  1 54; see also JANET LANDMAN, REGRET: THE PERSISTENCE O F  THE 
POSSIBLE ( 1 993); Abigail J. Stewart & Elizabeth A .  Vandewater, "If I Had It to Do Over Again . . .  ": 
Midlife Review, Midcourse Corrections, and Women s Well-Being in Midlife, 76 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 270 ( 1999). 
3 1 1 . See ROBERT A. BARON & DON BYRNE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 95 ( 1 0th ed. 2004). 
3 1 2. See id. 
3 13.  See Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted Medvec, The Experience of Regret: What, When, and 
Why, 1 02 PSYCHOL. REv. 379 ( 1 994); Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted Medvec, The Temporal 
Pattern to the Experience of Regret, 67 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 357 (1994). 
3 14. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 155. This phenomenon is undoubtedly related to our tendency to 
generate counterfactuals with respect to other behavioral choices that other people could have made, 
rather than envisioning alternative situations that they might have faced when choosing. 
3 15. See, e.g., John J. Hetts et aI., The Influence of Anticipated Counterfactual Regret on Behavior, 
1 7  PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 345 (2000); Janet Landman & Ross Petty, "It Could Have Been You ": How 
States Exploit Counterfactual Thought to Market Lotteries, 17 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 299 (2000); Ann 
L. McGill, Counterfactual Reasoning in Causal Judgments: Implications for Marketing, 17 PSYCHOL. & 
MARKETING 28 1 (2000); Michael Tsiros & Vikas Mittal, Regret: A Model of Its Antecedents and 
Consequences in Consumer Decision Making, 26 J. CONSUMER REs. 401 (2000). 
3 1 6. Neal J. Roese, Counterfactual Thinking and Marketing: Introduction to the Special Issue, 17 
PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 277, 278-79 (2000) (citations omitted). 
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Much has been written about counteIfactual thinking,3 17 its effects, and even its 
functionality.3 1 8 Still, the relentless part that our "what ifs," "if onlys," "but fors," 
"would'ves," and "should'ves" play in our consciousness remains in many ways 
unexplained. CounteIfactual imaginings can plague our present choices with fear and 
our future evaluations of our present choices with regret. Still, they "force themselves 
upon us with undeniable strength,,,3 1 9  making it difficult to ignore, among other 
things, how much nicer it would have been if the milk had not spilled. That strength 
suggests the power of our internal situations over our own seemingly dispositional 
mental lives, our thinking, and our decisionmaking. 
3.  Defending our Knowledge Structures 
A later section describes in some detail the influence of "motivation" on our 
attitudes, cognitions, and behavior.320 This section briefly discusses the phenom­
enon as it applies to our knowledge structures. 
a. Where Motive Meets Knowledge Structures 
"If a man is offered a fact which goes against his instincts, he will 
scrutinize it closely, and unless the evidence is overwhelming, he will refuse to 
believe it. If, on the other hand, he is offered something which affords a 
reason for acting in accordance to his instincts, he will accept it even on the 
slenderest evidence. " 
- Bertrand Russe1l32 I 
Four stages of adopting new ideas: "The first is, 'It's impossible. ' The second 
is, 'Maybe it 's possible, but it 's weak and uninteresting. '  The third is, 'It is true 
and I told you so. ' The fourth is, 'I thought of it first. ' "  
- Dean Radin322 
3 1 7. See. e.g., THE CENTER FOR COUNTERFACTUAL STUDIES, at http://www.sfu.calcounterfactuaU 
cfbib.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2004) (collecting papers on this topic); Dale T. Miller & W. Turnbull, 
The Counterfactual Fallacy: Confusing What Might Have Been With What Ought To Have Been, in LIFE 
CRISES AND EXPERIENCES OF Loss IN ADULTHOOD (L. Montada et a!. eds., 1992). 
3 1 8. The commentary ranges from a solidly felt sense of "how immeasurably poorer our mental lives 
would be if we didn't have this creative capacity for flipping out of the midst of reaility into soft 'what ifs!," 
DoUGLAS HOFSTAD1ER, GoDEL, EscHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GoLDEN BRAID 643 (1979), to a more sober 
rationalization of this mode of thinking in our lives (anticipatory regret, for example, may lead us to closely 
scrutinize important choices rather than make decisions willy-nilly). There also appears to be evidence that 
some mental diseases are associated with an inability to engage in counterfactual thought. 
3 19. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 157. 
320. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the assumption in economics that rational actors would ignore 
sunk costs). 
32 1 .  BERTRAND RUSSELL, PRoPOSED ROADS TO FREEDOM: SOCIALISM, ANARCHISM AND SYNDICALISM 147 
(19 19). 
322. Dean Radin is quoted in Chip Brown, They Laughed at Cali/eo Too. N. Y. TIMES. Aug. 1 1 ,  1996, 
§ 6 (Magazine), at 16. 
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This section returns to the topic of knowledge structures to further discuss the 
human tendency to persistently defend our knowledge structures, even when 
confronted with significant evidence that calls them into question. The history 
and evolution of legal economics illustrates the distorting loyalty of even social 
scientists to favored theories and beliefs. Above, we noted the benefits that 
result from using knowledge structures to organize new information in a 
cognitively efficient way.323 It is largely because of those benefits that we are 
motivated to protect our beliefs and our way of understanding the world and to 
reject alternatives. Thus, one can think of our knowledge structures (and 
resultant "knowledge") as valued cognitive gold-which, in a way, they are. An 
important question is how do we manage to protect our wealth from being 
replaced or debased with fools'  gold? How do we maintain our knowledge 
structures and our sense that we have a solid grasp on the "truth," when the 
truth is itself so slippery and elusive and when alternative claims to "truth" 
compete for our allegiance? 
We have already indicated one key defense. Because of the unseen or 
situational nature of our knowledge structures, we tend to experience our beliefs 
as emerging almost entirely from an unbiased assessment of evidence from 
reliable sources. Being blind to our interior knowledge structures allows them to 
influence our cognitive processes undetected. If we do not see them, we do not 
attempt to monitor them or influence them?24 
But our interior defenses are made stronger still by the very slipperiness of 
what "is" -the ambiguity of so much of our social realities?25 Insofar as reality 
is ungraspable, so too is proof that any one handle on it is illUSOry. Around our 
golden knowledge structures are moats that operate to keep out threatening 
evidence and, with drawbridges selectively lowered, to allow in any evidence 
323. See supra text accompanying notes 189-203. 
324. And that tendency is, again, a symptom of the interior fundamental attribution error: we 
"consistently fail to make sufficient allowance for the role that construal plays in determining behavior, 
a failure with profound personal and social consequences." Ross & NISBETI, supra note 6, at 12 .  For 
instance, we do not "recognize the degree to which [our] understanding of stimuli is a result of an 
active, constructive process, rather than a passive reception and registering of some external reality." [d. 
Similarly, we tend to underestimate the variability of situational construal across time and across 
people, and thus tend to be overconfident in our behavioral predictions regarding ourselves and others. 
See id. 
When this Article was in press, we came across some fascinating work by Professor Dan Simon and 
his colleagues on what they call "coherence-based reasoning." See, e.g., Dan Simon, The Third View of 
the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 7 1  U. CHI. L. REV. 5 1 1 ,  520-49 (2004) 
(summarizing the automatic cognitive mechanisms that help provide decisionmakers a sense of 
confidence in their reasoning); Dan Simon, Chadwick J. Snow, & Stephen J. Read, The Redux of 
Cognitive Consistency Theories: Evidence Judgments by Constraint Satisfaction, 86 J. PERSONALITY & 
Soc. PSYCHOL. 8 1 4  (2004) (reviewing experiments indicating the bidirectionality of reasoning between 
evidence and conclusion). 
325. Cf KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 59 ("Because information about the social world is typically 
mixed and inconsistent, we may often be biased toward confirming any hypothesis we entertain about 
our own or other people's attributes."). 
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that reinforces them.326 Confirming features of ambiguous evidence can be 
embraced as further support, and disconfirming elements of that same evidence 
can be ignored. Given the prevalence of ambiguity (not to mention our ability 
and that of others to manufacture ambiguity), our knowledge structures are 
generally well-protected.327 As Ziva Kunda explains, echoing Bertrand Russell, 
our knowledge structures 
may affect not only which memories, beliefs, and rules we access but also the 
amount of effort we invest in searching for relevant beliefs and rules in the 
first place . . .  . When we come across evidence that supports our desired 
conclusions, we may accept it at face value. But when we come across 
comparable evidence that challenges our desired conclusions, we may evalu­
ate it more critically and work hard to refute it.328 
Social psychologists have given a variety of names to this process-for 
example, confirmatory bias, perseverance bias, hypothesis-based filtering, elas­
tic justification, and, more generally, motivated reasoning.329 Perhaps unsurpris­
ingly (given the topic), researchers have found a great deal of evidence suggesting 
that such devices are extremely powerful. Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross summa­
rized the literature in 1 980 as follows: 
When people already have a theory, before encountering any genuinely 
probative evidence, exposure to such evidence (whether it supports the theory, 
326. See Peter H. Ditto & David F. Lopez, Motivated Skepticism: Use of Differentiated Decision 
Criteria for Preferred and Non-Preferred Conclusions, 63 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 568 ( 1 992); 
Dieter Frey, Recent Research on Selective Exposure to Information, in 19 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL 
SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 4 1  (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1986). 
327. For studies revealing the important role of ambiguity, see, for example, Darley & Gross, supra 
note 222; Jason Dana, Roberto A. Weber & Jason Xi Kuang, Exploiting Moral Wiggle Room: Behavior 
Inconsistent with a Preference for Fair Outcomes (Working Paper, June 24, 2003), at http:// 
emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/deUavignaJe2 I 8_f03/Fair.pdf; Christopher K. Hsee, Elastic Justifica­
tion: How Tempting but Task-Irrelevant Factors Influence Decisions, 62 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 330 ( 1995); Christopher K. Hsee, Elastic Justification: How Unjustifiable Factors Influence 
Judgments, 66 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM . DECISION PROCESSES 122 (1996); William M. Klein & Ziva Kunda, 
Motivated Person Perception: Constructing Justifications for Desired Beliefs, 28 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 145 ( 1 992); Henry Montgomery, From Cognition to Action: The Search for Dominance in 
Decision Making, in PROCESS AND STRUCfURE IN HUMAN DECISION MAKING 23 (Henry Montgomery & 
Ola Svenson eds., 1989); Melvin L. Synder et aI., Avoidance of the Handicapped: An Attributional 
Ambiguity Analsyis, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2297 (1979); Philip E. Tetlock & Jae n Kim, 
Accountability and Judgment Processes in Personality Prediction Task, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 700 (1 987). 
328. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 230. 
329. For more thorough discussions of the biases and of the evidence, see KUNDA, supra note 6, at 
1 1 1-60 & 223-32; NISBETT & Ross, supra note 129, at 67-89; Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, 
supra note 1 36, at 1195-1 2 1 1  (describing various facets of the "schema-protection" motive); Hanson & 
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note 126, at 646-54; Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirma­
tion Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REv. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 ( 1 998). For a more 
thorough discussion of the role of motivation, see infra Part Ill.C.2. 
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opposes the theory, or is mixed), will tend to result in more belief in the 
correctness of the original theory than normative dictates allow . 
. . . When people approach a set of evidence without a theory and then form 
a theory based on initial evidence, the theory will be resistant to subsequent 
evidence . . . .  [and] 
. . .  When people formulate a theory based on some putatively probative 
evidence and later discover that the evidence is false, the theory often 
survives such total discrediting.330 
The influence of those biases, and others,33 I makes clear one of the great 
problems with our schemas: we create them too quickly and maintain them too 
loyally. And, again, this problem is not limited to the processes of just lay 
scientists: "The tendency of professional scientists to persist in adhering to 
theories well past the point at which such adherence can be justified by the 
evidence has been observed by many.'.332 We will return to that point briefly 
below,333 and more thoroughly in subsequent articles.334 For now, the crux of 
our point is that all of us are subject to the same biasing process that we just do 
not see. 
To be sure, we often see others as biased, prejudiced, vested, incoherent, 
inconsistent, or closed-minded?35 But those experiences are schematized as 
dispositional quirks, not as a reflection of their deeper interior situations. 336 In 
ourselves, we see what every person is presumed capable of --clarity, objectiv­
ity, and open-mindedness .337 And we can maintain that self-affirming view-as 
do those who we feel should not-in significant part because we do not see the 
interior situation.338 
As with the other biases, there's a critical kicker to this analysis: exterior 
330. NISBETf & Ross, supra note 127, at 1 69. 
331 .  See, e.g., Mark Snyder & William B.  Swann, Jr., Hypothesis-Testing Process in Illteraction, 36 
1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1202 ( 1978) (showing how people investigate a hypothesis in a way 
that tends to confirm it); see also KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 1 1-60 (discussing how humans test 
hypotheses); SABINI, supra note 8 1 ,  at 1 69-70 (contending that the choice of hypothesis may be subject 
to irrational or nonsensical forces). 
332. NISBETf & Ross, supra note 129, at 168 (citing sources). 
333. See infra text accompanying notes 339-380. 
334. See, e.g., Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 36, at 1239-52 (laying out some 
basic predictions about this effect on legal theory); Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 32 
(providing evidence confirming those predictions in the basic schemas of legal theory). 
335. Cf Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naive Realism: Implications for Social Conflict and Misunder­
standing, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103 (Edward S. Reed et aI. eds., 1997) (arguing that individuals 
ascribe differences of opinion in others to reliance upon conflicting data, incompetence, or bias). 
336. See Emily Pronin, Thomas Gilovich, & Lee Ross, Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: 
Divergellt Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, I I I  PSYCHOL. REV. 781 (2004). 
337. Cf Emily Pronin et ai., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 374-76 (2002) (reporting that survey respondents had 
difficulty recognizing their own susceptibility to biases and claimed to possess more positive character­
istics-such as objectivity-than the average person). 
338. See generally Pronin, Gilovich & Ross, supra note 336 (describing our unseen mechanisms for 
responding to evidence or arguments that conflict with our own schemas). 
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situation, which we began by emphasizing our failure to appreciate, can wield 
an immense influence over which schemas we adopt, which we reject, and how 
and when we apply them. And that process is itself guided in part by the 
operation of interior schemas functioning below the level of our conscious 
awareness. Furthermore, once our schemas are in place, exterior situation can 
provide us the evidence and ambiguity we need to sustain them. 
b. Economics: A Preliminary Case Stud/39 
"The power of theory to organize information and guide inquiry is great 
and is the core of validity in the adage that you can 't beat a theory except with 
a better theory. " 
- Richard Posner340 
"New ideas encounter formidable obstacles, the foremost being indiffer­
ence, but also the new ideas will often conflict with old ideas or clash with 
apparently contradictory experience. " 
- George Stigler341 
Because, as we argued above, people have a stereotyped view of schemas 
(providing further evidence of their power and presence), we have thus far 
focused most of our attention on the most salient group concepts and have 
virtually ignored most of schemas' other, more general distorting effects. (The 
tendency should now be, we hope, a familiar one.) No human inference process 
is without schematic structuring, and none is insulated from schematic distor­
tions.342 Indeed, there is significant evidence that the reasoning of professional 
scientists, despite their presumed role as purveyors of objective truth, is like­
wise distorted. Much of what is known about the structure of scientific revolu­
tions (to borrow Thomas Kuhn's phrase)343 is just one manifestation of a far 
more general human tendency to create, defend, and, when forced to, abandon a 
favored schema or knowledge structure. Here, we will use the real-world 
example at hand-the schema-driven history of the role of choice biases in 
339. In a related project, one of us, with Ronald Chen, is exploring some fundamental ways in which 
knowledge structures are distorting law and legal theory. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, 
supra note 1 36; Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Distribution Versus Efficiency: Missing the Taste of the 
Pie (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors) [hereinafter Chen & Hanson, Taste of the Pie). 
340. Posner, supra note 249, at 278. 
341 .  GEORGE J. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 8 ( 1988). 
342. See C. Neil Macrae, Alan B. Milne & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypes as Energy-Saving 
Devices: A Peek Inside the Cognitive Toolbox, 66 1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 37 ( 1994). 
343. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIAC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970). 
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economics and legal economics.344 This partial case study illustrates not only 
the distorting effects of knowledge structures, but also how their effects bedevil 
policy analysts, including legal economists. 
i. Knowledge Structures in the Analysis of Temporal Effects 
Consider the history of social scientific analysis of the effects of time on 
judgment-a history that we already hinted at above. At least since Adam Smith 
and well before the emergence of neoclassical economics, economists have 
been interested in intertemporal decisionmaking. The early economists sought 
to identify and examine the often-conflicting "sociological and psychological 
determinants of these choices.,,345 In the early nineteenth century, for example, 
John Rae wrote about the affective attractiveness of immediate consumption as 
compared to the displeasure of saving: 
Such pleasures as may now be enjoyed generally awaken a passion strongly 
prompting to the partaking of them. The actual presence of the immediate 
object of desire in the mind by exciting the attention, seems to rouse all the 
faculties, as it were to fix their view on it, and leads them to a very lively 
conception of the enjoyments which it offers to their instant possession.346 
And around the same time economic theorist N.W. Senior wrote that "[t]o 
abstain from the enjoyment which is in our power, or to seek distant rather than 
immediate results, are among the most painful exertions of the human will. ,,347 
Thus, the sort of variability of preferences to which neoclassical economists 
have long been blind had not only been identified by economists a century 
before, but had also been explained by them. Strikingly, both Rae and Senior 
intuited what social psychologists more than a century later came to call 
immediacy. 348 
Similarly, toward the late 1 800s, some economists even began to write about 
the effects of heuristics in human cognitions. In 1 889, Eugen von Bohm­
Bawerk wrote: 
It may be that we possess inadequate power to imagine and to abstract, or that 
we are not willing to put forth the necessary effort, but in any event we limn a 
more or less incomplete picture of our future wants and especially of the 
344. For a related and more complete examination of the influence of knowledge structures on law 
and economic analysis of policy, see Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 36; Chen & 
Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 32; Chen & Hanson, Taste of the Pie, supra note 339. 
345. Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 153, at 35 1 .  
346. JOHN RAE, THE SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF CAPITAL 1 20 ( 1834), quoted in Frederick, Loewenstein 
& O'Donoghue, supra note 1 53, at 353. 
347. NASSAU W. SENIOR, OUTLINE OF THE SCIENCE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 60 ( 1 836), quoted in 
Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donaghue, supra note 1 53, at 353. 
348. See supra text accompanying notes 1 66--70. 
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remotely distant ones. And then there are all those wants that never come to 
mind at all.349 
77 
Thus, not only were these early economists developing a psychological 
theory to explain real human behavior,350 the theory they were developing-of 
a comer-cutting and schema-driven cognitive process-anticipated the very sort 
of interior fundamental attribution error that we are emphasizing here. In short, 
economists were beginning to glimpse something of our interior situation, 
particularly with respect to our cognitive miserliness. 
But the insight itself makes predictable what would be done with it. There 
was then emerging a new brand (or schema) of economics-the far more 
technical, simplistic, and axiomatic (and far less realistic) approach that came to 
be known as neoclassical economics. In an effort to create a simple way of 
thinking about intertemporal choice that comported with the emerging eco­
nomic models, Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson, in a five-page article, offered 
the now-dominant discounted utility modee5 1 "[I]n Samuelson's simplified 
model, all the psychological concerns discussed over the previous century were 
compressed into a single parameter, the discount rate.,,352 The new model was 
based not upon social scientific analysis but on "little more than introspection 
and personal observation" on the part of several economists.353 As Frederick, 
Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue explain in their recent account, the path to 
theoretical dominance was quick and direct, owing not to realism but to what 
we would call schematic biases, a retreat from realism to simplicity: 
Samuelson did not endorse the [discounted utility] model as a normative 
model of intertemporal choice, noting that "any connection between utility as 
discussed here and any welfare concept is disavowed" . . . .  He also made no 
claims on behalf of its descriptive validity, stressing, "It is completely arbi­
trary to assume that the individual behaves so as to maximize an integral of 
the form envisaged in [the discounted utility model]" . . . . However, despite 
Samuelson's manifest reservations, the simplicity and elegance of this formu-
349. EUGEN VON BOHM-BAWERK, CAPITAL AND INTEREST 268-69 ( 1 889), quoted in Frederick, Loewen­
stein & O'Donoghue, supra note 153, at 354. Similarly, in 1920 Arthur Pigou, the economist to whom 
Ronald Coase was responding in his famous The Problem of Social Cost, explained that variation of 
time preferences resulted from the fact that "our telescopic faculty is defective, and we, therefore, see 
future pleasures, as it were, on a diminished scale." ARTHUR C. PtGOU, THE EcONOMICS OF WELFARE 
( 1920), quoted in Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 153, at 354 n.2. 
350. Cf Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 153, at 355 ("In the early part of the 
twentieth century, 'time preference' was viewed as an amalgamation of various intertemporal mo­
tives."). 
35 1 .  Paul A. Samuelson, A Note on Measurement of Utility, 4 REv. ECON. STUD. 1 55 (1937). 
Samuelson did most of his pathbreaking work in very short articles, typically styled "notes." It is 
telling, we believe, that that the efficiency of his ideas is evident in both their substance and form, 
qualities that our readers are likely craving about now. 
352. Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 1 53, at 355. 
353. [d. at 352. 
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lation was irresistible, and the [discounted utility] model was rapidly adopted 
as the framework of choice for analyzing intertemporal decisions. 
The [discounted utility] model received a scarcely needed further boost to 
its dominance as the standard model for intertemporal choice when Tjalling 
C. Koopmans showed that the model could be derived from a superficially 
plausible set of axioms. Koopmans, like Samuelson, did not argue that the 
[discounted utility] model was psychologically or normatively plausible; his 
goal was only to show that under some well-specified (though arguably 
unrealistic) circumstances, individuals were logically compelled to possess 
positive time preference. Producers of a product, however, cannot dictate how 
the product will be used, and Koopmans '  central technical message was 
largely lost while his axiomatization of the [discounted utility] model helped 
to cement its popularity and bolster its perceived legitimacy. 354 
The influence of the discounted utility schema continues to be significant, 
even among the skeptics and nonbelievers. The theories offered to compete with 
the discounted utility model often have been heavily anchored to that model, 
although evidence of real human decisionmaking is forcing them to begin to 
take into account certain aspects of the situation.355 As we will detail below, the 
same is true for the more general rational-actor model in law and economics.356 
Thus far, we have indicated two general ways in which economists over the 
last half-century have responded to evidence of the lack of realism in the 
rational-actor-based discounted utility model. The most common method (and a 
key reason that Samuelson's brief note has become such a dominant approach to 
positive and normative theory) has been to adopt the basic model without regard 
to its realism. That strategy tends to work when economists are not confronted 
with anomalous or falsifying evidence. A second method is to acknowledge the 
basic model's unrealism and to accommodate the anomalous evidence with as 
little violence to the original model as possible.357 That approach, as we' ve 
noted, reveals the anchoring effect of our knowledge structures.358 
There is at least one more general method, a middle way between those two, 
which is to acknowledge the supposedly anomalous evidence, but construe it in 
a way that renders it confirmatory of the challenged model. 359 This is a 
restatement of the confirmatory bias described above.36o The strategy thus takes 
what appears to be damaging evidence and transforms it into reinforcing 
evidence. But, again, the strategy often reflects not a fair and accurate interpreta-
354. [d. at 355-56 (citations omitted). 
355. See id. at 365-73 (discussing alternative models that remain true to the discounted utility 
model). 
356. See infra Part V. 
357. See Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 153, at 373. 
358. See supra text accompanying notes 201-20. 
359. There are, of course, more extreme strategies-such as abandoning the original model in its 
entirety. Such alternatives are as rare in practice as they are revolutionary in theory. 
360. See supra text accompanying notes 2 1 6-17.  
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tion of the evidence, but a motivated attempt to maintain a favored theory. 
Richard Posner's response to intertemporal inconsistencies exemplifies that 
approach. He takes evidence that most economic behavioralists consider a threat 
to the rational actor model's viability and reinterprets it as further support for 
that purported model: 
[T]he reason for the [intertemporal choice variations] may simply be that I 
lack a clear conception of my consumption needs a decade hence; the reason 
may, in other words, be the imagination cost . . .  . I cannot imagine what 
might make me pay in effect a huge interest rate to reallocate consumption [in 
the distant future, whereas I can imagine it today] . The fact that knowledge 
and imagination are "bounded" just shows, what no rational-choice economist 
doubts, that information costs are positive?61 
Posner thus cleverly explains the phenomenon in terms of now-somewhat­
theorized information costs, exhibiting what Dean Radin describes as the "I 
thought of it first" stage of accepting an idea?62 Posner's reasoning reflects the 
confirmatory bias in its classic form inasmuch as he interprets selective portions 
of the ambiguous evidence as consistent with his favored theory, failing to see 
that it is also consistent with competing theories or to examine whether other 
portions of the evidence can be similarly construed.363 
But Posner's construal goes further and reveals what might be called counter­
feit confirmation bias.364 Posner does more than just selectively reinterpret 
evidence to corroborate a favored theory. He also fundamentally adjusts the 
underlying theory, while falsely claiming that its pre-altered version has been 
confirmed. More specifically, Posner conflates information costs, a sliver of 
which economists have long included in their basic model, with "imagination 
costs," which economists conventionally do not have a place for in their 
models.365 
Of course, we do not dispute that people have trouble imagining or appreciat­
ing factors that are less immediate. To the contrary, as we have been detailing 
for 1 .5 articles, that difficulty is a fundamental feature of the situational 
character's interior situation. The problem is that conventional economics has 
361 . RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 259 (2001).  
362.  See supra note 322 and accompanying text. 
363. Posner, like all of us, makes a habit of this. For example, he interprets evidence of downward­
sloping demand curves as a valid basis for preferring the rational-actor model over alternative models 
(such as the situational character), though it isn't. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 
161-63; infra notes 724-30 and accompanying text. 
364. This is an un surprising symptom of what we describe below, as counterfeit realism, one of 
several inadequate responses by legal economists to the challenge of realism. See infra Part V.c 
(describing and addressing economists' responses). 
365. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, 92 AM. 
EcON. REV. 460, 461-63 (2002) (describing in his Nobel lecture the reluctance and narrowness with 
which economists generally took information costs into account-for the same sorts of reasons that we 
describe in this Article). 
80 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 93: 1 
generally meant something very different when referring to "information costs"­
which is precisely why the insights of behavioralists have been slow in coming 
and why the bulk of social psychology and related fields have been ignored. The 
conventional assumption regarding the effect of information costs is not, con­
trary to Posner's version, that people will be unable to imagine their needs in a 
future state of the world, but rather that rational actors will mis-estimate the 
risks they face in the current state of the world. Furthermore, economists do not 
generally assume, as Posner does here, that individuals will systematically 
underestimate risk, but rather that they will mis-estimate randomly such that 
they are correct on average.366 Posner himself makes this precise argument 
when discussing the general role of information costs on people's consumption 
choices.367 And he makes the same sort of argument to help defend his rational 
actor theory when he claims that the presence of irrational actors may not alter 
the model's prediction regarding downward-sloping demand curves,368 so long 
as the irrational actors behave, on average, like rational actors.369 Even accept­
ing Posner's elastic definition of "information costs," his argument assumes that 
our limited imaginations are not a feature of our interiors that we can adjust for 
or control; otherwise, individuals would simply make rule-based (imagination­
free) adjustments to help eliminate time effects on their choices?70 Posner is 
claiming, not just that "rational actors" have limited imaginations, but also that 
they do not recognize that they have limited imaginations. He is, in other words, 
implicitly positing the existence of unseen interior situational influences-a 
view that we share, but that he cannot plausibly sustain while remaining 
otherwise committed to the rational-choice model that he hopes to defend.37 I 
In that way, Posner re-fashions the model that he purports to be defending. 
This move reveals either the unrealism of the unaltered rational-choice model or 
the elasticity and non-falsifiability of that model .372 Relatedly, by focusing so 
singlemindedly upon defending the rational actor model against the challenge at 
hand, Posner fails to see how his solution creates bigger problems for that 
model that were apparently beyond his imagination (or his cognitive budget) at 
366. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, Economists and Public Policy, REGULATION, May-June 1982, at 1 3, 
16 ("[p]eople act efficiently in their own interests . . . .  [They ] learn all the presently knowable things it 
pays them to know-always on average-and act with due regard for this knowledge."). 
367. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCJ1JRE OF TORT LAW 273-3 1 \  
( 1987). 
368. Downward-sloping demand curves represent the basic economic axiom that "when the price of 
x goes up, the amount of x that the consumer will purchase goes down, and vice versa." ROBERT COOTER 
& THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 23 (3d ed. 2000). 
369. POSNER, supra note 361 ,  at 261 .  
370. They could do so simply by rejecting today's preferences that, without obvious reasons, 
contradict the preferences that would exist were the same choice postponed until tomorrow. Thus, in 
our example above, see supra text accompanying notes 1 53-56, a person could simply re-pose any 
choice in a hypothetical future time frame, and make more reliable judgments. 
37 1 .  See irifra Part v.c. 1 .  
372. See infra text accompanying notes 724-49. 
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the time?73 But more important for our purposes, his arguments also exemplify 
one of the many ways in which all people selectively, unconsciously stretch 
their theories in service of a favored knowledge structure. 
To more clearly view the influence of counterfeit confirmatory bias in this 
episode, consider again the historical context of this debate. By pointing to 
people's imperfect imaginations, Posner is unwittingly restating the basic argu­
ments of the nineteenth-century economists, particularly those of Bohm­
Bawerk.374 Bohm-Bawerk looked to psychology and sociology in an effort to 
generate a realistic portrait of the human agent, untethered to the strictures of 
the formal rational-actor model.375 
Scholars who, a half-century later, adopted Samuelson and Koopmans' dis­
counted utility model for explaining intertemporal decision making were reject­
ing the realism undergirding Bohm-Bawerk's argument for the sake of embracing 
the elegance and simplicity of the rational choice model.376 Thus Posner, in the 
name of maintaining the rational-choice model, is falling back on the very same 
realism that was rejected in the name of adopting that model. This is the same 
Posner who has argued repeatedly in the face of criticisms that simplicity and 
elegance are the touchstones of good science,377 and the same Posner who 
frequently admonishes that "[i]n theory-making, descriptive accuracy is pur­
chased at a sacrifice of predictive power.'0378 
But Posner does not maintain the simplicity or predictive power that he 
claims to value. At best, he preserves merely the appearance of such qualities by 
altering the once-simJne theory to house evidence that had previously been 0 
rejected as too cumbersome to accommodate. It is not the theory's capacity for 
accommodation that has changed, but the weight, clarity, and prominence of the 
anomaly. Although Posner provides no meta-theory to explain when to relin­
quish reductionism for the sake of realism, the meta-theory is revealed in his 
373. For other criticisms of the nonfalsifiability of Posner's theoretical commitments, see Christine 
lolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, Theories and Tropes: A Reply to Posner and Kelman, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1 593, 1 595 ( 1 998) ("Throughout Posner's commentary, he goes through the following 
ritual. He discussses one of the phenomena we identify as problematic for economic theory; he offers a 
modification or elaboration on the standard theory that could, in principle, be consistent with this 
phenomenon; and then he declares victory. Posner seems to think that the fact that it is possible to tell a 
rational choice story consistent with the data is sufficient to establish that this explanation is the correct 
one. This is obviously a fallacy. In no case does he offer evidence to suggest that his preferred 
explanation is correct, nor even a test that would, in principle, discriminate between his explanation and 
ours. For those of us who believe in falsifiability, this is an unfortunate omission."); Hanson, Reyes, & 
Schlanger, supra note 43 (arguing that Posner's positive theory of tort law is non-falsifiable). 
374. See supra text accompanying notes 345-50. 
375. See supra text accompanying note 349. See generally Benforado & Hanson, The Costs of 
Dispositionism, supra note 47 (comparing and contrasting Posner's narrow, dispositionist approach to 
legal theory with Guido Calabresi's relatively situationist approach). 
376. See George Loewenstein, The Fall and Rise of Psychological Explanations in the Economics of 
Intertemporal Choice, in CHOICE OVER TIME 3 (George Loewenstein & 10n Elster eds., 1992). 
377. See infra text accompanying note 725. 
378. POSNER, supra note 36 1 ,  at 263; see also id. at 264 ("Explanation and prediction must not be 
confused."). 
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practice. The meta-theory, which is found in the human interior situation, is to 
take into account only as much anomalous evidence as one's prevailing knowl­
edge structure must, and to do so in a way that salvages as much of that 
knowledge structure as possible. 
It is important to recognize a likely effect of-and, perhaps, motive behind­
the counterfeit variation of confirmatory bias. Changing a theory, while pretend­
ing not to, in order to explain what would otherwise be disconfirming or 
falsifying evidence, allows for the pre-altered theory to be applied in unexam­
ined form in other contexts. For example, Posner does not feel compelled at the 
end of his treatment of intertemporal judgments to rethink all areas of economic 
analysis to determine the possible influence of "imagination costs." He is able to 
pretend that the rational-actor model, in unaltered form, has fully survived the 
skirmish with realism. The strategy further permits him to criticize those 
scholars who, in response to evidence of realism, call for new theories (with 
new names). Thus Posner claims that "behavioral economists tend to give up on 
rational-choice economics too soon.,,379 Of course the point is that Posner, too, 
has given up on rational-choice economics. It is just that he has done so in a 
way that allows him to maintain the legitimating mantle of a longstanding 
theory and to fall back on the simplified model without justification. 
In short, by engaging in the confirmatory bias-in both its classic and 
counterfeit forms-Posner has avoided the implications of the very "imagina­
tion costs" that rescued his rational actor model. If Posner were serious about 
imagination costs, he would be forced to recognize what those applying social 
science have, often to their own surprise, discovered and demonstrated: The 
limits of human imagination are not a factor that kicks in or should be relied on 
or explained away selectively. Instead, they are a permanent condition of our 
interior situations, an unseen condition that should be at the core of our 
understandings of human actors and, in tum, our legal theories. 
Economists, spurred by the importuning of economic behavioralists, may 
appear to be approaching another revolution (or counter-revolution) in the 
spiraling trajectory of their thinking about intertemporal choices?80 It is diffi­
cult to read that history, however, without seeing the economizing and distorting 
role of schemas or knowledge structures channeling and shaping that thinking. 
ii. The Focus on Choice Biases 
But there is more to be observed about the silent influence of interior 
situational forces over economists' experiences with choice biases. There is 
379. See id. at 260. 
380. Frederick, Loewenstein, and O'Donoghue argue compellingly that the old "idea that intertempo­
ral choices reflect an interplay of disparate and often competing psychological motives . . .  should be 
resurrected," because doing so "will help us to better understand and better explain the intertemporal 
choices we observe in the real world." Frederick, Loewenstein & O'Donoghue, supra note 1 53, at 393. 
Put differently, they, like us, are calling for a critical realist scientific revolution-though theirs is a far 
narrower agenda. 
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another, more general way in which prevailing knowledge structures in eco­
nomic and legal economic theory have evaded the most threatening implications 
of social psychology. It is no coincidence that, as noted in the previous section, 
it is choice biases that have been taken relatively seriously38 I by economists and 
legal economists. New subfields-behavioral economics and law and behavioral­
ism-have emerged in an effort to incorporate the choice biases into tractable 
economic models.382 
Indeed, Daniel Kahneman, one of several founders of behavioral economics, 
won the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics. The economics establishment cel­
ebrated his choice-based work precisely because it was so directly relevant and 
easily incorporated into many traditional, dispositionist economic models.383 
Choice biases focus on choice-the center of neoclassical economic theory. 
Thus, the behavioralist studies revealing choice biases are intended less to 
create a new general understanding of how humans think and more to reveal the 
flaws in the simple rational-actor and self-interest models of traditional econom­
ics. 
The narrowness of choice biases makes them the most straightforward and 
accessible means of disproving the predictions of unrehabilitated economic 
theory?84 With such discrete, clear anomalies, behavioralists pose the most 
immediate challenge to conventional economic models. But such anomalies are 
also the least damaging to, or the most easily accommodated by, models that 
continue to take preferences and choices as the centerpiece of human activity. 
3 8 1 .  Though not very seriously and not without substantial resistance. See infra Part IV. 
382. See infra Part V; see also Daniel Altman, A Nobel that Bridges Economics and Psychology, 
N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 1 0, 2002, at C I  ("Behavioral economics and experimental methods have become hot 
topics for graduate students in some of the nation's top economics departments. 'Many of the best and 
the brightest young graduate students are interested in these issues, and they're getting good jobs,' 
[University of Chicago] Professor [Richard] Thaler said. Universities in the United States, Europe, 
Israel and Japan have opened centers dedicated to behavioral and experimental economics in the last 
few years. David I. Laibson at Harvard credited the rapidly rising interest in the subject to the strength 
of its science. 'The field is based primarily on work that reflects real people's choices, '  he said. 'In that 
sense, the findings have an inherent validity."'). 
383. See Jon E. Hilsenrath, Nobel Winners For Economics Are New Breed, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1 0, 
2002, at B I  (noting that "[t]he Nobel committee praised the 68-year-old professor for 'having 
integrated insights from psychological research into economic science, especially concerning human 
judgment and decision-making."'). Kahneman's "prospect theory"-the work that many believe led to 
the Nobel Prize-is itself a dispositionist method of predicting consumer choices. It is, in other words, 
an important and seminal contribution to weak-form realism. See infra Part V.C.4 (discussing weak­
form realism). 
384. So it is that Richard Thaler, one of the most prominent of economic behavioralists, has based 
his important work on producing "convincing anomal[ies)" by finding "facts that contradict" the crisp 
predictions that flow from economics' "two key assumptions [of] rationality and self-interest." RICHARD 
THALER, WINNER'S CURSE 2 ( 1 992); see also POSNER, supra note 36 1 ,  at 264 (behavioralism "is defined 
by its subject rather than by its method and its subject is merely the set of phenomena that rational­
choice models (or at least the simplest of them) do not explain"); Andreas Ortmann & Gerd Gigerenzer, 
Reasoning in Economics and Psychology: Why Social Context Matters, in COGNITION, RATIONALITY, AND 
INSTITUTIONS 1 3 1 ,  1 33-34 (Manfred E. Streit et al. eds., 2000) (emphasizing the significance of 
"heuristics-and-biases" research for "identifying ever new anomalies, or systematic deviations from 
predictions of standard economic (game-theoretic) models"). 
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By focusing on choice biases, behavioralists do not investigate, much less 
challenge, the role of choice in the model, only the particular version of choice 
calculus conventionally assumed. Anomalies have thus been both easy to find 
and easy to present without implicating a far more thorough indictment of the 
entire economic paradigm that social psychology, taken seriously, would yield. 
Economists and economic behavioralists have thus been able to maintain their 
assumption about preference-driven, choice-making actors, while disputing only 
the extent to which that actor operates according to more or less rigid rationality 
assumptions. By focusing on choice biases, in other words, economists have 
been able to ignore the situation.385 
But this is not a dispositional critique. We are not saying-nor do we 
believe-that economists ignore situational influences consciously or deliber­
ately. They have been ignoring it because of the situation-their interior situa­
tion (and, arguably, their exterior situation, which rarely places them in direct 
contact with individuals or ideas that would challenge their dispositionist 
axioms). Their shared knowledge structures, for example, have distorted what 
they see and how they construe what they see.386 And, because their knowledge 
structure is itself situational, they have no reason to doubt what they think they 
see-that is, dispositional choice. 
As this discussion helps to demonstrate, professional scientists and lay 
scientists are bedeviled by the same situation. Knowledge structures and sche­
mas are all around us, guiding our every, or most every, thought, and simulta­
neously assisting and distorting what we "know." The coloring concepts and 
theories we employ can lead us to focus on irrelevant details in our environ­
ment, to overlook the relevant details, and to misunderstand our world.387 As we 
hope the reader has already recalled (with the aid of the knowledge structure 
that we are attempting to create), that is precisely the mechanism behind the 
exterior and interior fundamental attribution errors. 
4. Summary 
Where lay people and economists see "thinking," they vastly overstate its 
significance and vastly understate the interior situation of our thinking-that is, 
our unseen cognitions. Social psychology and related fields make clear that all 
of our cognitive processes are more or less influenced by unseen and distorting 
influences, from heuristics and framing effects on one hand to schematic and 
attributional processes on the other. And all of those unseen cognitions and 
cognitive processes render us more or less vulnerable to outside manipulation­
indeed, the experiments revealing the cognitive phenomena simultaneously 
385. See infra Part V (providing a more general critique of this type). 
386. As we have already hinted, other interior situational features-such as motivation-may have 
also contributed to this tendency. 
387. See KUNDA, supra note 6, at 20. See generally Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra 
note 136, at 1 1 55-1 2 1 6  (describing those and many other distorting influences of knowledge schemas 
and categories). 
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reveal the extent to which they can be tapped through exterior situation. 
In short, this section has shown some of the ways in which, although it is true 
that we experience ourselves thinking, we do not think the way we think we 
think. There is more to the situation. And, as the next section illustrates, we 
have barely scratched the surface of our interior situations. 
C. ATTITUDES (vs. "PREFERRING") 
The previous section focused on the situation of our "thinking." This section 
focuses on the situation of our attitudes or "preferences." This section leads to 
the same sort of conclusion: although it is true that we experience ourselves 
preferring, there is more to the situation than what we perceive, and thus more 
to the meaning of preferences than most of us, legal economists and policy 
makers included, have appreciated. 
1 .  Some Evolution of the Concept 
a. The Traditional View-Stable and Causal 
We begin by reminding our readers of attitudes, the name that social psycholo­
gists have given to the concept that economists have called preferences. Tradition­
ally, attitudes were as central to the theories of social psychologists as preferences 
are to economists-and their centrality played a very similar role. In 1 954 
Gordon Allport claimed, "this concept is probably the most distinctive and 
indispensable concept in contemporary American social psychology.,,388 More 
recently, Richard Eiser claimed that 
[t]he term 'attitude' is probably used more frequently than any other in social 
psychology. There are few theories in which the concept is not explicitly or 
implicitly introduced, and few experiments in which attitudes are not involved 
somewhere among the dependent variables.389 
Preferences are similarly central to economic theories?90 One important 
difference is that while economists have, for decades, complacently assumed 
the actuality of their pre-theoretic concept of preferences, social psychologists 
have, for nearly a century,39 1 painstakingly applied scientific methods to test 
and better understand their concept of attitudes. 
Economists assume preferences are stable and exogenous-by which they 
388. Gordon W. Allport, The Historical Background of Modem Social Psychology, in HANDBOOK OF 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 3, 43 (Gardner Lindzey ed., 1 954). 
389. J. RICHARD ElSER, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: ArrITUDE, COGNITION, AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 1 1  ( 1 986). 
390. See infra Part V. 
39 1 .  For a description of some of the earlier, classic studies on the relationship (or surprising lack of 
relationship) between attitudes and behavior, see ElSER, supra note 389, at 52-53; FISKE & TAYLOR, 
supra note 72, at 530--32. 
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essentially mean dispositional.392 What social psychologists have learned about 
attitudes by studying them reveals attitudes are malleable and, for the most part, 
endogenously determined-by which we mean internally and externally situ­
ational. 
Before describing the situational nature of attitudes, it is worth highlighting 
that even social psychologists initially believed or expected to find that there 
was a dispositional "there" there. For example, Allport, in 1935, defined "atti­
tude" as "a mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience, 
exerting a directive and dynamic influence upon the individual 's response to all 
objects and situations with which it is related.,,393 In 1948, Krech and Crutch­
field wrote "[a]n attitude can be defined as an enduring organization of motiva­
tional, emotional, perceptual, and cognitive processes with respect to some 
aspect of the individual's world.,,394 Those definitions reflect an old, now 
largely rejected, version of attitudes-as "involving beliefs, feelings, and dispo­
sitions to act.,,395 
b. The Modern View-Neither Stable nor Causal 
It has only been through extensive social scientific efforts to pin them down 
that social psychologists have come to discover just how situationally contin­
gent attitudes really are: 
When one looks at those studies that have attempted directly to compare 
verbal expression of attitude towards a group or issue with other attitude­
relevant behaviours, a rather confused picture emerges. Sometimes the verbal 
measures provide quite good predictors of the specific kinds of behaviour 
under investigation, but very often they seem to allow no such prediction at 
all?96 
In response to the "many examples where measures of attitude and behaviour 
fail to correlate, or where correlations are found which are ambiguous with 
respect to the direction of causality," most social psychologists have maintained 
their allegiance to the concept of attitudes, but changed its definition?97 More 
specifically, "theorists seem to be moving toward a conception of attitudes as 
evaluations that are related in complex ways to beliefs, feelings, and actions. 
This newer approach allows the question of the relation of attitudes to behavior, 
392. See infra Part V.A. 
393. Gordon W. Allport, Attitudes, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 8 IO (Carl Murchison ed., 
\ 935). 
394. DAVID KRECH & RICHARD S .  CRUTCHFIELD, THEORY AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 152 
( 1 948). 
395. SABINI, supra note 8 1 ,  at 527. 
396. ElSER, supra note 389, at 52. 
397. [d. at 53. 
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for example, to be an empirical rather than a definitional issue. ,,398 
And what the empirical evidence has shown is, first, that "attitudes" as 
traditionally conceived-and as they are imagined by most policy analysts and 
policymakers--do not reveal themselves as stable determinants of human behav­
ior and, second, that exterior situation has an immense influence over the 
interior relationship between attitudes and behavior. As Allan Wicker put it in 
his summary of the evidence more than thirty years ago, there exists "little 
evidence to support the postulated existence of stable, underlying attitudes 
within the individual which influence both his verbal expressions and his 
actions.,,399 And, more recently, Fiske and Taylor summarize the role of situa­
tion by asking: 
Why should seemingly trivial aspects of a situation have such a clear impact 
on people's behavior? Why should it matter what you temporarily access 
about your past behaviors or beliefs? Situationally induced salience can put 
relevant attitudes . . .  in the mental foreground, making them more available 
as guides to action . . . .  What is salient defines the situation for the individual, 
reducing ambiguity and inconsistency . . .  ; it tells you what should be 
relevant to your behavior if you are uncertain of what to do. Finally, when 
[your] global attitudes . . .  are made salient, responsibility for behaving 
consistently with one's attitude will loom large . . . . To predict which cogni­
tions will cohere with behavior, then, one must know which factors in a 
situation are salient.4OO 
Again, the exterior situations interact with our interior situations-all outside of 
our conscious perception and all while we perceive ourselves to be acting 
according to our thoughts and preferences. 
To be sure, we have some articulable attitudes. B ut even those attitudes are 
far more situationally contingent than we appreciate. And any situation in which 
we report or perceive our attitudes will rarely correlate with our actual behavior 
in other situations, or even our reporting or perception of our attitudes in other 
situations .  Our failure to appreciate the role of our interior situations further 
interferes with our dispositionist expectations that attitudes will define our 
behavior. The following subsection offers a more thorough, though still sum­
mary, examination of the interior situation giving shape to our attitudes. 
c. The Emerging View-Implicit and Automatic 
While social psychologists first believed attitudes to be outside the reach of 
398. SABINI, supra note 8 1 ,  at 527-28. This newer approach to attitudes helps to illustrate the 
contribution that social cognition has made to its primary antecedent, social psychology. See FiSKE & 
TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 464 ("Social cognition's main contribution to the field of attitude research has 
been a fine-grained analysis of the mediating processes involved in attitude formation and change."). 
399. Allan W. Wicker, Attitudes Versus Action: The Relationship of Verbal and Overt Behavioral 
Responses to Attitude Objects, 25 J. Soc. ISSUES 4 1 ,  75 ( 1969). 
400. FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 53 1-32. 
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measurement, they have come to see that "attitudes"-an individual's assess­
ment of an object along a favorable-unfavorable dimension--could be measured 
and did influence people's feelings, cognitions, and behavior. Again, attitudes 
were long a cornerstone concept in social psychology, and their measurement, 
through a variety of self-report mechanisms such as feeling thermometers and 
questionnaires, became one of the major preoccupations of social psychology. 
But emerging out of those then-revolutionary views of attitudes as measurable 
is what today some describe as "an orthodoxy," which has made difficult the 
recognition of a less visible (more situational), but still measurable, type of 
attitude.401 
In the last several years, social psychologists have encountered "new, previ­
ously undetected forms of attitudes" that "elude conscious awareness, seem 
oblivious to conscious intention, and defy conscious control.,,402 Perhaps be­
cause of the recentness of the findings, they go by a number of names, including 
implicit attitudes, "automatic thoughts and feelings," "unconscious thoughts," 
"unconscious social cognition,,,403 and "automatically activated attitudes .,,404 
Whatever their name, the phenomena are revealed through new methods that, 
very loosely, involve measuring the speed and strength with which people 
automatically make associations between objects and attitudes.405 Through such 
work, psychologists have found that the evidence regarding our worst tenden­
cies-including stereotyping and prejudice-suggests that they 
operate via the rou'6.ne mechanisms of perception, memory, categorization, 
and decision-making. Just as those processes operate outside awareness, 
control, intention, and self-reflection, so do their more value-laden versions 
concerning stereotypes and attitudes about individual humans and the social 
groups to which they belong.406 
The best evidence further indicates that "our minds contain knowledge about 
social groups (stereotypes) and attitudes (prejudice) toward them-whether we 
want to or not.,,407 And that knowledge and those attitudes are influencing us 
even if we don't want them to, and despite our best conscious efforts to prevent 
it.408 The findings are so disturbing that even social psychologists have strongly 
resisted them "with a passion atypical of the sterility of normal academic 
40 1 .  See Banaji, Implicit Attitudes, supra note 1 05, at 1 1 7, 1 1 8. For a discussion of whether implicit 
attitudes are indeed attitudes or are something else, see id. at 1 20-3 1 .  
402. Id. at 1 1 8. 
403. Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice, supra note 1 05,  at 8. 
404. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes, supra note 105, at 1 1 9. 
405. See William A. Cunningham, Kristopher J. Preacher & Mahzarin R. Banaji, bnpiicit Attitude 
Measures, 12  AM. PSYCHOL. Soc. 1 63 (2001 )  (describing and assessing the various related techniques). 
406. Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice, supra note 1 05,  at 9.  
407. Id. 
408. See id. 
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exchange. ,,409 
The work on these newly discovered forms of attitudes is a collaborative 
effort among numerous social psychologists at nearly as many universities.4 l O  
Rather than recount that effort here, we will simply highlight some of the key 
findings that have come out of the work. First, researchers have found that 
people . have stronger "automatic preferences" for groups with which they 
associate themselves-what social-psychologists call "in-groups"-than they 
do for "out-groups," or people with whom they do not associate. Those findings 
are nof uniform, however, for it has also been demonstrated that individuals 
who identify with groups that are dominant within the larger culture have 
stronger automatic in-group preferences than do individuals from less dominant 
groups. So, for example, white Americans appear to have a stronger implicit 
in-group preference than do African-Americans. Further, stereotypical "knowl­
edge" about different social groups, whether more or less dominant, is activated 
automatically-such that, for example, the terms "black" and "athlete" are 
implicitly associated.4 1 1  
Perhaps the most staggering insight of the implicit attitudes research is that 
the human mind does all this--conjuring stereotypical and dubious associations 
that give shape to our attitudes-outside our conscious awareness. What is 
more, as is true with every situational phenomenon, our implicit attitudes are 
subject to external situational influence. The very studies evoking implicit 
attitudes demonstrate that point. Such studies have also demonstrated that 
exposure to unfamiliar or counter-stereotypical associations can temporarily 
reshape implicit attitudes; with the right situational manipulations, for example, 
subjects begin to automatically associate the terms "strong" and "female," or 
"black" and "good.,,4 1 2  In sum, the important research indicates some of the 
ways that our attitudes are formed and altered by forces beyond our conscious 
awareness.4 1 3  
The scholars working i n  the burgeoning field o f  implicit attitudes admit to 
being quite "taken aback" by many of their own findings.4 1 4  And, in reconciling 
409. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes, supra note 105,  at 1 1 8;  see also id. at 1 1 9 (explaining that "issues 
and questions raised by experts and lay audiences appear to be equal in sophistication"); John A. Bargh, 
The Cognitive Monster: The Law Against the Controllability of Automatic Stereotype Effects, in 
DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 361 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999). 
4 1 0. A useful description of the work, as well as a collection of the relevant evidence, is available at 
http://projectimplicit.net (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
4 1 1 .  Those implicit patterns are evident in both individuals who are members of the group that is 
automatically associated with some quality, and for individuals who are outside the group. For an 
illuminating review of the evidence of a "pro-white preference," see Banaji, Implicit Attitudes, supra 
note 105, at 137-45. 
4 1 2. See Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice, supra note 1 05 ,  at 9-10. 
4 1 3. For more extensive discussions of that research, see Jason Mitchell, Brian Nosek & Mahzarin 
Banaji, Category Salience Determines Implicit Attitudes Toward Black Female and White Male Targets 
(Paper presented at the First Annual Meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, 
Nashville, Tenn., 2000), available at http://projectimplicit.net/nosekltalklSPSP.mitchell.handout.2000.doc. 
4 14. See, e.g., Banaji, Implicit Attitudes, supra note 1 05, at 1 36. 
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that surprise with their findings, they emphasize, as do we (though in slightly 
different terms), the parallel between our inability to see highly influential 
features of our exterior situations and our inability to see such features of our 
interior situations: 
Just as social psychology's demonstrations of the power of social situation 
revealed something stunning and even jarring about the ordinary nature of 
horrific behavior, research on unconscious social cognition has the potential to 
nudge us similarly toward unappealing conclusions about ourselves: that the 
stuff in our minds about ourselves and other humans, about our social groups 
and theirs, can be activated automatically and that once activated they can 
potentially produce psychologically and socially beneficial and harmful ef­
fects.4 15 
That we resist recogmzmg or accepting such "stunning and even jarring" 
evidence about "the stuff in our minds" is in part the consequence of another 
element of our interior situations: motivation. 
2. Motivation 
To more completely understand our attitudes, such as they are, it is necessary 
to understand the role of motivation. Social psychologist Bernard Weiner claims 
that "motivation lies at the heart, the very center, of psychology.,,4 1 6  In the 
previous section we cited social psychologists claiming that "attitudes" were at 
the core of their discipline.4 17  And, as this section will help show, the two 
claims are not necessarily inconsistent, for motivations may well be at the heart 
of our attitudes. 
We might put the point slightly differently and claim that motivation lies at 
the heart of our interior situations. We have already suggested some of the 
effects of motivation on our cognitions. For instance, we argued that people 
were motivated to construe their world in a way that confirmed their knowledge 
structures, theories, or schemas.41 8 But we can go further. Motivations influence 
not only what "data" we focus on and how we interpret ambiguous evidence, 
but also which knowledge structures, theories, or schemas we unconsciously 
embrace to begin with.4 19  Motivations likewise have a significant influence on 
our attitudes-what our attitudes are at any given moment and how tenaciously 
we will resist altering them. And motives, like attitudes, are easily mistaken as 
"preferences" inasmuch as they "are the motor for behavior.,,42o 
4 1 5 .  Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice, supra note 1 05 ,  at 1 0. 
4 1 6. BERNARD WEINER, HUMAN MOTIVATION: METAPHORS, THEORIES, AND RESEARCH I ( 1 992). 
4 1 7 .  See, e.g., supra note 384 and accompanying text. 
4 1 8. See supra Part III.B. I .a. 
4 1 9. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 36, at 1 1 39- 1 2 1 8  (describing those 
effects). 
420. FISKE, supra note 233, at 14.  
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It is not just that our minds have a mind of their own (as the previous analysis 
has indicated), it is also that those inner minds have a motivation-actually, a 
whole set of motivations-of their own.42 1 In this section, we will describe a 
sample of findings concerning those motivations and some of the interior 
tensions caused by their coexistence. 
Motivations are catalogued and categorized in different ways by different 
scholars. In our review of the relevant literatures, four general types of motiva­
tions stand out as particularly significant aspects of the situational character's 
inner life: (a) the motive to understand; (b) the motive to self-affirm; (c) the 
motive to simplify; and (d) the motive to cohere.422 As our review of more 
specific motives will reveal, motivations can be, and often are, in tension with 
one another. The motive to understand, for example, is often in tension with the 
motives to self-affirm and simplify. The motive to cohere, then, pushes us to 
reconcile our conflicting motivations by altering exteriorly and interiorly our 
cognitions, attitudes, or behavior. But we are getting ahead of ourselves. It aids 
comprehension to first review one motive at a time. 
a. Motive to Understand 
Social psychologists, as indicated above, sometimes describe people as intui­
tive scientists because of people's strong desire to understand their worlds.423 
That motive makes sense: satisfying it helps people to predict and control their 
world (or at least enjoy the comfort that comes from believing they can).424 
In light of that explanation, it may seem more accurate to describe the motive 
as one of prediction and control, a motive that reveals itself as a desire to make 
sense of the world. To be sure, the motive to control is a robust one-though it 
will get short shrift in this Article. But social psychologists have not framed it 
that way, we suspect, because people's desire to understand seems often to exist, 
42 1 .  We have chosen to place the topic of motivation under the larger heading of attitude not 
because the effect of motivations is limited to our attitudes, but because there is no clear limit and they 
needed to go somewhere. We are motivated to include motivations but our schema-which, necessarily, 
cannot be up to the task of representing our interior situations--does not have a definite place for them. 
So, to include them, we will force our schema to accommodate our motive. The difficulty of 
categorizing motivation is not unique to us-nor is our reaction. Cf SABINI, supra note 8 1 ,  at 1 67 
(noting that the classification of motivations is "not so obvious[]"). In any event, our main thesis 
regarding the impact and importance of the situation is not harmed-indeed, it is probably ad­
vanced-by evidence that the situation is actually more complex than our construct suggests. 
422. Cf FISKE, supra note 233, at 15 (dividing motive into "belonging, understanding, controlling, 
enhancing self, and trusting others" (emphasis omitted» ; FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 2 1 1-26 
(breaking down motivational processes into the motives for "accuracy," "self-enhancement," and 
consistency); David A. Dunning, On the Motives Underlying Social Cognition, in EMOTION AND 
MOTIVATION 137, 1 54 (Marilynn B. Brewer & Miles Hewstone eds., 2004) (similarly dividing the 
motivational processes into the desires for "knowledge," "affirrn[ation]," and "coherence"). 
423. See supra text accompanying notes 1 84-86; see also KUNDA, supra note 6, at 141 (describing 
our motive to understand our world and to find an understanding grounded in reasons). 
424. See FISKE, supra note 233, at 17-18. For an early rendition of this explanation for the motive, 
see HEIDER, supra note 184. See generally Hanson, Reyes, & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra 
note 43 (reviewing that and subsequent explanations). 
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at least in muted fonn, even when their prospect of controlling or even 
predicting is remote.425 
Consider a pair of experiments providing a pure illustration of the motive to 
understand. In one study, subjects were shown from zero to three pictures of 
different body parts (hands, feet, and torso) of a man or woman. After viewing 
all of the selected pictures, the subjects were given the choice of either seeing a 
picture of the entire person or receiving a small sum of money as a "bonus 
payment.,,426 Those subjects who saw more body parts preferred to see the 
picture of the entire person.427 To be clear, subjects had no obvious personal 
stake in seeing the picture other than a desire to "see the full picture"-a desire 
to know. 
In the second experiment, subjects in one group were told that they would be 
asked ten geography questions.428 Then, prior to hearing the geography ques­
tions, the subjects were asked if they would prefer to receive, after completing 
the test, a candy bar or the answers to the questions. A second group of subjects 
was first asked the questions, and then given the choice between the candy bar 
and the answers. As the experimenters predicted, three-quarters of the subjects 
who were offered the choice before being asked the questions chose the candy 
bar-illustrating the well-known craving for chocolate in the bellies of the 
subjects.429 However, in the second group, who actually heard the questions 
before being offered the choice, half of the subjects chose to receive the 
answers instead. Hearing the questions stimulated the not-so-well-known crav­
ing for understanding in the minds of the subjects.43o 
In a quite famous study, Ellen Langer had experimental confederates ap­
proach strangers about to begin making copies at a library copy machine and 
ask if they could cut in.43 1 When the confederates provided no reason for 
cutting, saying only "Excuse me, I have five pages. May I use the Xerox 
machine?," sixty percent of the subjects honored the request. When would-be 
cutters provided a reason, however, saying "Excuse me, I have five pages. May 
425. We want to be careful not to overstate our point. The perceived inability to control a force, 
event, or outcome may sometimes weaken our interest in understanding it. Indeed, a major source of 
dispositionism is, we believe, the widely held sense that situation is, insofar as it is recognized at aU, 
presumed immune to any individual's choices. People tend to accept that which they perceive as fixed, 
and the belief that people should simply accept and make the most of their situation is a cultural truism. 
426. George Loewenstein, The Psychology of Curiosity: A Review and Reinterpretation, 1 1 6 PSY­
CHOL. BULL. 75, 90 ( 1 994). 
427. Id. 
428. See George Loewenstein, Drazen Prelec, & Catherine Shatto, Hot/Cold Intrapersonal Empathy 
Gaps and the Under-Prediction of Curiosity I ,  10 ( 1 997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
429. Id. 
430. See id. As stated by the authors, "people have limited introspective access to the factors that 
influence judgment and decisions . . .  and, consequently . . .  they cannot 'undo' the effects of informa­
tion received." /d. at 16. 
43 1 .  For a fuJI account of the study, see EUen Langer et aI., The Mindlessness of Ostensibly 
Thoughtful Action: The Role of "Placebic " Infonnation in Interpersonal Interaction, 36 J .  PERSONALITY 
& Soc. PSYCHOL. 635 ( 1978). 
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I use the Xerox machine because I 'm in a rush?," fully ninety-four percent of 
the subjects acceded.432 Thus, when subjects were offered a good reason, they 
were far more willing to give up their spot. People want reasons. 
But what Langer did next revealed even more about our desire to understand. 
When her confederates provided a meaningless reason (a "placebic" reason), 
subjects were just as willing to consent to the request as they were when the 
cutters had given a good reason. More precisely, when asked "Excuse me, I 
have five pages. May I use the Xerox machine because I have to make copies?," 
ninety-three percent of the subjects acceded.433 In other words, an empty reason 
can be as effective as a good reason in situations where both are significantly 
more influential than no reason.434 People want reasons so badly that they will 
sometimes settle for the mere appearance of a reason.435 
Relatedly, the reasons we provide for our own conduct are often demonstra­
bly inaccurate, even as they seem to confirm our self-concepts as attitude­
driven.436 In a series of experiments, Timothy Wilson and his colleagues have 
shown that, far from being stable predictors of behavior, attitudes can be 
manipulated simply by prompting people to consider their reasons for holding 
them. In a typical study, subjects asked to contemplate their reasons for liking or 
disliking a variety of posters (prior to selecting one to keep) expressed less 
satisfaction with their choice when contacted weeks later by phone than did 
subjects who were not asked to consider their reasons.437 According to Wilson, 
that "introspection effect" results from the fact that our reasons are not plucked 
from a garden of stable attitudes within us; rather, they emanate from our 
motive to have reasons, which, in tum, leads us to focus on the most "plausible, 
accessible, and easy to verbalize" "reasons" available.438 
432. [d. at 637 & tbl. l .  
433. Id. 
434. The results of this study have been somewhat controversial. Compare Valerie S. Folkes, 
Mindlessness or Mindfulness: A Partial Replication and Extension of Langer, Blank, and Chanowitz, 48 
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 600 ( 1 985), with Ellen Langer et aI., Mindlessness-Mindfulness in 
Perspective: A Reply to Valerie Folkes, 48 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 605 ( 1 985). 
435. See Jonathan St. B.T. Evans & P.e. Wason, Rationalization in a Reasoning Task, 67 BRIT. 1. 
PSCHOL. 479 ( 1 976) (describing and demonstrating how people's account of their own thought processes 
reveal little about their actual thought processes-and instead reveal our motive to cohere). 
436. As we'll see below, this experiment reveals more motives beyond just a desire to understand. 
See infra Part 1I1.E. 1 .  
437. See Timothy DeCamp Wilson et aI., Introspecting About Reasons Can Reduce Post-Choice 
Satisfaction, 1 9  PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 33 1 ( 1 993). 
438. See Timothy D. Wilson, Sarah D. Hodges & Susan J. LaFleur, Effects of Introspecting About 
Reasons: Inferring Attitudes from Accessible Thoughts, 69 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 6, 1 6  
( 1 995). 
That desire for reasons, and the tendency to focus on the salient and simplistic, reflects and helps to 
reinforce dispositionist schemas in Western cultures. The need for "reasons" would seem to be 
heightened by dispositionism, inasmuch as people are presumed to act according to the "reasons" 
generated by the interplay between their thinking, their preferences, and their will. In a dispositionist 
culture, we need to make sense of our behavior in a way that our fellows and we ourselves can 
understand. We need dispositionist reasons. The desire to have reasons also reinforces dispositionism, 
because dispositionism is the most salient and simplistic place to begin when creating reasons. That is, 
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Social psychologists have long recognized that our desire to make sense of 
our world is one of our strongest desires. But it does not operate independently 
of many other features of our interior situation, including our other, sometimes­
conflicting motives. It is important to resist the temptation to view those 
components of the situational character's interior as just discrete and incidental 
ambivalences in a dispositional actor's preference rankings. After all, the mo­
tives we are discussing here generally operate outside of our conscious aware­
ness. It is for this reason that we are so easily persuaded by the illusion of our 
own articulated reasons, and treat them, unreflectively, as truly the causal 
wellspring of our behavior. This habit of reason-seeking and reason-offering is 
deeply ingrained in us, running through unseen canyons of our interior situation, 
and leaving us vulnerable to exterior manipulation. 
As Ellen Langer's simple experiment illustrates, such situational influences, 
and the motives behind them, help determine how our motive to understand is 
satisfied. There are other interior motives, however, that also play a role. Our 
desire for understanding is closely related to the motive to be correct in our 
understanding-the motive to be accurate (or to perceive ourselves as accurate). 
That motive can strongly influence the nature of our mental processes-for 
example, the extent to which we rely on activated knowledge structures.439 
When our motive for accuracy is strong, our minds become more focused, we 
are more calculating and diagnostic in our evaluations, and we rely less on 
general heuristics.440 The motive to be accurate, however, is not the only thing 
that drives our understanding, for our drive for accuracy is often confounded by 
more solipsistic ventures supporting a very powerful motive well studied by 
social psychology-the motive for self-affirmation. 
b. Motive to Self-Affirm 
At virtually every level of their existence, people tend toward self-affirming 
attitudes and cognitions. There are different ways of describing this motive. 
Susan Fiske summarizes it by stating that "[a]ll else being equal, people 
basically like to feel good about themselves . . .  ; they like to feel that they are 
good and lovable.,,44 1 David Dunning stresses that "[i]f there is any theme that 
emerges again and again in social psychology it is that the [situational charac-
because the notion that human behavior reflects thinking, preferring, and willing is so widely accepted. 
and because that notion so easily explains (albeit tautologically) most behavior, dispositionism also 
quite naturally becomes the "reason" people settle on when they seek to explain, understand, predict, or 
control human behavior. Absent that schema, the goals of explaining behavior, assigning responsibility, 
and altering conduct seem complex and intractable. Similar dynamics help to explain why the 
dispositionist reasons offered for individual conduct in this culture tend to boil down to simple, often 
materialistic, notions of self-interest. See Dale T. Miller, The Norm of Self-Interest, 54 AM. PSYCHOLO­
GIST 1053 ( 1 999) (describing ways in which the schemas or norms of self-interest are self-fulfilling). 
439. See Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 36, at 1 1 82-1 2 1 1 .  
440. See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 1 08 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 48 1-82 ( 1 990). 
44 1 .  FISKE, supra note 233, at 22. 
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ter] is a prideful one.,,442 
This motivation can be at odds with, and often overwhelms, accuracy mo­
tives. Research has shown that our pride is routinely misplaced, and that the 
impressions we form and maintain of ourselves have been widely demonstrated 
to be more self-affirming than accurate. Our self-conceptions are thus "falsely 
positive.,,443 
The motive for self-affirmation is aided by the confirmatory bias. We enter­
tain a view of ourselves that is favorable, and in our mental life we search for 
and highlight evidence that will tend to confirm rather than disprove that 
view.444 And we do that with respect to our individual selves, the groups with 
which we identify, and the systems of which we are part. 
i. Individual 
On the individual level, "research . . .  shows that people[] . . .  are heavily 
influenced by the need to feel good about themselves and to maintain self­
esteem ' "  . [R]esearch suggests that the impressions that people hold of 
themselves may be falsely positive and somewhat exaggerated with respect to 
their actual abilities, talents, and social skills.,,445 People are "eager to affirm 
. . .  [that they are] competent, masterful, successful, and moral indvidual[s] ., ,446 
As those conclusory statements suggest, there are innumerable studies reveal­
ing people's tendency to hold unrealistically rosy self-conceptions. This is why 
this motive is described as the motive to self-affirm-not a motive to under­
stand oneself accurately, but rather a desire to feel good about oneself. In one 
study, researchers led a group of subjects to believe that extroversion was 
correlated with success and a second group to believe that introversion was.447 
Later, the first group of subjects reported themselves to be extroverts, and the 
second group claimed to be introverts. No matter the requisite personality trait, 
then, people found a way to see (or portray) themselves as poised for success. 
The mechanism making those optimistic beliefs possible were, of course, 
hidden below the horizon of interior situations. According to the scholars 
conducting the experiments, the mechanism is similar to confirmatory bias, but 
here the relevant data was found in each person's memory of herself. The 
motive to be viewed as successful made salient those memories of extroversion 
or introversion that could confirm the desired personality trait. 
442. David Dunning, On the Motives Underlying Social Cognition, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: INTRA INDIVIDUAL PROCESS 348, 352 (Abraham Tesser & Norbert Schwarz eds., 
200 1 ). 
443. See FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 2 1 2-16; see also A.G. Greenwald, F.S. Bellezza, & M.R.  
Banaji, Is Self-Esteem a Central Ingredient of the Self-Concept?, 14 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 34 ( 1 988); Kunda, supra note 440, at 485-86. 
444. See KUNDA, supra note 6, at 1 1 9. 
445. FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 2 1 2-13 .  
446. Dunning, supra note 442, at  352. 
447. Rasyid Sanitioso, Ziva Kunda & Geoffrey Fong, Motivated Recall of Autobiographical Memory, 
59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 229 ( 1 990). 
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The tendency towards optimism is ubiquitous in human self-perception. Neil 
Weinstein has devoted a significant portion of his impressive career to showing 
how people perceive themselves to be less likely than others to experience 
negative outcomes and more likely than others to experience positive out­
comes.448 College students are six times more likely to think that they will have 
above average job satisfaction than below average and six times more likely to 
think they have an above average chance of being homeowners than a below 
average chance.449 Ninety-seven percent of consumers think they have a better­
than-average ability to avoid power mower or bicycle accidents.45o And ninety 
percent of drivers consider themselves to be better-than-average drivers.45 1 Our 
optimism bias and perception of a just world may even transcend to the 
heavens- literally. Polling shows that while 90% of Americans believe in 
heaven, only 73% believe in hell. As Weinstein might predict, even some 
believers skew their odds for a positive outcome in the afterlife: a full 94% of 
those who believe in heaven think they have fair-to-excellent chances of going 
to heaven, while a paltry 6% of those who believe in hell think they' l l  end up in 
hell.452 Although proving those estimates wrong is, at this stage of our research, 
difficult, they do seem a bit skewed in the direction that we would predict. 
Whether in avoiding accidents or achieving success here or hereafter, we 
humans tend to be optimistic souls. 
For our purposes, and perhaps for legal theory generally, one of the most 
revealing manifestations of our self-affirming tendencies is what social psycholo­
gists call the illusion of control: People believe themselves to exercise more 
control over their environments than they actually do-an illusion that itself 
reflects an underlying motive to exercise control. In one demonstration of that 
illusion, Ellen Langer and Jane Roth asked subjects to predict the outcome of a 
series of thirty coin tosses.453 All subjects were led to believe that they guessed 
correctly fifteen times (half the guesses), but some subjects were led to believe 
that their first four guesses were correct, while others were led to believe that 
four of their first five were incorrect. Those with early success rated their own 
overall performance more highly than did the less initially successful subjects 
448. See, e.g. , Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Heath Problems: 
Conclusions from a Community-Wide Sample 10 J. BEHA V. MED. 48 1 ( 1 987). 
449. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J .  PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 806, 8 1 0  ( 1980). 
450. W. KIP VISCUSI & WESLEY A. MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND WORKER RESPONSES 
TO HAZARD INFORMATION 95 ( 1 987). 
45 1 .  OIa Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful than our Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACTA 
PSYCHOLOGICA 1 43, 1 46 ( 1 98 1 ). Retrospectively, too, we tend to be optimistic in our contributions to 
joint products. See Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Bias in Availability and Attribution, 37 J. 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 322 ( 1 979). 
452. Russell Shorto, Belief by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1 997 §6, at 60 (Magazine) 
(summarizing poll data). 
453. See Ellen J. Langer & Jane Roth, Heads I Win, Tails It 's Chance: The Illusion of Control as a 
Function of the Sequence of Outcomes in a Purely Chance Task, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
95 1 ( 1 975). 
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and were similarly biased in predicting their likely performance in future tosses. 
Significantly, subjects in the first group tended to see themselves as good (not 
lucky) guessers and subjects in the second group tended to see themselves as 
bad (not unlucky) guessers. In other words, subjects in both groups fel l  easy 
prey to the fundamental attribution error-failing to see the role of randomness 
in the situation and wrongly attributing perceived success or failure to their skill 
dispositions. The illusion of control is revealed not only in the tendency to 
dispositionalize the random event, but also in the fact that forty percent of all 
the subjects believed that they could enhance their performance at guessing 
random outcomes through practice, and twenty-five percent felt that their 
performance would be hampered by distraction.454 
In a second demonstration of the illusion, Langer gave office workers tickets 
for a random lottery.455 Some of the workers were able to choose their ticket, 
while others had their ticket assigned. All workers were then given the option of 
trading their ticket in for another ticket in a different lottery with better odds. 
Langer found that the first group of subjects (those who had chosen their ticket) 
were significantly less likely to exchange their ticket than were the second 
group of subjects. As she concluded, subjects were apparently under the illusion 
that by choosing their tickets they had increased their chances of winning the 
first lottery. Put differently, they believed that their choice had given them some 
control over what was, in fact, random-that is, situational. 
Some social psychologists have suggested that such self-affirming motives 
may contribute to the exterior and interior situational blindness that we have 
been highlighting. Thus, one can interpret through that lens the situational 
blindness exhibited in the study discussed above,456 in which subjects were told 
about the Milgram experiments and then asked to estimate how they would 
have behaved as one of Milgram's subjects. Most individuals believed that they 
would not have administered powerful shocks, a result that reveals the hidden 
influence of both exterior situation (pressures to conform) and interior situation 
(motive to self-affirm). As Mahzarin Banaji recently explained: 
[T]he discovery that . . .  the immediate situation may have [its] influence 
outside consciousness is hard to contend with . . . . The inability to draw the 
parallel to oneself, to realize the possible lack of control over one's thoughts 
and actions is stark and, I would add, psychologically interesting in its own 
right. It is difficult to see the power of the situation in oneself when the 
454. /d. at 956. 
455. Ellen J .  Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 3 I l  ( 1 975). 
456. See supra text accompanying notes 1 66-70. But see Robert J. Wolosin et a!., Predictions of 
Own and Other 's Conformity, 43 J. PERSONALITY 357, 376 ( 1 975) (reporting that oberserver subjects 
were not only able to preduct the degree to which participant subjects would conform to bogus 
estimates of how many times they had heard and auditory tone but were also able to predict their own 
degree of conformity if they were the participants). 
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outcome is unpalatable, just as it is difficult to see the influence of any cause 
that is not immediate.457 
As with the other elements of our interior situation, the illusion of control­
and the underlying motive for control-renders us susceptible to manipulation 
through our exterior situations. We tend to accept the frame of those who tell us 
we are in control, even when our control is limited.458 The illusion of control 
reveals how our motives for self-affirmation often coincide with our disposition­
ism.459 Indeed, the view of our "self' that we each seem to be attempting to 
affirm is very often that of a dispositional actor.460 
Sometimes, though, our self-affirming motives can conflict with our disposi­
tionism-that is, there are instances, such as following a failed or disappointing 
performance, that we look to situation for causal attributions in order to avoid 
the disheartening conclusion that that failure reflected our own dispositional 
shortcomings.46 I One experimenter interviewed politicians several months after 
an election. The winners attributed their performance largely to dispositional 
factors such as hard work, perseverance, skill, planning, and strategy. The 
losers, on the other hand, looked to situation, and attributed their performance to 
the politics of the district, their opponents' name recognition, to their lack of 
money, and so on.462 The groups thus revealed the two-sided nature of the 
self-serving attributions: "a ' self-enhancing bias' (attributing success to internal 
relative to external causes) and a 'self-protecting bias' (attributing failure to 
external relative to internal causes).,,463 
Our desire for self-protection is so great that people often engage in situ-
457. Banaji, Ordinary Prejudice, supra note 1 05, at 8. 
458. See Hanson & Kysar, The Joint Failure, supra note 298 (describing the ways in which cigarette 
manufacturers tapped into consumers' illusion of control); Benforado, Hanson & Yosifon, Broken 
Scales, supra note 54 (making a similar point with respect to restaurant industry); Hanson & Yosifon, 
The Situation, supra note 5, at 285-99 (describing how scholars recognize only the most palpable 
situational restrictions on volition); see also Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 32, at 
99-1 05 (describing the market's "illusion of freedom"). 
459. Or perhaps it is as accurate to say that our dispositionism is partially a reflection of our motive 
for control, or that our self-affirming illusion of control partially reflects our dispositionism. The causal 
relationships are, we suspect, multidirectional. 
460. See Steele, supra note 86, at 262 (describing our motive "to maintain a phenomenal experience 
of the self-self-conceptions and images-as adaptively and morally adequate-that is, as competent, 
good, coherent, unitary, stable, capable of free choice, capable of controlling important outcomes, and 
so on"). 
461 .  See SABINI, supra note 8 1 ,  at 1 67.  
462. John W. Kingdon, Politicians ' Beliefs About Voters, 61  AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 37, 141  ( 1967), 
cited in MILES HEWSTONE, CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION: FROM COGNmvE PROCESSES TO COLLECTIVE BELIEFS 
57-58 ( 1 989). 
463. HEWSTONE, supra note 462, at 58. These self-serving biases exemplify two occasions-and 
there are others-in which individuals are particularly likely to make situationist attributions. Even in 
those circumstances the attribution will be limited to only a tiny portion of the situation, as we have 
defined that concept, and is prone to inaccuracy inasmuch as it is motivated by the motive to self-affirm 
and not the motive for accuracy. See generally Hanson, Reyes, & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, 
supra note 43. 
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ational manipulation in order to "self-handicap" prior to accepting a chal­
lenge.464 In one intriguing experiment purportedly about the performance effects 
of certain drugs, college students were given a choice to take either performance­
enhancing drugs or performance-inhibiting drugs before performing either a 
simple or a difficult task. The group facing the simple task opted for the 
performance-enhancing drugs. The group facing the difficult task tended to 
prefer the performance inhibiting drugs. The second group seemed to want an 
excuse for their anticipated failure.465 In circumstances where we are uncertain 
of our own ability to perform well, we will often unconsciously create situ­
ational factors (or the appearance of such factors) on which we can hang 
responsibility for our failures.466 
Indeed, one common way of avoiding threats to our self is to avoid the 
situation altogether in which such a threat might occur. For instance, we might 
avoid the threat posed by an exam that purports to measure our intelligence by 
avoiding the test altogether. More SUbtly, we can temper the threat by altering 
our attitudes about its significance. If, for example, we' re worried about how 
well we will perform on such an exam, we may subconsciously find a way to 
make "book smarts" an unimportant feature of our identity.467 By such handicap­
ping--disengagement and disidentification-we protect not just the image that 
others have of us, but also our image of ourselves.468 Indeed, the subjects in the 
study discussed above self-handicapped to the same extent regardless of whether 
they believed anyone would know how well they performed the task.469 That 
we manage to fool even ourselves,47o reveals just how well hidden our motiva-
464. See, e.g., Dunning, supra note 442, at 357. 
465. See Steven Berglas & Edward E. Jones, Drug Choice as a Self-Handicapping Strategy as a 
Response to Non-Contingent Success, 36 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 405 ( 1 978). For a review of 
other studies of self-handicapping, see FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 235-38; SABINI, supra note 
8 1 ,  at 205-07. 
466. The example in the text arguably involves not situational manipulation, but manipulation of 
attributions from the stable disposition of intelligence to the non-stable disposition of intoxication. 
Those attributions are less threatening to the self, because they are ostensibly temporary. Similarly, 
individuals might want to attribute some embarrassing behavior to temporary dispositions (for example, 
choice)-"I meant to do that"-rather than to stable dispositions (for example, ignorance or dimwitted­
ness). In any event, the basic motive is the same, and social psychologists have shown that we adopt the 
same handicapping strategy by manipulating attributions from dispositions to situation. See, e.g., James 
A. Shepperd & Robert M. Arkin, Behavioral Other-Enhancement: Strategically Obscuring the Link 
Between Performance and Evaluation, 60 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 79 ( 1 99 1 ). 
467. Cj Steele, supra note 100, at 50 (explaining and reviewing evidence that one way to protect 
against stereotype threat, see supra text accompanying notes 252-65, is "by ceasing to care about the 
domain in which the stereotype applies"). For a more complete discussion of disidentification strategies 
including domain and group disidentification and less drastic types of selective disidentification, see 
Emily Pronin, Claude M. Steele & Lee Ross, Identity Bifurcation in Response to Stereotype Threat: 
Women and Mathematics, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 152 (2004). 
468. See Berglas & Jones, supra note 465. 
469. See id. 
470. Another possible explanation for such behavior is, not so much that people are attempting to 
trick themselves, but that people have, through the course of experience, generally pursued a goal that 
has become habituated. Social psychologists call those habituated motives nonconscious goals or 
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tions are within our interior situations.47 I 
ii. Group 
Individuals engage in the same kind of motivated reasoning regarding the 
institutions, groups, and situations with which they identify as they do with 
regard to themselves. This is hardly surprising. Our motivation to maintain a 
positive view of ourselves encourages us to maintain a positive view of the 
groups with which we are affiliated. And so, as a general matter, we do. Social 
psychologists have referred to that tendency (which is popularly known as 
everything from "patriotism" to "racism") as the "ethnocentric" or "group­
serving" bias.472 
The section on knowledge structures above473 discussed at length various 
forms of groupism-the human "tendency to view the world in terms of 'we' 
and 'they, ' with at least a working hypothesis that 'we' are somehow better and 
more deserving" than "they.,,474 Our emphasis in that section was on how 
knowledge structures-concepts, schemas, categories, stereotypes, and so on­
influence our cognitive processes and perceptions. But a review of that section 
should make clear that coupled with the "we-they" schema was a "good-bad" 
motivation.475 When the Rattlers and Eagles food-fought with out-group mem­
bers and uncritically embraced in-group members, a strikingly powerful and 
easily activated motivation was at work.476 "Merely telling [people] that they 
are now a group leads them to want to reward their own group more, and to see 
its members as having better personalities, nicer looks, less responsibility for 
any failures, and more responsibility for successes.,,477 The self-serving attribu­
tional biases of individuals also appear on the group level as "in-group members 
[tend] to attribute internal [or dispositional] causes to positive in-group and 
negative out-group behavior and to attribute negative in-group behavior and 
positive out-group behavior to external [or situational] causes.,,478 
automatic goals. See Tanya L. Chartrand & Clara M. Cheng, The Role of Nonconscious Goal Pursuit in 
Hope, 13 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 290 (2002). Interestingly, there is research suggesting that such noncon­
scious goals can be primed through exterior situation. See id.; Clara M. Cheng & Tanya L. Chartrand, 
Self-Monitoring Without Awareness: Using Mimicry as a Nonconscious Affiliation Strategy, 85 J.  
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 1 70 (2003). We discuss the role of automaticity in greater detail below. 
See infra Part III.E. I .  
47 1 .  See also supra text accompanying notes 256-57 (discussing methods o f  coping with stereotype 
threat). 
472. FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 80-8 1 .  
473. See supra Part III.B.2.a. 
474. Ross & N ISBETT, supra note 6, at 40. 
475. See supra Part I1I.B.2.a. 
476. See supra text accompanying notes 221-5 1 .  
477. FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 1 34. 
478. FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 72, at 80-8 1 (citing Miles Hewstone & J.M.F. Jaspars, Intergroup 
Relations and Attribution Processes, in SOCIAL IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 99 (H. Tajfel ed., 
1 982» . 
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iii. System (and World) 
Our self-affirming motivations extend beyond our self and group identifica­
tions. Just as each of us is motivated to believe that "I am good," and, with 
respect to our groups, "we are good," so too are we motivated to believe that 
"our world is good." 
In a pioneering project within social psychology, Melvin Lerner demon­
strated that people seek to confirm a ')ust world hypothesis." Through a series 
of experiments, Lerner demonstrated that, "we do not believe that things just 
happen in our world; there is a pattern to events which conveys not only a sense 
of orderliness or predictability, but also the compelling experience of appropriate­
ness expressed in the typically implicit judgment, 'Yes, that is the way it should 
be.",479 And, yes, "people get what they deserve.,,48o 
In one classic demonstration of the phenomenon,48 1 subjects watched another 
"subject" (actually a collaborator on videotape) apparently react with pain to a 
series of supposed electric shocks. The Milgrarnesque shocks were ostensibly 
punishments for errors in a human learning experiment. In one condition, the 
observers could, in effect, compensate the victim by reassigning her to a system 
in which she would earn money rewards for correct answers instead of continu­
ing to receive electric-shock punishments for incorrect answers. In a second 
condition, no alternative was offered and observers were led to believe that the 
victims would continue to be subject to the painful shocks. Thus, in the former 
condition observers were able to (and did) restore justice,482 while in the latter 
condition they could only observe their cohort's suffering. 
At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to evaluate the victim. In a 
result that has been replicated in numerous experimental settings, observers of 
the second condition, which could not be changed, tended to disparage the 
victim, whereas observers of the first condition, which was subject to improve­
ment, tended to be far more sympathetic to the victim. According to Lerner and 
Miller, "the sight of an innocent person suffering without the possibility of 
reward or compensation motivated people to devalue the attractiveness of the 
victim in order to bring about a more appropriate fit between her fate and her 
character.,,483 In short, we are motivated to resist a perception of injustice either 
479. MELVIN J. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD: A FUNDAMENTAL DELUSION, at vii ( 1 980). 
480. Melvin J. Lerner & Dale T. Miller, The Attribution Process: Looking Back and Ahead, 85 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1 030, 1030 ( 1 978). 
48 1 .  See Melvin J. Lerner & C.H. Simmons, The Observer's Reaction to the "Innocent Victim ": 
Compassion or Rejection, 4 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL 203 ( 1966). Our account of the experiment 
comes from the summary provided in Lerner & Miller, supra note 480, at 1 03 1 -32. 
482. See Lerner & Miller, supra note 480, at 1 03 1  ("[M]ost subjects took advantage of this 
opportunity to compensate the victim."). 
483. Lerner & Miller, supra note 480, at 1 032. Lerner and Miller also cite numerous studies 
replicating those results with diverse populations. See id. As with all motives, this motive is neither 
total nor omnipotent. The motive to believe in a just world may be fairly anemic when the perceived 
injustice does not implicate the observer. See Isabel COITeia, Jorge Vala, & Patricia Aguiar, The Effects 
of Belief in a Just World and Victim 's Innocence on Secondary Victimization, Judgments of Justice and 
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by restoring the perception of justice or by altering our perception that an 
injustice has in fact occurred. 
In our effort to maintain our belief in a ''just world" hypothesis, we tend to 
attribute bad outcomes to individual dispositions, because it is generally more 
comforting to presume that it is the person who was bad, rather than the 
situation. Another chilling, if somewhat dated, study in this area illustrates that 
phenomenon.484 Subjects participated in a simulated jury exercise in which a 
criminal defendant was said to have raped one of three victims. The victims had 
been arrayed along a continuum of "respectability": a virgin ("most respect­
able"), a married woman ("respectable"), or a divorcee ("least respectable"). 
Subjects found the virgin and married woman to be more responsible than the 
divorcee for the rape. Presumably, it was easier for subjects to derogate the 
divorcee, and to accept that her suffering was compatible with a just world, than 
it was for them to accept that the "respectable" married woman and virgin 
would, in a just world, suffer such a fate. To maintain their belief in a just 
world, subjects needed to find the married woman and the virgin more disposi­
tionally responsible for the bad outcomes they suffered: 
[T]he knowledge that innocent, highly respectable females can be raped was 
particularly threatening to the subjects' belief that the world is just, and to 
avoid the threat posed by this type of admission, it was necessary to find fault 
with the actions of the victim. Thus, the subjects appear to have tried to 
convince themselves that the victim was really not innocent and that she must 
have contributed, at least in some small but significant way, to her fate.485 
The same tendency to find fault with the actions of the victim will exist where 
the victim is of high social status or personally attractive.486 
Lerner's "just world hypothesis" has recently been substantially advanced by 
contemporary social psychologists who study the operations and influences of 
our thinking about the social systems with which we identify. John T. Jost has, 
with numerous collaborators, found that across individuals, and across many 
Deservingness, 14 Soc. JUSTICE RES. 327 (2002). Suffering in another part of the world, even if the 
victims might seem undeserving, can be attributed to forces well outside of our control and unthreaten­
ing to us. On the other hand, there are times when an injustice does implicate us and cannot simply be 
laid on the victim. The Oklahoma bombing and the terrorist acts of 9/1 1  are good examples. Indeed, 
that may well be part of what makes those events so horrifying. Our suspicion is that the word "evil" is 
invoked particularly when the events leave us with no way of alleviating or avoiding the harm and no 
way of believing that it is deserved. 
484. E. Jones & E. Aronson, Attribution of Fault to a Rape Victim as a Function of Respectability of 
the Victim, 26 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 4 1 5  ( 1 973). This summary of Jones's and Aronson's 
research comes from Lerner & Miller, supra note 480, at 1034-35. 
485. Lerner & Miller, supra note 480, at 1 035. 
486. Id. at 104 1 .  It is important to recall here, as always, that while group and system affirmation 
may be evident in some manner in all people, its strength and the nature of its manifestations may also 
differ widely across individuals and across societies. With respect to cross-cultural distinctions in the 
situational character, see Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 250-59. 
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kinds of social groups, there is a powerful motive to embrace and justify 
existing social systems.487 According to the theory they have developed and 
tested, people have a strong desire to "justify and rationalise the way things are, 
so that existing social arrangements are perceived as fair and legitimate, perhaps 
even natural and inevitable."488 The motive is so strong that it is often pursued 
even when doing so conflicts with our other self-affirmation motivations.489 
It is hardly surprising that individuals who enjoy high social status want to 
justify the system that supports and maintains that status. Legitimating the 
system legitimates their own success. But here is the surprising part-low-status 
individuals also engage in system justification, particularly when that system is 
under threat. And doing so often leads them to hold more positive attitudes 
towards high-status individuals than they hold of themselves or members of 
their own group. In other words, as strong as our motives may be to affirm 
ourselves or our groups, they can take a back seat to our desire to legitimate the 
social, political, and economic status quo-to believe, that is, that our social 
situation is just. 
There is a significant and growing body of evidence demonstrating people's 
strong incentive to affirm the status quo. In one experiment, for example, Jost 
and his colleagues identified distinct groups of high-status and low-status Jews 
in Israel, the former represented by the politically and economically elite 
Ashkenazi Jews of European ancestry, and the latter by the much less powerful 
and poorer Sephardic Jews of Middle Eastern and African descent.49o The 
groups answered questions about a range of social issues confronting Israel and 
about the dispositional qualities of social groups in Israel. Two different ver­
sions of the questionnaire were used. In the first respondents were primed with a 
description of the state of Israeli society that was "low threat"-it described the 
current state of affairs in Israel as "good" and prospects for the future as 
487. See John T. Jost & Orsolya Hunyady, The Psychology of System justification and the Palliative 
Function of Ideology, 1 3  EUR. REV. Soc. PSYCHOL. I I I  (2002); John T. Jost et aI., Non-Conscious Forms 
of System justification: Implicit and Behavioral Preferences for Higher Status Groups, 38 J. EXPERIMEN­
TAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 586 (2002); John T. Jost, Outgroup Favoritism and the Theory of System justifica­
tion, in FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN SOCIAL COGNITION 86 (G. Moskowitz ed., 200 1 ); John T. Jost & Diana 
Burgess, Attitudinal Ambivalence and the Conflict Between Group and System justification Motives in 
Low Status Groups, 26 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 293 (2000); John T. Jost & Mahzarin R. 
Banaji, The Role of Stereotyping in System justification and the Production of False Consciousness, 33 
BRIT. J .  Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 ( 1 994). 
488. Jost & Hunyady, supra note 487, at 1 19 (emphasis omitted). 
489. The concept of system justification has many theoretical forbearers, from Lerner's "just world" 
hypothesis in social psychology to the theory of "false consciousness" and dominant ideology in 
political economy to the concept of ideology in critical theory, race studies, and feminism. Jost and his 
co-authors acknowledge the influence of this work on the development of system justification theory 
and argue that the new approach provides a more coherent-and scientifically supported-picture of 
this widely recognized reality of our interior situations operates. See, e.g., id. at 1 1 1-19. For one, 
system justification theory is itself not focused on any particular nexus of in- and out-groups (like class 
or race or gender), but is meant to provide an explanatory framework that is instructive across, and 
within, various situations. See Jost & Banaji, supra note 487, at 1 1 .  
490. Jost & Hunyady, supra note 487, at 126-28. 
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"hopeful." In that version, when responding to the questions about social 
groups, high- and low-status Jews exhibited mild in-group favoritism. Members 
of each group rated their own group more positively on traits such as intelli­
gence, ambition, responsibility, work-ethic, and open-mindedness.49 \ In the 
second version of the questionnaire, respondents were primed with a "high­
threat" description of Israeli society, one in which the present state of affairs 
was described as "precarious" and prospects for the future as "bleak." In that 
version, the high-status Ashkenazi Jews continued to exhibit an in-group prefer­
ence. But this time, with the social system under threat, the low-status Sephar­
dic Jews exhibited an out-group favoritism, rating Ashkenazi Jews higher than 
their own group.492 Apparently, where the social system itself is under threat, 
the motive to affirm the system can override the desire to affirm even our own 
groupS.493 
System-justification theory has led to numerous hypotheses. Among them is 
the prediction that, under certain circumstances, "members of disadvantaged 
groups should have the strongest system justification needs.,,494 That hypothesis 
has found support from several social psychological studies and from data 
collected for other purposes. Indeed, "evidence from five US national surveys 
indicat[es] that members of disadvantaged groups show enhanced levels of 
system justification.,,495 For instance, "low-income Latinos were more likely to 
believe that 'the government is run for the benefit of all' than were high-income 
Latinos,,496 and low-income Americans and African Americans were both "more 
likely than others to believe that economic inequality is legitimate and neces­
sary.,,497 
What is behind the system-justification motive? Probably the best explana­
tion at this point stems from the "dissonance reduction" tradition. System 
affirmation, on this account, serves a palliative function both for high- and 
low-status individuals, soothing what would otherwise be irreconcilable ten­
sions about one's social condition: 
[S]ystem justification, as a set of beliefs and assumptions about the existing 
social system, serves a stress-preventing function by allowing the individual 
to feel that the social context is stable, understandable, predictable, consistent, 
meaningful, and just . . .  . We propose that in order to minimize or avoid 
certain kinds of stress, such as the stress that comes from perceiving that one 
is a victim of discrimination, people are willing to pay other psychological 
costs, such as those that follow from blaming themselves for their own 
491 .  See id. at 126-28. 
492. /d. 
493. See id. 
494. /d. at 1 22. 
495. [d. at 1 42. 
496. [d. at 1 42-43. 
497. [d. at 1 43 .  
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misfortune . . . .  It seem[s] to offer some measure of consolation to those who 
are disadvantaged as well as advantaged.498 
1 05 
There is another way of putting this: We dispositionalize, and attribute 
injustice to individual dispositional inadequacies or differences, in order to 
avoid the disconcerting possibility that our situations are unjust and, in particu­
lar, that our own suffering or disadvantage reflects system-wide injustice. Thus, 
in one study, "poor people reported more positive emotion, less guilt, and 
greater satisfaction when they felt responsible for their situation then when they 
made external (system-blame) attributions for their poverty.,,499 
For our purposes, one particularly important finding of system-justification 
research concerns the pivotal role of stereotyping as a legitimating device. lost 
and Banaji argue that system justification theory predicts not only when stereo­
types will emerge, but also what form stereotypes will take.5°O Because the 
motive is to protect the coherence of the system, the system-justification motive 
generates stereotypes of low-status groups that attribute the group's predicament 
to the group's dispositions, rather than to the situation. The dispositionalizing 
stereotypes need not be negative. Aaron Kay and lohn lost have identified a 
series of complementary, positive gender and class stereotypes (e.g. that women 
are kind and gentle while men are assertive and strong, and that poor people are 
happy and honest while rich people are miserable and dishonest) that increase 
support of the status quo without requiring victim derogation. 50 I Through 
negative and positive dispositionalizing stereotypes, an unjust system can be 
plausibly perceived as a meritocracy.502 And thus, system-affirmation is an 
additional influence entrenching our dispositionism.503 
498. Id. at 147 (citations omitted). 
499. /d. at 145 (citing lAMES R. KLUEGEL & ELIOT R. SMITH, BELIEFS ABOUT INEQUALITY: AMERICANS' 
VIEW OF WHAT Is AND WHAT OUGHT To BE 280-83 ( 1 986)). 
500. See lost & Banaji, supra note 487. 
501 .  See Aaron C. Kay & 10hn T. lost, Complementary Justice: Effects of "Poor but Happy" and 
"Poor but Honest" Stereotype Exemplars on System Justification and Implicit Activation of the Justice 
Motive, 85 1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 823 (2003). 
502. Evidence further suggests that the stereotypes enabling us to justify the situation are activated 
automatically-"implicitly"-and influence even those of us who reject the explicit renditions. See 
Mahzarin R. Banaji & A. G. Greenwald, Implicit Stereotyping and Prejudice, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PREJUDICE 7 (Mark P. Zanna & lames M.  Olson eds., 1 994); lost & Banaji, supra note 487, at 1 5- 1 6  
(citing Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 5 6  
1 .  PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 5 ( 1 983» . 
503. A possible lesson of system justification theory is that, to combat stereotyping and its status-quo­
supporting effects, it may be wise to aim less at changing individual dispositions and to focus more on 
changing the situation that produces the dispositionalizing impulse. Thus, lost and Banaji conclude that 
an important implication of the system-justification approach "is that a most expedient way of changing 
stereotypes is to change material reality"-that is, by altering the situation. See lost & Banaji, supra 
note 487, at 1 8; Alice H. Eagly & Valerie 1. Steffen, Gender Stereotypes Stem from the Distribution of 
Women and Men into Social Roles, 46 1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 735 ( 1984); Curt Hoffman & 
Nancy Hurst, Gender Stereotypes: Perception or Rationalization?, 58 1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. 
1 97 ( 1 990). 
106 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vo\. 93: I 
iv. Summary 
In a wide variety of ways, we humans tend to hold self-affirming beliefs and 
reach conclusions that at some level we are motivated to hold, while at the same 
time we under-appreciate the motives or that tendency, particularly in ourselves. 
Each of those motivations reflects and enhances our dispositionism and our 
reluctance to appreciate the situation. In other words, self-affirming motiva­
tions, hidden out of sight and out of "mind" in our interior situation, wield 
tremendous influence over our sense of ourselves, the groups to which we 
belong (or do not belong), and the systems in which we live. 
c. Motive to Simplify 
The simpler the better-it is difficult to think of a context where that axiom 
does not apply. Unsurprisingly, the same is true of our social theories. We prefer 
hypotheses that are simple, and we are motivated to bolster such theories and 
defend them against more complex altematives.504 We have already provided 
substantial evidence of this motive. Our discussions of heuristics and knowl­
edge structures suggest that such cognitive tendencies and structures result, at 
least in significant part, from that motive-we seek simple cognitions and 
schemas because the situation of our minds is such that they operate under 
scarce capacity, cognitively, temporally, and conceptually. People thus generally 
employ a kind of lay version of the celebrated principle known among profes­
sional scientists as Occam's Razor: causal explanations with fewer assumptions 
are to be preferred to those with more. Similarly, we prefer simple explanations, 
those that can explain the most with as little complexity as possible.505 Because 
we discussed several manifestations of this motive above, we will, for the sake 
of simplicity, offer no more examples. But a few comments about the interac­
tion of this motive with others seem in order. 
The simplification motivation may be congruent with-and may even further­
some of our other motives, such as our motive for understanding. Yet it is in 
obvious tension with other basic motives, such as our motive to be accurate. 
Our too-simple interpretive and analytic habits often keep us from accurately 
assessing much about our environs and ourselves. Somewhat less obviously, 
this conflict between the motive for simplicity and the motive for accuracy may 
spill over and cause discord for our motive of self-affirmation. Those basic 
motives506 then can conflict with each other. That difficult mixture of motives is 
504. See KUNDA, supra note 6, at 141 (discussing the motive to simplify). 
505. We believe that this motivation, taken together with our deep capture thesis, suggests some­
thing about the kinds of ideas that will be successfully employed in deep capture efforts. More 
particularly it suggests a reason for the success of law and economics as compared with more 
complicated legal theories. 
506. There are of course other motives that have been identified by social psychology, and 
refinements of these motives, that we are not reviewing here. Our treatment is meant only to provide an 
overview of this area of social psychology, and its implications for the situational character that we are 
here attempting to sketch. For a more exhaustive treatment, see Kunda, supra note 440. 
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held together by a yet another powerful motive-the motive to cohere. 
d. Motive to Cohere 
"One might say that this paradox-to be realistic, and at the same time be 
guided by high goals-lies at the heart of the problem of morale . . . . " 
-Kurt Lewin507 
107 
We humans seek explanations that are coherent, that we can make sense of, 
and that can be supported by reasons.508 This coherence motive animates the 
relationship and tradeoff among motives. Because we value coherence, the 
desire to see it in ourselves dovetails with our motive for self-affirmation. That 
powerful driving force in our self-conception has figured prominently in social 
psychological research. Inquiry into "cognitive dissonance," for example, has 
been a mainstay of the field for decades.509 Often it is the case, as we have 
already suggested, that our motivations are in conflict. Though motivated to 
view ourselves positively, our behavior can pose problems for that self­
conception. There can be many reasons for such dissonance-not least of which 
is the fact that we are dispositionist situational characters. 
While social psychologists debate some of the details of the cognitive 
dissonance dynamic,5 10  it is the basic pattern, about which most agree, that best 
illustrates the dispositional illusion. The dispositionist sees behavior as reflect­
ing little more than thinking, preferring, and willing. From that conception, the 
dissonance can be eliminated by bringing behavior into line with those interior 
elements. But it can also be, and commonly is, eliminated, by bringing the latter 
into line with the former.5 1 1  That basic challenge to dispositionism-that our 
behavior influences our beliefs and attitudes-has been a recurring theme in the 
cognitive dissonance literature: "Regardless of the exact motivational underpin­
nings of dissonance, the evidence clearly indicates that attitudinally discrepant 
actions can result in a reanalysis of the reasons why a person engaged in a 
certain behavior (or made a certain choice), and cause a person to rethink the 
merits of an attitude object.,,5 1 2  That subconscious task can be accomplished in 
a myriad of ways, from changing our opinions outright to more subtly trivializ-
507. Kurt Lewin, TIme Perspective and Morale, in KURT LEWIN, RESOLVING SOCIAL CONFLICTS: 
SELECTED PAPERS ON GROUP DYNAMICS 103 ( 1 948). 
508. See KUNDA, supra note 6, at 140. 
509. See. e.g., LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE ( 1 957). 
5 10. For an overview of disputes in the cognitive dissonance literature, see THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 335-37 (Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 1 998). 
5 1 1 .  See generally Paul Thagard & Ziva Kunda, Making Sense of People: Coherence Mechanisms, 
in 1998 CONNECTIONIST MODELS OF SOCIAL REASONING AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 3; Paul Thagard, Explana­
tory Coherence, 1 2  BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN SCI. 435 ( 1 989). 
5 12. THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 5 1 0, at 337. 
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ing a belief that is incongruent with our behavior. 5 I 3 
The important critical realist lesson here is not just that behavior may not 
reflect a preference or belief. That much we have said before when describing 
how situation can powerfully influence behavior--<iisposition notwithstanding. 
The lesson is also that our preferences, such as they are, are themselves 
malleable, constructed, and contingent-subject to changes in our behavior and 
in our situation. The malleability of our attitudes, combined with our sense that 
attitudes are stable, assists us in our motive for coherence. The motive for 
coherence, like the motive for affirmation, is manifested at several levels, as we 
next explore. 
i. Individual 
One of the earliest and best-known experiments demonstrating our willing­
ness to alter our attitudes in service of our self-image involved manipulating 
subjects to act in a manner contrary to their belief.5 14  Subjects were first made 
to perform a boring task-moving pegs on a board-5 15and then were requested 
to tell other potential "subjects" that the task was actually quite interesting and 
fun. One group of subjects was paid $ 1  and another, $20 (a substantial sum in 
1959). After describing the task, the original subjects were then asked about 
how they in fact felt about the experiment. Surprisingly, those who were paid $ 1  
reported finding the experiment far more interesting than those who were paid 
$20.5 16  In other words, those who were paid less changed their beliefs about the 
tedious task, internalizing their own efforts to persuade subsequent "subjects." 
Those who were paid more maintained their original-and arguably more 
accurate-belief. 
Simpler (dispositionist) models might predict that the less one was paid the 
less one would alter her belief about the activity. After all, a small amount of 
money would not offer an external signal to suggest, or incentive to believe, that 
the activity was worthwhile and worth embracing as such-but such a predic­
tion would ignore the motivational significance of self-justification. The sub­
jects receiving $20 had a ready means of reconciling the dissonance between 
their beliefs and their words to the third-party. Subjects receiving just $ 1 ,  
however, faced a bigger problem. Given the minimal payment, some other 
S 1 3. See J.W. BREHM & A.R. COHEN, EXPLORATIONS IN COGNmVE DISSONANCE ( 1 966); Linda Simon et 
aI., Trivialization: The Forgotten Mode of Dissonance Reduction, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
247 ( 1 99S); cf THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note S 1O, at 336 ("[T]he accumulated 
research of dissonance suggests that the negative feelings associated with dissonance can be reduced 
not only directly by modifying one of the cognitions involved, but indirectly by virtually any other 
means that would make a person feel less unpleasant."). 
S 14. See Leon Festinger & James M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance, S8 
J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203 ( 1 9S9), available at http://psychclassics.yorku.calFestinger. 
S 15. Subjects were, for instance, told to carefully turn each peg on a board a quarter turn. After 
turning all the pegs once, they were told to turn them another quarter turn. Later they were asked to 
remove each peg carefully, and then put them all back. After an hour, they were told they were done. 
S 1 6. See Festinger & Carl smith, supra note S 1 4, at 203. 
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method of reconciliation was needed, and a subconscious alteration of attitudes 
provided the necessary consonance.S 1 7  
Hundreds of experiments have replicated that basic finding.s l s  People are 
generally averse to being dishonest, and will avoid lying without good reason. 
One central lesson of the research on motivated reasoning, however, is that a 
ready way to avoid lying is to change beliefs rather than behavior. Dissonance 
can be induced or introduced into a circumstance of clarity and consonance, as 
it was here when the subject was asked to promote the experiment to another 
person. In nonexperimental settings such manipulation can obviously be more 
serious, sinister, or exploitative. 
As a more recent body of work has demonstrated, a change of attitudes is just 
one way to respond to a threat to "one's sense of oneself as an intelligent and 
decent person."S I 9  
Any thoughts and actions that bring to mind valued aspects of one's  self­
concept can also serve to reestablish one's sense of oneself as a worthy 
person, even if these are completely unrelated to the counterattitudinal behav­
ior. For a scientist, self-worth could be reaffirmed through reading a scientific 
journal, for a religious person through prayer, and for an art-lover through a 
visit to an art gallery. If, following a counterattitudinal behavior, one is 
reminded of these valued aspects of oneself, this will reaffirm one's global 
self-worth and, therefore, reduce the need to change one's attitude in the 
service of self-affirmation.s2o 
Instead of changing beliefs or lowering our self-image we can reduce the 
salience of local negative self-perceptions by searching globally for self­
affirming counterexamples. 52 I Or, as Claude Steele expresses it, "[i]n ego 
defense, people are concerned with the big picture . . . . It is the war, not the 
battle, that orients this system."S22 
This desire to see ourselves in a positive light is an important motive behind 
what Lee Ross and his co-authors have dubbed "naive realism"-the name 
5 17. Social psychologists often refer to this as the less-leads-to-more effect: the less obvious the 
explanation for one's behavior, the more one will tend to alter one's attitudes to make sense of it. See 
BARON & BYRNE, supra note 3 1 1 ,  at 150. 
5 1 8. See ElSER, supra note 389, at 92-99; Ross & NISBEIT, supra note 6, at 66; M. Riess & B.R. 
Schlenker, Attitude Change and Responsibility Avoidance as Modes of Dilemma Resolution in Forced­
Compliance Situations, 35 1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 2 1  ( 1 977); see also ElSER, supra note 389, at 
84-89 (reviewing portions of the literature on "intrinsic and extrinsic motivation" and the process of 
"overjustification"). 
5 19. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 22 1 ;  see also BARON & BYRNE, supra note 3 1 1 ,  at 145-46 (describing 
other responses, including the more "direct" methods of "acquiring new information that supports our 
attitudes or our behavior," trivializing the inconsistency by "concluding that the attitudes or behaviors 
in question are not important ones," and the "indirect" tactics of focusing on "positive self-attributes" 
or distracting oneself from the dissonance through some activity or even by drinking alcohol). 
520. KUNDA, supra note 6, at 221 .  
521 .  See generally Steele, supra note 86. 
522. [d. at 289. 
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given to "three related convictions about the relation between [one's] subjective 
experience and the nature of the phenomena that give rise to that subjective 
experience.,,523 First, we naively believe that we see the world as it really 
is-through objective, unfiltered lenses. Most of us think that we "get it" for the 
same reason that the vast majority of us believe that we are above average 
drivers-it is self-affirming. Second, it almost goes without saying that anyone 
else who is similarly neutral and intelligent will see the world as we do-that is, 
accurately. At times, though, we are confronted with views that conflict with our 
own, an experience that creates a kind of dissonance. That suggests the third 
tenet of naIve realism. When our interpretation of a particular situation appar­
ently conflicts with someone else's, something has to give. Because we presume 
that we see things as they are, something must be distorting the perceptions of 
those who see things otherwise. Social psychological research shows that an 
extremely common means of relieving that dissonance is to attribute the gap 
between our outlook and theirs to a lack of objectivity on their part. We assume 
that there is some dispositional source of their bias-lack of intelligence, or 
laziness, or corruption. To be sure, we ourselves will admit to having a 
particular vantage point and set of experiences that inform our judgment and 
perspective-but as it turns out, our particular background was the path to 
authentic insight. 524 
This is a key source of our biases: we don't  believe that we are subject to 
them (allowing us to trust our own clear vision) and we are extremely quick to 
see them in others (allowing us to distrust others' obscured vision).525 And so it 
is that we are quick to see ideological or political bias on the part of our 
adversaries and gullibility or vanity on the part of even our friends and family 
when they fail to share our worldview.526 And so it is that even scholars from 
one field of study are able to write off other fields of research writing on the 
same topic. Thus, Richard Posner writes: 
Economic theory itself (including the application of the theory to law), at least 
when employed for positive rather than normative analysis, has no political 
valence . . . .  [T]he sociology of law is, as far as I am able to judge, entirely 
523. See, e.g., Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naive Realism: Implications for Social Conflict and 
Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE (Edward Reed et aI. eds., 1 997). 
524. See id. ; see also Robert J. Robinson, Dacher Kettner, Andrew Ward, & Lee Ross, Actual Versus 
Assumed Differences in Construal: "Naive Realism " in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 404, 405 ( l 995) (describing naive realism as one's "unshakeable 
conviction that he or she is somehow privy to an invariant, knowable, objective reality-a reality that 
others will also perceive faithfully, provided that they are reasonable and rational, a reality that others 
are apt to misperceive only to the extent that they (in contrast to oneself) view the world through a 
prism of self-interest, ideological bias, or personal perversity"}. 
525. That asymmetry of attributions is what leads virtually all of us to believe that we are, ourselves, 
immune to the manipulative influences of marketing and advertising even as we acknowledge that 
advertising does work and that many people are easily manipulated. See JEAN KILBOURNE, CAN'T Buy 
My LOVE: How ADVERTISING CHANGES THE WAY WE THINK AND FEEL 27 ( 1 999). 
526. See Pronin et aI., supra note 337. 
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dominated by scholars of left-liberal bent. So uniform are their politics that 
they may unconsciously regard liberalism (in its modem "welfare state" 
sense) as part of the definition of their field, disqualifying economics from 
contributing to it.527 
They are ideologically motivated. I am not. 
1 1 1  
NaIve realism, in those ways, helpfully reduces the dissonance that we might 
otherwise feel and protects our existing perceptions, including our positive 
self-image. Unfortunately, it also is a major part of what renders us biased and 
vulnerable to manipulation-precisely what we like to believe we are not. 
It bears noting that a particularly common means of counteracting dissonance 
is to attribute other people's "distorted" vision to their self-interest, typically a 
monetary incentive to a vested interest.528 Indeed, it is that tendency to disposi­
tionalize people with self-interest that makes the "boring task" experiment 
described above so counterintuitive. When people are presumed to "like" what 
they find rewarding, it is jarring to discover that the poorly paid subjects 
enjoyed rearranging pegs more than the well-paid subjects. Experiments di­
rectly testing this phenomenon have shown that even people whose behavior 
reflects attitudes toward a social policy that are out of sync with their own 
self-interest will assume that the behavior of others will reflect attitudes that 
correspond with self-interest.529 
In sum, we see bias there, but not here-and, in either case, disposition­
ism.530 
ll. Group 
"[Sjocial man lives constantly outside himself and only knows how to live 
in the opinion of other[sj . . . . " 
� Jean Jacques Rousseau53 1  
527. Posner, supra note 249, at 274 (emphasis omitted). 
528. See Dale T. Miller & Rebecca K. Ratner, The Disparity Between the Actual and Assumed 
Power of Self-Interest, 74 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 53 ( 1 998) [hereinafter Miller & Ratner, The 
Disparity] ;  Dale T. Miller & Rebecca K. Ratner, The Power of the Myth of Self-Interest, in CURRENT 
SOCIETAL ISSUES IN JUSTICE 25-48 (Leo Montada & Melvin J. Lerner eds., 1 996). 
529. Miller & Ratner, The Disparity, supra note 528, at 58. And this is  true despite evidence that the 
actual link between social attitudes and self-interest is often much weaker than we suppose. See David 
O. Sears & Carolyn L. Funk, Self-Interest in Americans ' Political Opinions, in BEYOND SELf-INTEREST 
147 (Jane Mansbridge ed., 1 990); David O. Sears & Carolyn L. Funk, The Role of Self-Interest in 
Social and Political Attitudes, in 24 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2 ( 1 99 1 ). 
530. The tendency of dispositionists to dismiss situational accounts has been dubbed "naive cyni­
cism." See Benforado & Hanson, Naive Cynicism, supra note 78. Much of the tort reform movement 
and the anti-PC backlash can be understood as a manifestation of naive cynicism. /d. More generally, 
na'ive cynicism influences-and is currently dominating-virtually all significant public policy debates. 
53 J .  JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN Of INEQUALITY ( 1 754), reprinted in JEAN 
JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 3 1 ,  1 1 6 (G.D.H. Cole trans., Everyman 
1 993). 
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The situational character is no island. Our motive for coherence guides not 
just our own self-conceptions, but also our conception of ourselves as beings 
situated among others in groupings, which in tum provide a powerful guide to 
our understanding of ourselves and our world.s32 We are, of course, each a 
member of myriad groups, some more prominent than others in our self­
conceptions, from families, to workplaces, from nations to townships, from 
races to genders, from religions to political parties. Social psychologists have 
long studied the relationship between the individual and her group affiliations, 
and have been particularly interested in the influence of group identification on 
the formation and conception of the self. In the experimental literature, particu­
lar attention has been paid to the relationship and potential for dissonance 
between personally held beliefs and beliefs attributed to the group. 
In analyzing the coherence motive as it plays out in groups, social psycholo­
gist Philip Tetlock has proposed a view of what we are calling the situational 
character as not so much lay scientists or lay economists striving-within our 
limited cognitive budgets-to understand the truth of the world around us or to 
maximize our own preferences, but rather as lay politicians, striving to situate 
ourselves comfortably and coherently among our relevant identity-group constitu­
encies. We are motivated not only to make sense of our own behavior to 
ourselves, but also by the pervasive "expectation that [we] will be called on to 
justify [our] opinions or conduct to others."s33 Social psychologists have found 
that where our desire for approval is high, people predictably "adjust their 
public attitudes toward the views of the anticipated audience."s34 This is 
understandable and perhaps un surprising for a person motivated to maintain a 
favorable, and thus self-bolstering, perception of (and approval by) the groups 
with which she affiliates. But our motive for coherence runs deeper; we are not 
rationally conspiring dispositional actors, scripting our public performances of 
belief while, on the interior, maintaining our own authentic views. To be sure, 
such public deceptions do occur, but the deeper tendency documented by social 
psychologists is to keep our private beliefs and our public expressions conso­
nant. Tetlock writes: 
Attitude shifting becomes psychologically costly to the degree that it requires 
compromising basic convictions and principles (stimulating dissonance) or 
back-tracking on past commitments (making decision makers look duplici­
tous, hypocritical, or sychophantic) . . . . [E]vidence . . .  indicates that when 
these obstacles have been removed, and the facilitative conditions are present, 
attitude shifting serves as a cognitively efficient and politically expedient 
532. For a more general discussion of our motive for "belonging," see FISKE, supra note 233, at 
1 6-17. 
533. Phillip E. Tetlock, Intuitive Politicians, Theologians, and Prosecutors: Exploring the Empirical 
Implications of Deviant Functionalist Metaphors, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INTUmVE JUDGMENT 582, 583 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002). 
534. /d. at 585. 
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means of gaining approval that does not undermine the decision maker's 
self-concept as a moral and principled being, or his or her reputation for 
integrity in the wider social arena.535 
1 1 3 
Again, duplicity is not what drives us, but rather blindness to our interior 
situations and the divergence between what we see and what we do not see. 
Social scientists have discovered numerous manifestations of our motive for 
group coherence. That motive, combined with the self-affirming faith we place 
in our own knowledge structures, contributes, for instance, to a phenomenon 
that social psychologists have dubbed the "false consensus" effect.536 In a 
classic demonstration of that effect, subjects were asked if they would partici­
pate in an experiment on different mediums of expression in which subjects 
would be required to walk the streets surrounding the university wearing a (j 
sandwich-board placard emblazoned with the slogan: "Eat at Joe's.,,537 After 
indicating their willingness to participate, subjects were then asked to estimate 
. how other people would respond to the same request. The experimenters found 
that those who had agreed to wear the sandwich board estimated that a strong 
majority, sixty-two percent, of their peers would do the same, whereas those 
subjects who declined predicted that sixty-seven percent would respond as they 
did.538 This false consensus effect, a tendency to regard one's own views to be 
commonly held by others, has been demonstrated by more than a hundred 
empirical studies, over a wide range of topics from particular food preferences 
to broad political and social policy views.539 
The group-coherence motive combined with dispositionism can yield some 
troubling and otherwise perplexing phenomena. Because we are dispositionists, 
our perception that certain behaviors are common (or uncommon) leads us to 
perceive that the attitudes, preferences and beliefs of others correspond to that 
common (or uncommon) behavior. Because we do not ourselves subscribe to 
those attitudes, we infer from others' behavior that our attitudes are exceptional. 
That dynamic contributes to the tendencies known in social psychology as 
"pluralistic ignorance" and "false uniqueness." Both illustrate the power of the 
group coherence motive. 
Consider the illustration of the famous "Princeton drinking study," the signa-
535. Id. 
536. For discussion of the mechanisms behind the false consensus effect see KUNDA, supra note 6, at 
399; Steven J. Sherman et aI., Mechanisms Underlying the False Consensus Effect: The Special Role of 
Threats to the Self, 1 0  PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1 27 ( 1 984). 
537. See Lee Ross et aI., The "False Consensus Effect ": An Ego-centric Bias in Social Perception 
and Attribution Processes, 35 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 880 ( 1 977) (first reporting this study). 
538. Id. 
539. For reviews of these studies, see Joachim Krueger, On the Perception of Social Consensus, in 
30 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 63 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1998); Gary Marks & 
Norman Miller, Ten Years of Research on the False-Consensus Effect: An Empirical and Theoretical 
Review, 102 PSYCHOL. BULL. 72 (1 987); Brian Mullen et aI., The False Consensus Effect: A Meta­
Analysis of 115 Hypothesis Tests, 2 1  J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 262 ( 1 985). 
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ture piece in an influential line of work by Deborah Prentice and Dale Miller. 540 
Their studies revealed how students misestimated their cohorts' attitudes toward 
alcohol consumption and the gap between those attitudes and their own. Specifi­
cally, most students actually had a rather negative view of the state of alcohol 
consumption on the campus, but incorrectly assumed their fellow students held 
more positive views. Almost sixty-six percent of their sample endorsed the 
view, the second strictest of five graded options, that "[a]n occasional 'drunk is 
okay, as long as it doesn't interfere with grades or responsibilities." Less than 
twenty percent endorsed the two most permissive gradations. However, when 
asked to indicate what they though their collegiate colleagues' attitudes were 
towards alcohol consumption, more than sixty percent selected one of the two 
most permissive gradations-"[a]n occasional 'drunk' is okay, even if it does 
occasionally interfere with grades or responsibilities," and "[a] frequent 'drunk' 
is okay, if that's what the individual wants to do.,,54 1 In other words, the 
students exhibited significant pluralistic ignorance.542 
Prentice and Miller's study did not end there. They also examined how 
pluralistic ignorance might itself influence behavior. The bad news was that 
some subjects began to alter their own behavior and beliefs to more closely 
correspond with their ignorant perceptions.543 Prentice and Miller attributed that 
toubling example of self-fulfilling group perceptions to a basic motive to avoid 
dissonance with one's key constituencies. Once again, it is crucial to recognize 
that the subjects were not faking their new attitudes. These are not rational 
actors operating within stable preferences, altering their conduct through clever 
performance while remaining true to their core beliefs. These are situational 
characters in whom stable preferences and core beliefs are largely an illusion. 
Our behavior and attitudes and the behavior and perceived attitudes of our 
groups are all mutually constructed and reconstructed as the situation requires. 
As each of us looks out at others seeing disposition and missing situation, we 
infer attitudes that do not exist. But, as these studies reveal, our false percep­
tions can be tragically powerful as we each seek to bring our own view and 
behavior into sync with shared rnisperceptions. Prentice and Miller "believe that 
group identification is the root cause for many cases of pluralistic ignorance-
540. See Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller, Pluralistic Ignorance and the Perpetuation of Social 
Norms by Unwitting Actors, in 28 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 161 (Mark P. Zanna 
ed., 1996). 
54 1 .  Id. at 169. 
542. Prentice and Miller point out that the phrase "pluralistic ignorance" is an unfortunate one, not 
only because it is somewhat inelegant, but also because it does not actually describe the phenomena 
well. More than being "ignorant" about others' beliefs, for example, we are actually mistaken about 
them. Prentice and Miller stuck with the term, however, because, by the time they were writing, it had 
been around in social psychology for more than fifty years. Using the somewhat wrongheaded phrase 
helped to illustrate Prentice and Miller's point: "[W]e are simply conceding the well-known social fact 
that it is much easier to abide by an established convention than to change it. Moreover, it is precisely 
this concession that often gives rise to pluralistic ignorance." Id. at 161-62. 
543. Id. at 188. 
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that individuals often act of a desire to be good group members but interpret 
others ' similarly motivated behavior as reflecting personal beliefs and opin­
ions.,,544 
The problem of pluralistic ignorance and the motive for group coherence 
distorts many social norms and would seem to have significant implications for 
policy and law. The dynamic seems to be at work in creating and reinforcing 
gender and sex roles.545 It is also behind the pervasive, dysfunctional classroom 
dynamic in which students do not ask questions because they assume that 
others ' silence suggests they are themselves alone in their ignorance, thus 
contributing to the silence that encourages others to do the same.546 And so it is 
that even in most "learning" environments, ignorance begets ignorance. Perhaps 
most important, a form of pluralistic ignorance seems to animate the precise 
shape that our dispositionism takes in Western cultures-that is, of individuals 
devoted primarily to their own material self-interest.547 
Understanding the cycles of ignorance can help us break them. Prentice and 
Miller found that spreading the word about what most people thought about 
alcohol was more successful in discouraging heavy drinking than the notori­
ously ineffective (perhaps counterproductive) approach of encouraging students 
to not be moved by peer pressure.548 
In sum, as these examples demonstrate, our motive for group coherence is a 
powerful interior situational influence that, like the others, renders us subject to 
manipulation. 
3 .  Affect 
This Section has thus far focused generally on attitudes and motives. Each, as 
we' ve seen, could be mistaken (and has been mistaken549) for "preferences" by 
policy analysts. As previous sections illustrate, however, our attitudes and 
motives are simply not the well-behaved, stable preferences that policy analysts 
and policymakers generally assume. Put differently, although the intuitive, 
simplified, preference-based dispositionism that is foundational to law and 
policy is attractive to us, particularly given its simplicity and self-affirming 
implications, it is nonetheless wrong. 
544. Id. at 1 63. 
545. In addition to their famous drinking experiments, Prentice and Miller also pursued important 
studies of the role of pluralistic ignorance in the formation and internalization of gender stereotypes by 
children. See id. at 1 88-96; see also Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 35, at 1 207-1 1 
(discussing the self-fulfulling effect of schemas, including gender stereotypes). 
546. See Dale T. Miller & Cathy McFarland, Pluralistic Ignorance: When Similarity is Interpreted 
as Dissimilarity, 53 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 298 ( 1 987). Some social psychologists have 
referred to the self-perpetuating nature of the pluralistic ignorance phenomena as the "spiral of silence." 
See ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, THE SPIRAL OF SILENCE, PuBLIC OPINION-OUR SOCIAL SKIN ( 1 984). 
547. That claim is the topic of future work. For a fascinating review of social psychological 
evidence supporting that claim, see Dale T. Miller, The Norm of Self-Interest, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
1 053 ( 1 999). 
548. Prentice & Miller, supra note 540. 
549. See infra Part IV. 
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We are more or less unaware of the greater part of our interiors, and that 
ignorance plays an immense causal role in our behavior. Another important 
aspect of our interiors that gives shape to the situational character is emotion or 
"affect.,,550 Emotion is a topic that most legal scholars and laws acknowledge, if 
at all, only when it manifests itself in a blatant and unmistakable way. We are 
dispositional actors, according to this view, except in those rare and unfortunate 
instances when we are overwhelmed by emotion.55 I 
Social psychology reveals that this understanding of "emotion" is, like so 
much else regarding our self-knowledge, fundamentally wrong. That bold and 
broad claim is the topic of future work,552 so we will provide only a cursory 
treatment here. 
First, emotions are not just those rare overwhelming feelings we have when 
we are being "emotional." Emotions are instead a ubiquitous feature of our 
interiors, interacting with virtually all interior situations, including all those we 
discuss in this Article.553 Thus, our attributions influence our emotions, and our 
emotions influence our attributions.554 Similarly, emotions influence the extent 
to which we rely on knowledge structures and precisely which ones we rely 
on.555 We have affective responses to virtually everything we see, and those 
reactions (of which we are rarely conscious) immensely influence our behavior 
and cognitions.556 
-
Thus, emotion plays an immeasurable role in our day-to-day lives, though we 
perceive its role only in the most extreme circumstances when the emotion feels 
sufficiently intense to manifest itself in an unmistakable form. It is as though 
one were standing on Landsdowne Street on the outside of the "green monster" 
at Boston's Fenway Park counting balls that cleared the wall as our measure of 
how many times a bat is swung inside the park. Our nearly blind vantage point 
leads us to miss the vast majority of swings, and the vast majority of what is 
moving the game. 
Just as we fail to consciously sense our affective responses to our situation, 
we fai l  to appreciate just how powerfully the situation moves us. Few would 
expect, as social psychologists have demonstrated, that the stock-market tends 
550. The study of affect has produced an extensive, and growing, l iterature. See, e.g. , Daniel Gilbert 
et aI., Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 72, at 292; Norbert 
Schwarz, Feelings as Information: Mood Influence Judgments and Processing Strategies, in HEURISTICS 
AND BIASES, supra note 72, at 534; Paul Siovic et aI., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, 
supra note 72, at 397. 
55 1 .  In fact, the treatment of interior situation is quite analogous to the general treatment of exterior 
situation. We acknowledge the "heat of passion," like we do "a gun to the head," but little else. See 
David Arkush & Jon Hanson, Situating Emotions (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). 
552. See id. 
553. See Robert B. Zajonc, Closing the Debate Over the Independence of Affect, in FEELING AND 
THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN SOCIAL COGNmON 3 1  (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000). 
554. See Hanson, Reyes, & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra note 43. 
555. For a description of that interaction, see Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 35. 
556. See Antoine Bechara, Hanna Damasio, Daniel Tranel, & Antonio R.  Damasio, Deciding 
Advantageously Before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy, 275 SCIENCE 1 293 ( 1 997). 
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to go up on a sunny day-good weather creating pOSItIve affect in human 
beings, producing an optimistic expectation of high returns-and down on a 
gray day-lousy weather creating a negative affect, producing gloominess.557 
Beyond that market-measured behavioral response to one unseen affect, which 
has been observed in twenty-six different stock exchanges around the world,558 
social psychologists have found that our views about our own overall happiness, 
or satisfaction with our job, or views of our prospects for future happiness, can 
be powerfully influenced by own present emotional state.559 
Additionally, social psychologists have shown that by priming subjects with 
negative affective influences, such as stories of war or poverty--or by testing 
them on rainy days-subjects express far more negative views of totally 
unrelated matters, including their own overall happiness, than they otherwise 
do.560 Subjects in these experiments are generally unaware of the situational 
influences on their own subjective evaluations.56l Influential research in this 
area has shown, for example, that merely being exposed to a stimulus-whether 
the exposure is conscious or unconscious--can influence a person's positive 
affect towards that stimulus on subsequent exposures.562 
Thus far, the basic messages of the social psychological research we have 
highlighted have been, first, that emotion is omnipresent as an interior influence; 
second, that emotion is, whether we are aware of it or not (and usually we are 
not), immensely influential over our cognitions, attitudes, and behavior; and 
third, that emotion and affect are highly sensitive to exterior situation, including 
557. See Edward M. Saunders, Stock Prices and Wall Street Weather, 83 AM. ECON. REv. 1 337, 1 344 
( 1 993). 
558. David Hirshleifer & Tyler Shumway, Good Day Sunshine: Stock Returns and the Weather 2-3 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.cob.ohio-state.edulfinldice/papers/2001 /2ool -3 .pdf 
(last visited Sept. I I ,  2003). 
559. For a summary of studies, see Schwarz, supra note 550, at 534-36. 
560. Id. The importance of nonconscious situational influences on affect was discovered and 
elaborated in a series of studies by Robert Zajonc and his colleagues. See Robert B. Zajonc, Attitudinal 
Effects of Mere Exposure, 9 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPH I ( 1 968); Robert B. Zajonc, 
Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences, 35 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1 5 1  ( 1980); Robert B .  
Zajonc & Hazel Markus, Affective and Cognitive Factors in Preferences, 9 J .  CONSUMER REs. 1 23 
( 1982). 
561 .  Schwarz, supra note 550, at 536-38. Such findings about the nature of situational influences on 
our emotional lives obviously have important implications with respect to the potential for the 
situational manipulation of affective responses. See Paul Slovic et aI., supra note 530, at 4 1 7  ("As 
Epstein observes, 'Cigarette advertising agencies and their clients are willing to bet millions of dollars 
in advertising costs that the . . .  appeal of their messages to the experiential system will prevail over the 
verbal message of the Surgeon General that smoking can endanger one's life, an appeal directed at the 
rational system.' Through the workings of the affect heuristic . . .  we now have evidence suggesting that 
cigarette advertising designed to increase the positive affect associated with smoking will quite likely 
depress perceptions of risk." (citing Seymour Epstein, Integration of the Cognitive and Psychodynamic 
Unconscious, 49 AM . PSYCHOLOGIST 709, 7 12 ( 1 994))). See generally Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavior­
alism Seriously /I, supra note 132.  
562. See Robert F. Bomstein, Exposure and Affect: Overview and Meta-Analysis of Research, 1 06 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 265 ( 1 989); Robert F. B omstein & Paul R. D' Agostino, Stimulus Recognition and the 
Mere Exposure Effect, 63 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 545 ( 1 992). 
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those elements of the environment of which we are not mindful. Each of those 
findings contradicts the basic assumptions of dispositionism. 
Still, there is also evidence that in some circumstances our behavior appears 
to be controlled by something that looks like careful deliberation and choice 
based on the anticipated emotional effect of our choices. We seem to choose 
option "A" instead of "B" or "c" because we expect it to deliver us the greatest 
amount of happiness or least amount of displeasure. 
The "happiness" or "displeasure" that we seek or repel in this dispositional 
mode are, of course, emotions. And here emerges another major flaw in the 
dispositionist model. The best evidence about our ability to predict (or even 
remember) our emotional states reveals that we are often poor judges of our 
own well-being. The problem is not so much that we do not know what will 
bring us pleasure or pain. People typically are correct to assume that a new car 
will elicit some happiness and that a bad accident will generate unhappiness. 
The problem is that, owing to our ineffective forecasting, we vastly overestimate 
the intensity and duration of our emotional reactions to such happenings.563 
Winning the lottery, landing a good teaching job, and falling in love all may 
bring us some joy. Losing a bet, a job, or a lover will certainly bring sadness. 
But none of these events will affect us as much as we tend to imagine.564 
Because of this impact bias, "common events typically influence people's 
subjective well-being for little more than a few months, and even uncommon 
events-such as losing a child in a car accident, getting cancer, becoming 
paralyzed, or being sent to a concentration camp-seem to have less impact on 
long-term happiness than one might naiVely expect.,,565 
In one study, for example, associate professors were asked to estimate what 
their overall happiness would be if they made tenure, or were denied it. The 
study found that, in the short term, those who received tenure were less happy 
than they expected, and those who were denied tenure were happier than they 
predicted.566 Another study asked student respondents who were involved in 
committed, long-term relationships to estimate what their happiness levels 
would be if they suffered a break-up. Their happiness estimates were far lower 
than the actual reported happiness levels of other students who had recently 
suffered a break-up.567 
Our pattern of poorly forecasting our affective states has been demonstrated 
in a number of studies of political events. One version of the study asked 
Republicans and Democrats how happy or unhappy they thought they would be 
the week following the 1996 presidential election if Bill Clinton were re-
563. See generally Gilbert et aI., supra note 550. 
564. This tendency reflects, in part, a problem we highlighted above: the failure of our imaginations 
to see beyond the salient. We see the imagined event plainly, but it eclipses other events that will serve 
to counteract it. 
565. Gilbert et aI., supra note 550, at 292 (collecting studies) (citations omitted). 
566. [d. at 299-300. 
567. [d. at 297-99. 
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elected. A week after the election, Democrats who had predicted that they 
would be substantially happier if Clinton won in fact reported overall happiness 
levels that were no different than before the election. Republicans were only 
slightly less happy overall than they were before the election, although they had 
predicted that they would be substantially less happy.568 Even in ordinary 
circumstances that we experience repeatedly-such as consumer or employ­
ment decisions-we continue to make the same affective forecasting errors 
again and again.569 There is apparently too much working in favor of the 
maintenance of our dispositionism for it to be compromised by evidence of it 
failing us. 
The basic lesson of affective forecasting research is clear. Despite our overly 
optimistic and overly pessimistic predictions, the truth about ourselves is, as 
Daniel Gilbert and his co-authors put it: "Most people are reasonably happy 
most of the time, and most events do little to change that for long.,,57o 
So what explains this inability to accurately assess our own emotional 
reactions? There are, it seems, numerous causes. But most of them stem from 
our dispositionist tendencies and the fact that we miss most of the effect of our 
exterior and interior situations. Thus, when people overestimate just how happy 
winning a lottery will make them, or just how unhappy becoming a paraplegic 
will leave them, they do so largely because they are incapable of seeing past the 
salient situational factor-a million dollars or life in a wheelchair-to all the 
other situational influences that help determine their overall level of happiness. 
Similarly, we vastly underestimate the way our interior situation is motivated­
well-equipped to make the "bad outcome" seem not so bad-and to make the 
opportunities missed appear, like unreachable grapes, sour. Our affective forecast­
ing, then, responds to our dispositionist intuitions and tendencies, while our 
emotions respond as well to our situations.57 I 
568. See Timothy D. Wilson et aI., Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting, 
78 1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 82 1 ,  822 (2000). 
569. See B.L. Fredrickson & Daniel Kahneman, Duration Neglect in Retrospective Evaluations of 
Affective Episodes, 65 1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 45 ( 1 993); Terence R. Mitchell et aI., Temporal 
Adjustments in the Evaluation of Events: The "Rosy View, " 33 1. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 421 
( 1 994). 
570. Gilbert et aI., supra note 550, at 293. 
57 1 .  Social psychologists have offered a number of explanations for the affective forecasting 
phenomenon, including that we misconstrue the nature of future events, that we are motivated to distort 
our affective predictions, that the process of predicting focuses our imagination to the exclusion of 
other aspects of our future lives that will influence our affect ("focal ism"), and that our interior 
situations immunize us from being emotionally subsumed by bad outcomes in our lives. See Gilbert et 
aI., supra note 550, at 293-97 (summarizing explanations of affective forecasting findings). These 
explanations are consonant with our own analysis in this Article, which, in turn, draws on them. 
We should point out that affective (mis)forecasting, like so many features of our situational character, 
can have a very positive or adaptive part to play in our lives. Like the heuristics and knowledge 
structures that enable us to make decisions with our limited brainpower, our poor affective forecasting 
is no quirk; rather, it is central to our psychological makeup. Affective reactions can give us a basis for 
acting and a means of recovering from the disappointment of bad outcomes. In that way, our interior 
situation protects us from ourselves. 
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D. BEHAVIOR (VS. "CHOOSING") 
This Article is now deep into its examination of the situational character. The 
contrast with the dispositionist models of the human actor that now dominate 
policy, policymaking, and common sense is becoming clear. We are subject to a 
fundamental interior attribution error-an error that helps explain the fundamen­
tal exterior attribution error and that leaves us vulnerable to many varieties of 
situational manipulation. As Parts IILB and IILC make clear, our thinking and 
our preferences are not what they seem. Thus, it should by this point be no 
surprise that our behavior-which the dispositionist models assume is the 
product of "thinking + preferring + willing"-is likewise not what it seems. 
Our behavior, which we tend to attribute to conscious choices based on stable 
preferences and given information, is more often a manifestation of the interior 
and exterior situational influences to which we are largely blind. That conclu­
sion is implicit in the evidence and arguments provided above regarding our 
cognitions and attitudes. Many of the experiments, including Milgram's, con­
tained a behavioral component that itself proved the point. This Section supple­
ments that evidence and highlights several ways in which our behavior is not 
what our dispositionist schemas presume. 
1 .  Visceral Factors 
We have already discussed the malleability and implicit aspects of our 
attitudes. We have also described the power of situational forces-in our 
interiors and exteriors-to shape our behavior and, in tum, the power of our 
behavior to change our attitudes. According to recent work by George Loewen­
stein and several of his co-authors, we are often moved by interior drive states 
to act in ways that contradict even our explicit attitudes, that is, in ways that we 
actually experience as counter-attitudinal. Those drive states include hunger, 
thirst, sexual desire, sleeplessness, moods, emotions, and physical pain: "At 
sufficient levels of intensity, these, and most other visceral factors, cause people 
to behave contrary to their own long-term self-interest, often with full aware­
ness that they are doing SO.,,572 
To be sure, those urges are all manifestations of regulatory processes "essen­
tial for our survival, but all are also associated with behavior disorders-for 
example, hunger and overeating, fear and phobias, sexual desire and sexual 
compulsion, anger and spouse abuse, and craving and addiction.,,573 Thus, 
visceral factors are like many of the interior features that we have been 
reviewing: generally useful but potentially quite harmful and capable of dominat­
ing those interior elements to which we attribute our dispositionism. 
There are two key reasons why visceral factors lead us to knowingly behave 
572. George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 1. ORG. BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272, 272-73 ( 1 996). 
573. George Loewenstein, A Visceral Account of Addiction, in SMOKING: RISK, PERCEPTION, & POLICY, 
supra note 298, at 1 88, 1 88-89. 
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counter-attitudinally. First, they tend to "crowd out" all goals other than that of 
mitigating the visceral factors themselves.574 They "focus attention" on the 
present, the self, and on satisfying a single craving.575 If you find that difficult 
to understand, try holding your breath for two minutes or dropping an anvil on 
your toe, and see what significance your other goals and attitudes have in your 
behavior before the pain subsides. 
Of course, responding to such intense bodily reactions makes perfect sense 
and is not, in itself, problematic. People should prioritize the acquisition of 
oxygen when it is scarce. And people should attend to their acute injuries before 
checking to make sure the anvil is ok. The problem stems from the fact that 
people often behave, in response to visceral cues, in ways that contradict their 
view of how they should behave, and sometimes even their own volition. And 
that problem occurs, according to Loewenstein, because of the second key 
feature of visceral factors, which is that "people underestimate the impact on 
their own behavior of visceral factors they will experience in the future,, :576 
"Unlike currently experienced visceral factors which have a disproportionate 
impact on behavior, delayed visceral factors tend to be ignored or to be severely 
underweighted in decision making. Today's pain, hunger, anger, and so on are 
palpable, but the same sensations anticipated in the future receive little weight.,,577 
In one experiment, for example, two groups of male subjects were shown 
photographs and then asked to imagine how they would behave in the context of 
a date-rape scenario. The group that had been shown sexually arousing photo­
graphs reported a much greater likelihood of behaving aggressively than the 
group that had been shown non-arousing photos.578 Without being aroused by 
the photographs, the second group seemed less able to imagine what they would 
do when aroused on a date. 
Loewenstein explains that this divergence in our ability to appreciate visceral 
factors in the present and in the future is probably an artifact of our interiors, 
which "seem[] ill suited to storing information about visceral sensations.,,579 
Thus, although "we can easily recognize pain, . . .  few can recall it in the sense 
of reexperiencing it in imagination or memory.,,580 Pain, cravings, and motives 
in the present wield greater influence than pain, cravings, and motives in the 
future because the former are cognitively vivid while the latter are cognitively 
pallid. 
Put differently, immediate visceral factors are like dispositional factors that 
dominate our field of interior vision, while future visceral factors are like 
574. Id. at 1 89. 
575. Id. at 1 91-92. 
576. /d. at 1 89. 
577. Id. at 1 93 .  
578. George Loewenstein et  aI., The Effect of Sexual Arousal on Expectations of Sexual Forceful­
ness, 34 1. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 443, 455-56 & tbl. I ( 1 997). 
579. Loewenstein, supra note 573, at 1 94. 
580. Id. 
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situational factors that tend to be obscured, and their future influence thereby 
underappreciated. Visceral factors are yet another manifestation of the interior 
fundamental attribution error. And the influence of this error is hardly limited to 
the margins of extreme exceptions. "Visceral factors are a ubiquitous aspect of 
everyday life, and they regularly undermine the rationality of decisionmaking, 
due to both their underestimation in prospect and their disproportional force 
when they operate in the present.,,58 1 
2. The Inverted Causal Relationship Between Attitudes and Behavior 
The evidence on visceral factors provides further confirmation for our claim 
that people fail to see much of their interior situation and that behavior often 
reflects that fai lure as much or more than it reflects a person's stable prefer­
ences. But the dispositionist presumption-that behavior is more or less caused 
by preferences or attitudes-can be even more fundamentally challenged. So­
cial psychology teaches that, although we like to believe that such a causal 
relationship between attitudes and behavior exists, it is often just the reverse­
that is, our attitudes reflect our behavior (which, in tum, reflects our situation). 
The temptation to see preferences first and behavior as the consequence is 
widely shared. When we act, we need to believe that there exists an attitude or 
preference behind that act--our motive for coherence creates a need for rea­
sons. 
But very often reasons do not precede behavior. So, we are motivated to 
concoct them-so motivated that we will often alter pre-existing attitudes. We 
have already described some examples of that phenomenon. In Festinger and 
Carlsmith's classic peg-moving study,582 for instance, subjects paid $20 to tell 
others that the boring subject was interesting felt no dissonance, and thus did 
not need to alter their attitudes. On the other hand, subjects who were paid only 
$1 were still situationally moved to cooperate with the experimenter, though 
they needed some way to relieve the dissonance they felt between experience 
and attitude. That situational manipulation and their behavior led them to alter 
their attitudes toward the peg-moving task.583 
Following up on that "induced compliance" study, Philip Zimbardo and his 
collaborators asked subjects to participate in a study that ostensibly was about 
novel foods.584 More specifically, the subjects, who included ROTC members, 
military reservists, and other college students, were told that the new "mobile 
military" was interested in determining how much people enjoyed (or did not 
58 1 .  [d. at 2 1 3. 
582. See Festinger & Car1smith, supra note 5 14. 
583. Other examples of this phenomenon include disidentification and self-handicapping. See supra 
Part III.C.2.b.i. We alter our behavior to protect either cherished views of ourselves or our self-esteem; 
we try to trick ourselves in the same way that we trick, or are tricked by, others. 
584. See Philip G. Zimbardo et aI., Communicator Effectiveness in Producing Public Conformity 
and Private Attitude Change, 33 J. PERSONALITY 233 ( 1 965). 
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enjoy) eating fried grasshoppers.585 The supposed taste test was administered by 
one of two individuals. Some subjects were warmly greeted by "Mr. Nice" -a 
sensitive and gentle person who worked well with his coworkers.586 Other 
subjects took instruction from "Mr. Nasty," a cantankerous taskmaster who 
berated his coworkers. Many participants ate one or more grasshoppers, but 
their assessments varied depending upon who administered the test.587 Those 
taking instructions from the gruff "Mr. Nasty" reported that they liked the 
grasshoppers much more than "Mr. Nice's" subjects did.588 The experiment thus 
situationally induced participants to eat something that they otherwise would 
not. Those who were taking instructions from "Mr. Nice" had a good reason for 
doing so-after all, "Mr. Nice" was asking them to. But those who were eating 
grasshoppers under the instruction of "Mr. Nasty" needed to justify complying 
with the wishes of a jerk. Their solution, then, was to alter their attitudes toward 
the grasshoppers.589 
Today there are hundreds of experiments demonstrating the same phenom­
enon.590 As Claude Steele puts it: 
For nearly 30 years, dissonance researchers have tricked subjects into "volun­
teering" . . .  [such] self-contradictory actions as writing public essays against 
their beliefs, expending effort on meaningless tasks, and delivering embarrass­
ing speeches in front of prestigious audiences. Lacking any better means of 
reducing the distress over these actions, subjects typically attempt to justify 
them by changing their beliefs or attitudes to be more consistent with their 
actions. 59! 
Indeed, from evidence that our attitudes tend to be caused by our behavior 
rather than the other way around, Daryl Bern developed a plausible and initially 
compelling theory that individuals do not "know" their attitudes and other 
interior dispositions, but rather infer them from their behavior. As he summa­
rized his self-perception theory: 
Individuals come to "know" their own attitudes, emotions, and other internal 
states partially by inferring them from observations of their own overt behav­
ior and/or the circumstances in which this behavior occurs. Thus, to the extent 
that internal cues are weak, ambiguous, or uninterpretable, the individual is 
functionally in the same position as an outside observer, an observer who 
585. ld. at 237-4 1 .  
586. ld. 
587. [d. at 241-54. 
588. [d. 
589. See id. 
590. See generally Steele, supra note 86. 
59 1 .  /d. at 269. 
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must necessarily rely upon those same external cues to infer the individual's 
inner states.592 
In short, there is considerable evidence that the dispositionist view that attitudes 
lead to behavior is, at least at times, backwards. The cart is often our attitudes; 
the horse is often our behavior.593 
There is another way of making this point. The cognitive dissonance litera­
ture, which depends so heavily on induced compliance studies, is actually a 
demonstration of the fundamental attribution error as much as it is a demonstra­
tion of cognitive dissonance. Subjects are routinely manipulated through situa­
tion to act in ways that are counter to their attitudes or perceived dispositions. 
What experimenters call "induced compliance," then, subjects experience as 
free choice. Because the subjects are dispositionists, and experience themselves 
as acting according to their own attitudes or preferences, they react to their 
counter-attitudinal behavior by feeling a dissonance, a dispositional dissonance. 
To maintain their dispositionist self-conception, they unwittingly alter their 
attitudes or otherwise adjust their perceptions to relieve that dissonance.594 
Subjects thus see disposition and free choice based on stable preferences; they 
miss the importance of both the exterior situational forces that induced their 
compliance, and the interior situational forces that invisibly lead to their altered 
attitudes. 
E. AUTOMATICITY AND THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL ("THE WILL") 
"The whole sting and excitement of our voluntary life . . .  depends on our 
sense that in it things are really being decided from one moment to an­
other . . .  " 
- William James595 
And so we come at last to the conscious will, that inarticulable, yet unmistak­
able, inner experience of "oomph" that is, in many ways, the crown jewel of our 
592. Daryl J. Bern, Self-Perception Theory, in 6 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 , 2 
(L. Berkowitz ed., 1 972). For a discussion of the history of Bern's theory and the challenge it posed to 
cognitive dissonance theory, see KUNDA, supra note 6, at 2 1 7-20. 
593. Our claim is not that our attitudes are always giving way in response to our behavior. In fact, 
there are other ways to reduce dissonance, including changing our behavior. See supra text accompany­
ing notes 5 1 0-5 1 3  (summarizing alternatives); see also Joel Cooper & Steven 1. Scher, Actions and 
Attitudes: The Role of Responsibility and Aversive Consequences in Persuasion, in PERSUASION 95, 
95-1 1 1  (Timothy C. Brock & Sharon Shavitt eds., 1 994) (explaining when attitude change is most 
likely to change in response to dissonant behavior). Our point is that the one-way causal relationship 
presumed by lay and legal-theoretic dispositionist models is missing what social psychology has 
demonstrated about our interior situations. 
594. See supra notes 5 1 0-548 and accompanying text (summarizing some of the ways that cognitive 
dissonance is reduced and citing authorities). 
595. WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 453 ( 1 890). 
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dispositionist self-conception.596 We have been emphasizing throughout this 
Article that there is a vast interior situation that invisibly influences our thoughts, 
preferences, and actions, and leaves us vulnerable to exterior situational forces 
that do the same. What, then, of the conscious will? Much of the social 
psychological material canvassed in this Article has touched on the issue of 
conscious will only implicitly, if at all. Nonetheless, such material has quietly 
suggested the same conclusion drawn by those researchers who have examined 
the issue directly. If we perceive that we consciously will our actions, even as 
the best evidence indicates that our behavior is substantially influenced by 
interior and exterior situational factors, then this experience of "will" may be a 
part of our dispositionist deception. Indeed, as Daniel Wegner concludes in a 
book that brings together generations of experimental research on the felt 
experience of human will: "[C]onscious will is an illusion. It is an illusion in the 
sense that the experience of consciously willing an action is not a direct 
indication that the conscious thought has caused the action. ,,597 Two other 
leading researchers of the will, John Bargh and Tanya Chartrand, have made an 
extremely compelling, if unsettling, case that "most of a person's everyday life 
is determined not by [her] conscious intentions and deliberate choices but by 
mental processes that are put into motion by features of the environment and 
that operate outside of conscious awareness and guidance"-a thesis that they 
acknowledge is "difficult . . .  for people to accept.,,598 
In part for that reason, we want to be certain that the claim is not miscon­
strued. None of the researchers in this field of social science have concluded, 
nor do we, that the "conscious will" is purely and totally an illusion. What is 
asserted-and what researchers have demonstrated-is that the experience of 
will is far more widespread than the reality of will. Wegner calls the latter the 
empirical Will599 and argues that our perceived will is often an unreliable and 
misleading basis for understanding our behavior. The experience of will occurs 
often without empirical will, and thus creates the illusion of will. Moreover, it 
contributes to the illusions of choice, preference, and, more generally, disposition­
ism. 
596. It is worth noting that economists do not often speak of, or have a place in their models for, 
"the will." Furthermore, they generally have no need for the concept, inasmuch as they assume that 
behavior reflects preference-satisfying choices and that those underlying preferences are exogenous and 
stable. In that sense, economists embrace a form of determinism. Individuals have no real choice but to 
act as their preferences dictate. We focus on "the will" in this Article because it is important in lay 
conceptions of the interior situation and many other influential conceptions of the human animal in law 
and legal theory. (Furthermore, we suspect that most legal economists do not conceive of themselves as 
determinists or their theories as based on such a determinist conception.) 
597. WEGNER, supra note 84, at 2. 
598. John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity of Being, 54 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 462, 462 ( 1 999). 
599. WEGNER, supra note 84, at 14. 
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1 .  Automaticity 
Exhibit A in the case that our conscious will is not as central as we presume is 
the fact that our conscious attentional capacity is extraordinarily limited.60o 
Remember your first attempt at driving a manual transmission automobile­
before the processes became automatic. If you are like us, the memory still 
causes some embarrassment. Images of stalling, chugging, and squealing evince 
the limits of our ability to tell our feet and legs-much less the car-precisely 
how to behave. Now suppose that, at the same time you were attempting to let 
the clutch out with your left foot while depressing the gas pedal with your right, 
you were attempting to have a serious phone conversation with a friend about, 
say, your love problems. Such multitasking would be all but impossible given 
the severe limits on our ability to be consciously attentive. The point has been 
demonstrated in numerous experiments.601 For instance, studies have shown 
that eating radishes instead of available chocolates depletes one's ability to 
persist in attempting to solve puzzles, and that suppressing emotional reactions 
to a movie depletes one's ability to solve anagrams or to squeeze a handgrip 
exerciser.602 The unhappy truth is that because "even minor acts of self-control, 
such as making a simple choice, use up [one's] limited self-regulatory resource, 
conscious acts of self-regulation can occur only rarely in the course of one's 
day.,,603 Social psychologists studying the phenomenon have concluded that, in 
our daily lives, our conscious will "plays a causal role only [five percent] or so 
of the time.,,604 Little wonder that the growing popUlarity of cell phones has 
made driving generally more dangerous, even for experienced drivers.6os 
Exhibit B in the case for automaticity is the now-cascading evidence demon­
strating the extent to which our choice biases, our schemas, our memories, our 
attributions, our affective responses, our motives, our perceptions, and so on are 
activated automatically--outside our conscious awareness, and often by exterior 
situational features and events.606 The evidence of implicit attitudes summa­
rized above is just a small strand of the larger fabric of automaticity operating 
within our interiors.607 
There is also mounting evidence that our automatic perceptions are linked to 
600. See supra text accompanying notes 72-78. 
60 1 .  For an illuminating summary, see Wendy Wood et aI . ,  Habits in Everyday Life: Thought, 
Emotion, and Action, 83 1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 28 1  (2002). 
602. See Roy F. Baumeister et aI., Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource ?, 74 1. 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 252 ( 1 998); Mark Muraven et aI. ,  Self-Control as Limited Resource: 
Regulatory Depletion Patterns, 74 1. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 774 ( 1 998). 
603. Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 598, at 464. 
604. /d. 
605. See, e.g., Consumer Reports, New studies define cell-phone hazarrls, at http://www.consumerreports. 
orglmainlcontentldisplay _report.jsp?FOLDER %3C%3Efolder_id = 334665&bmUID= 1 1 05999597 1 36 
(describing research on role of cell phone use in accidents) (last visited lan. 17 , 2005). 
606. See Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 598, at 465. 
607. See supra text accompanying notes 401 -4 1 5 .  
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our behavior, also through automatic means.60S Charles Carver and his col­
leagues, for instance, found that subjects participating as the "teacher" in a 
Milgram-esque experiment tended to give longer shocks when they had been 
primed with a list of hostility-related words.609 More recently, John Bargh and 
his collaborators have made numerous demonstrations of the automatic percep­
tion-behavior link. In one experiment, for example, some subjects were primed 
with words related to rudeness, others, with words related to politeness.6l o The 
subjects were then placed in a situation that presented both an opportunity and 
motive to interrupt an ongoing conversation. The first, rude-primed group 
interrupted more than sixty percent of the time, while the second, polite-primed 
group interrupted less than twenty percent of the time.61 1 In other studies, 
subjects primed with stereotypical qualities of elderly people (e.g., wrinkles, 
Florida) behaved more like elderly people-walked more slowly, were more 
forgetful, and so on-than subjects who were not similarly primed.6 1 2  And 
Chartrand and Bargh have shown in other experiments that, without being 
aware of it, subjects often engage in so-called "behavior matching," or the 
"chameleon effect." For instance, when subjects are placed next to an interac­
tion partner who is either rubbing his or her face or shaking his or her foot, the 
subjects tend to engage in behavioral patterns matching those of their interac­
tion partner.613 
But the automaticity doesn't stop there. Although we sometimes intentionally 
try to transform our conscious acts into automatic behavior-recall how you 
practiced playing the piano, dribbling a basketball, or driving that dam stick 
shift-much of what becomes automatic does so automatically. And that in­
cludes many of our goals and motivations.6 14 In one study, for instance, subjects 
were asked to rearrange scrambled words to make a sentence.6 l S  Some subjects 
were nonconsciously primed to succeed because the words included items like 
"strive," "achieve," and "succeed." Others were given neutral words that would 
608. See Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 598, at 466 (describing and summarizing evidence of the 
"perception-behavior link"). 
609. Charles S. Carver et aI., Modeling: An Analysis in Terms of Category Accessibility, 19 1. 
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 403 ( 1 983). 
6 1 0. John A. Bargh et aI., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and 
Stereotype Activation on Action, 7 1  J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 230, 233 ( 1 996). 
6 1 1 .  See id. at 235 fig. I. A control group, which was primed with neither type of word, interrupted 
thirty-eight percent of the time. See id. 
6 1 2. See Ap Dijksterhuis et aI . ,  Of Men and Mackerels: Attention, Subjective Experience, and 
Automatic Social Behavior, in THE MESSAGE WITHIN: THE ROLE OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE IN SOCIAL 
COGNmON AND BEHAVIOR 37, 39 (Herbert Bless & Joseph P. Forgas eds., 2000) (citing Bargh et aI., 
supra note 6 1 0, at 236). 
6 13 .  See Tanya L. Chartrand & John A.  8argh, The Chameleon Effect: The Perception-Behavior 
Link and Social Interaction, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 893, 897-900 ( 1 999). 
614.  See Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 598, at 468-73. 
6 15 .  Tanya L. Chartrand & John A. Bargh, Nonconscious Motivations: Their Activation, Operation, 
and Consequences, in SELF AND MOTIVATION: EMERGING PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 1 3  (Abraham 
Tesser et al. eds., 2002). 
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not prime the goal to achieve.6 1 6  All of the subjects then were given a second, 
timed task-to rearrange letters in words to create new words. The anagrams 
ranged from simple to impossible.6 1 7  After completing the anagrams or running 
out of time, the subjects filled out questionnaires about their moods. Subjects 
who were not primed to succeed reported similar moods whether they per­
formed well or poorly. The moods of the subjects who were primed to succeed, 
however, varied depending on whether they succeeded or failed. That is, they 
seemed to care about how well they performed, even though they were unaware 
of what caused their moods, much less that it was the success-oriented words 
they encountered in the first task.6 18  Subjects were, beneath their conscious 
radars, given a goal that they did not even know they had, and that goal 
remained, hidden in their interior situation, shaping their moods in ways they 
neither saw nor appreciated. 
Our automatic goals are quite pervasive. When we commonly adopt a 
particular goal in a given situation-be it the workplace, the classroom, or the 
ping-pong table-that goal is likely to be triggered automatically in that situa­
tion, whether or not we want it to be triggered.6 19  As with all evidence of 
situational influence, such automatic goal-setting and mood-affecting evidence 
further reveals the extent to which we humans are susceptible to situational 
manipulation. 
2. The Illusion of Will 
If most of what we perceive, feel, and do is driven by automatic processes, 
then why is it that most of us perceive our behavior to be the consequence of 
our conscious will? There are several reasons. First, we are rarely conscious of 
that which is automatic in us-indeed, that's the point: automaticity frees up for 
other purposes our extremely limited capacity for conscious thinking and acting. 
It is as if automaticity occurs silently in the dark, whereas conscious thinking 
happens noisily beneath a spotlight. The conscious eclipses the automatic before 
our introspective eye. 
Perhaps more important, when we do experience ourselves consciously will­
ing our actions, we are often mistaken. Daniel Wegner, in his superb book The 
Illusion of Conscious Will, brings together an intriguing array of direct evidence 
to make his case that we humans are subject to an illusion of will (which, again, 
we think has been circumstantially implied in evidence of the more general 
6 16. ld. at 30. 
6 17. ld. 
6 1 8. ld. 
6 19. See Tanya L. Chartrand & Clara M. Cheng, The Role of Nonconscious Goal Pursuit in Hope, 
1 3  PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 290 (2002). This and related work also demonstrate how nonconscious goals can 
affect not only our moods, but also the way we perform and the judgments we make about others. See, 
e.g., Tanya L. Chartrand & Valerie Jefferis, Consequences of Automatic Goal Pursuit and the Case of 
Nonconscious Mimicry, in RESPONDING TO THE SOCIAL WORLD: IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT PROCESSES IN SOCIAL 
JUDGMENTS AND DECISIONS 290 (Joseph P. Forgas et al. eds. ,  2003). 
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illusion of disposition ism). 
Consider the case of "phantom limbs." People who have had an arm or a leg 
amputated usually report that they continue to "feel" the presence of the limb 
long after it is gone. One pair of researchers who studied a group of three 
hundred World War II amputees found that ninety-eight percent experienced the 
phantom limb phenomenon. But there is more: Many amputees report that they 
can voluntarily move their phantom limbs, especially their fingers and toes.  
They report having the experience of consciously willing the movement of the 
limb, despite the absence of the limb or any willing movement of it. They 
perceive themselves willing something that clearly is not there to will. This is 
one intriguing piece of evidence that "the intention to move can create the 
experience of conscious will without any action at all. ,,620 
Another intriguing study provides another clue to the puzzle of conscious 
will .  Researchers used highly sensitive electromyographical devices to study the 
patterns of electrical impulses generated during the performance of a "willed 
action." Hooked to electrodes, subjects were asked to move their fingers "at 
will ." The researchers established a baseline electrical impulse that was wit­
nessed in the brain shortly before the subjects moved their finger, which 
preceded a second impulse that was seen when the finger actually moved. This 
first impulse register was dubbed "readiness potential." In a recent version of 
the study, subjects were placed before an especially sensitive clock, and were 
asked to report for each finger movement the position of the clock hand at the 
moment that they experienced a "conscious awareness of 'wanting' to perform 
the finger movement., ,621 The researchers found that they were able to identify 
three distinct blips (to use the scientific term) in the electrical impulses of the 
brain throughout the course of action. The first was the "readiness potential" 
registered in the baseline. Sometime after the "readiness potential," however, 
came the experience of willing the finger. Finally, in a third distinct moment, 
there was an impulse associated with the actual movement of the finger. The 
researchers discovered that the subject's "readiness potential" occurred dis­
tinctly before the subjects themselves perceived a will to move the finger. The 
experience of conscious will, it appears, arises at some point after the brain has 
already begun the action. As the chief researcher of this study concluded: 
[T]he initiation of the voluntary act appears to be an unconscious cerebral 
process. Clearly, free will or free choice of whether to act now could not be 
the initiating agent, contrary to one widely held view. This is of course also 
contrary to each individual's own introspective feeling that he/she consciously 
initiates such voluntary acts; this provides an important empirical example of 
the possibility that the subjective experience of a mental causality need not 
620. WEGNER, supra note 84, at 40 (referring to original study by Henderson & Smyth ( 1 948». 
62 1 .  /d. at 50-52 (referring to original study by Komhuber & Deecke ( 1 965» . 
130 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 93: 1  
necessarily reflect the actual causative relationship between mental and brain 
events.622 
In another fascinating study, researchers put a series of subjects into a 
"transcranial magnetic stimulation" device, which has been found to cause­
through a directed magnetic impulse-the involuntary movement of different 
parts of the human body.623 Without explaining the operation of the device to 
subjects, the experimenters asked subjects to move either their right or their left 
finger, whichever they chose, whenever they heard a click. The click was 
actually the sound of the device turning on, and forcing the movement of a 
particular digit. Although the magnetic impulses led the subjects to move the 
finger they moved, the subjects nevertheless perceived that they were choosing 
which finger to move, and then moving it.624 "When asked whether they had 
voluntarily chosen which finger to move, participants showed no inkling that 
something other than their will was creating their choice.,,625 Findings such as 
these suggest that the experience of conscious will may stem from an internal 
system that is distinct from both the action itself and the action's true source. 
Put differently, willing may be different then acting, and although the experi­
ence of both may often be coterminous, they are not necessarily causally 
related. Furthermore, even when some unappreciated situational force­
including the business end of a transcranial magnetic stimulation device-is 
leading us to act in a particular way, we tend to experience our actions as 
volitional, willed choices. Again, we miss situation and see disposition. 
Based on his review of many such studies, including his own research, 
Wegner concludes that our minds produce the experience of conscious will 
through a process that is independent of the actual cause of our behavior. "[W]e 
must be careful to distinguish," Wegner argues, "between . . .  empirical will­
the causality of the person's conscious thoughts as established by . . .  their 
covariation with the person's behavior-and the phenomenal will-the person's 
reported experience of will.,,626 
There are, to be sure, times when we experience that we have willed 
something when, in fact, we have.627 Foregoing a just-out-of-the-oven choco­
late chip cookie can be, when we succeed, evidence of the empirical will. But 
622. B. Libet, The Neural Time-Factor in Perception, Volition and Free Will, 97 REVUE DE METAPHY­
SIQUE ET DE MORALE 255 ( 1992), quoted in WEGNER, supra note 84, at 54. As often occurs in social 
science, the significance and implications of this line of research are not without controversy. Our 
treatment here is based largely on Wegner's analysis, which is, in our view, as balanced and reliable 
account in this developing field as is presently available for use in legal theory. 
623. See WEGNER, supra note 84, at 47 (citing Joaquim P. Brasil-Neto et aI., Focal Transcranial 
Magnetic Stimulation and Response Bias in a Forced-Choice Task, 55 J. NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY & 
PSYCHIATRY 964 ( 1992». Apparently this one slipped by the human subjects committee. 
624. WEGNER, supra note 84, at 48. 
625. [d. 
626. [d. at 14. 
627. See id. at 15. Wegner writes: 
2004] THE SITUATIONAL CHARACTER 1 3 1  
the experience of will is not reliable evidence of the empirical will. The 
experience of will is generated by our minds to accompany behaviors whose 
source may be unwilled situation. "The experience of will," as Wegner puts it, 
"is the way our minds portray their operations to us, not their actual opera­
tion.,,628 Wegner's diagnosis reveals the limited viability of the experience of 
will as a last bastion of dispositionism. 
Though we perceive will and behave and experience ourselves "as if' our 
will were controlling our behavior, and though we project will onto the behavior 
of others, these intuitive conceptions of the will are fundamentally unreliable 
indicators of both the reality of our will and the source of our behavior. Here 
again, there is more to the situation:629 
[T]he brain structure that provides the experience of will is separate from the 
brain source of action. It appears possible to produce voluntary action through 
brain stimulation with or without an experience of conscious will. This, in 
tum, suggests the interesting possibility that conscious will is an add-on, an 
experience that has its own origins and consequences. The experience of will 
may not be very firmly connected to the processes that produce action, in that 
whatever creates the experience of will may function in a way that is only 
loosely coupled with the mechanisms that yield action itself.630 
A final experiment suggests the extent to which our experience of will can be 
subject to situational influence, again without our conscious awareness. Subjects 
viewed a computer screen that flashed strings of letters and were asked to judge 
whether they saw words in what flashed.63 1 The screen would go entirely blank 
In psychology, clear indications of the empirical will can be found whenever causal relation­
ships are observed between people's thoughts, beliefs, intentions, plans, or other conscious 
psychological states and their subsequent actions. The feeling of consciously willing our 
actions, in contrast, is not a direct readout of such scientifically verifiable will power. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 327 (observing that there often is a correlation between our felt 
experience of will and scientifically verifiable empirical will power). 
628. Id. at 96. 
629. Cf id. at 66 ("Although day always precedes night, for example, it is a mistake to say that day 
causes night, because of course both are caused in this sequence by the rotation of the earth in the 
presence of the sun."). We perceive ourselves consciously thinking and willing our actions, and 
wrongly believe that we perceive all there is. In part, we perceive our conscious will because any time 
we look for it, we find it. The problem is that when we are not looking for it, it is rarely there. See 
generally Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 598 (finding that much of human behavior is nonconscious 
and situational). It is as though we conclude from the fact that every time we look into the mirror we 
see ourselves looking back, that our reflection is always in that mirror, looking out. It is not, but when 
we look, it is-and, so, what we see when we look gives us a false sense of what is happening when we 
are not looking. 
630. WEGNER, supra note 84, at 47; see also id. at 64 ("The theory of apparent mental causation, 
then, is this: People experience conscious will when they interpret their own thought as the cause of 
their action. This means that people experience conscious will quite independently of any actual causal 
connection between their thoughts and their actions."). 
63 1 .  Ap Dijksterhuis et aI., Unconscious Priming of Conscious Will (2001 )  (unpublished manu­
script, on file with authors). 
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once each trial, either after the subject pressed the response button, or automati­
cally after a very short time (400-650 milliseconds) if the subject failed to 
respond. The intervals were so quick that it was difficult for subjects to tell 
whether their response triggered the blank screen, or whether it had automati­
cally gone blank. One group of subjects, however, was subliminally primed 
with a flash of the word "I" or "me" (subjects reported not recognizing it) just 
prior to the flash of letters that they could consciously see and were to evaluate. 
The researchers found that subjects primed with the dispositionist terms "I" or 
"me" were more likely to conclude that they had caused the screen to go blank 
than were subjects who had not been so primed. The subjects, it seems, "were 
influenced by the unconscious priming of self to attribute an ambiguous action 
to their own will.,,632 Our experience of will then, is not only an internal 
illusion, it is an internal illusion that is susceptible to external situational 
manipulation. 
The will, it turns out, rather than being the trump card in the dispositionist's 
deck, may be the joker in our dispositional delusion.633 As Wegner summarizes: 
The unique human convenience of conscious thoughts that preview our 
actions gives us the privilege of feeling we willfully cause what we do. In 
fact, however, unconscious and inscrutable mechanisms create both conscious 
thought about action and the action, and also produce the sense of will we 
experience by perceiving the thought as the cause of the action. So, while our 
thoughts may have deep, important, and unconscious causal connections to 
our actions, the experience of conscious will arises from a process that 
interprets these connections, not from the connections themselves.634 
We want to emphasize again what we are not claiming, lest our actual claims 
be wrongly caricatured and dismissed. We have not argued here, or elsewhere in 
this Article, that there is "no such thing" as will, or that everything we seem to 
will is, to the contrary, determined for us. We do not doubt the existence of the 
632. See WEGNER, supra note 84, at 209. For a related discussion of how sellers attempt to attribute 
consumer behavior to the free exercise of consumers' wills, informed by stable preferences, see 
Hanson, Yosifon, & Benforado, Broken Scales, supra note 54. 
633. See WEGNER, supra note 84, at 28 ("The mind has a self-explanation mechanism that produces a 
roughly continuous sense that what is in consciousness is the cause of action-the phenomenal 
will-whereas in fact the mind can't ever know itself well enough to be able to say what the causes of 
its actions are. "). 
634. /d. at 98. Wegner adds: 
We must remember that this analysis suggests that the real causal mechanisms underlying 
behavior are never present in consciousness. Rather, the engines of causation operate without 
revealing themselves to us and so may be unconscious mechanisms of mind. Much of the 
recent research suggesting a fundamental role for automatic processes in everyday behavior 
. . .  can be understood in this light. The real causes of human action are unconscious, so it is 
not surprising that behavior could often arise-as in automaticity experiments-without the 
person's having conscious insight into its causation. Conscious will itself arises from a set of 
processes that are not the same processes as those that cause the behavior to which the 
experience of will pertains, however. 
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individual human will, and we do not doubt that there is  human genius rightly 
to be attributed to it. Our point, rather, is that our experience of will-our 
familiar experience that our will is responsible for our conduct-is often not a 
reliable indicator of the actual cause of our behavior. The felt experience of will 
therefore contributes greatly to our dispositionism. Where we are moved situation­
ally, the phenomenon of will fills out our stories and helps to eclipse our vision 
of the situational influences that move us. When it seems that our "will" is 
doing the moving, it follows that we must have "chosen" our actions. And if we 
chose our actions, we must have had reasons or preferences for doing so. Thus, 
the illusion of will is a central feature of the illusion of dispositionism. How, 
after all, can situation be moving us, when we can "feel" the disposition? 
Our point, then, is both subtle and disquieting: The experienced "will," rather 
than a mirror and measure of our true selves, may be another mask in the 
disguise of dispositionism that keeps us from seeing what really moves us. 
IV. A FEW POSSIBLE LESSONS FOR LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 
Part I of this Article examined the person schema that forms the foundation of 
most laws and legal theories. Part III summarized some of what psychology 
teaches about what actually moves human beings. What is now fairly clear is 
that the dominant lay and legal theories of the person (or "personology") are 
wrong-not just "too simple," but fundamentally wrong. Social science has 
clearly demonstrated that we are not who we think we are. It is true that we 
experience ourselves thinking, preferring, acting, and willing, but those comfort­
ing perceptions are often illusory, and they obscure the far more significant 
influence of our unseen interior situation. 
What should also be clear is that every experiment demonstrating the extent 
and power of our interior situations likewise indicates just how incredibly 
vulnerable we-our cognitions, attitudes, behavior, and even our conscious 
will-are to exterior situational manipulation. To see that, one need only go 
back and note how each experiment discussed above revealed one or another 
element of our interior situations by secretly manipulating the subjects' exterior 
situations. Our dispositionist self-schemas and our perceptions of thinking, 
preferring, willing, and choosing lead us to miss the situation, and render us 
vulnerable to it. So it is that the hidden situation can be as powerful as a loaded 
gun. This, we believe, is the central lesson of our argument. Understanding its 
implications generally for law, policy, policymaking, and legal theory goes well 
beyond the scope of this Article.635 Still, we will suggest a few tentative 
635. This Part offers a few positive predictions about the contours of the law and legal theory. 
Beyond what we can describe here, there is much to learn about the legal institutions (indeed all 
institutions) when one begins with a more realistic conception of the human animal. And, for now, we 
are concerned in this project primarily with pursuing such positive questions about why the huamn 
animal and its institutions behave as they do. 
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implications here.636 
A. THE LAW 
Getting to know something about the situational character teaches us some­
thing about how better to understand our laws. The point is taken up in other 
work, but some preliminary observations are worth making here. For instance, 
we believe that "law" itself can be usefully understood as a kind of disposition­
ist situational character, reflecting all the same tendencies of the human variety. 
That is true, in our view, because legal systems place judges, juries, legislators, 
and the like in a position of resolving disputes between competing interests. 
Those decision-makers-be they individuals, or groups or processes that con­
ceive of themselves as individuals-tend to see their institutions as human-like 
entities.637 They see themselves and their institutions very much the same way 
we humans conceive of ourselves-as information-gathering, reasonable think­
ers with steady sets of preferences-and they are subject to the same sorts of 
situational influences, such as the various motivations for coherence, simplicity, 
system-affirmation, and so on.638 
For lawmakers, such preferences might be identified in various policy scripts 
defining the purpose of law or lawmaking.639 In the case of judges, the 
preferences might be found in similar scripts in various legal principles and 
When we have presented this paper in various settings, our most vociferous and incredulous 
questioners have tended to disregard the positive implications of our work and to press on us the 
possible normative questions raised by critical realist situationism. Oftentimes (though certainly not 
always), those individuals seemt to suggest that, absent a clear normative description of what goal the 
law should serve and how the law should be reformed to better serve that goal, we have said little of 
interest to legal theorists. 
Needless to say, we disagree. Some conception of the human animal-be it explicit or implicit, 
realistic or farcical-forms the foundation of all legal theories-positive or normative. Positive theories 
are important for understanding, predicting, and influencing the law and legal institutions. And a 
positive theory, particularly one that is committed to a realistic account of the human animal, can be 
significant for both assessing existing normative and prescriptive theories and for developing or shaping 
such theories. Put differently, we believe that the sort of evidence that we are reviewing, and the 
positivist arguments we are making in this Article and elsewhere, have immense normative implica­
tions. And we look forward to exploring these implications in the future. In the meantime, we believe 
that, in light of the evidence, the burden is not on us to develop a new situationist-based normative 
theory, but on those who embrace some form of dispositionism to justify their normative theories or to 
join in the effort of trying to understand the normative implications of situationism. 
636. Id. at 97. In related work, we hope to elaborate these and other implications. See, e.g. , Chen & 
Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 36; Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 32; 
Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously II, supra note 1 32; Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, 
supra note 5. Other scholars have also made important strides in considering the implications of social 
psychology (and related fields) for law, legal theory, and legal institutions. See, e.g., Ross & Shestowsky, 
supra note 56. 
637. See FISKE, supra note 233, at 460-63 (describing the perceived "entativity" of groups). 
638. See Wendy Wood, Attitude Change: Persuasion and Social Influence, 5 1  ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 
539 (2000) (summarizing much of the recent evidence on individual and group decision-making­
private and public). 
639. See generally Chen & Hanson, Categorically Biased, supra note 1 36, at 1 239-52 (offering a set 
of predictions about the role of knowledge structures on legal theories and law); Chen & Hanson, The 
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precedents. Judges, being human, understand and portray their individual deci­
sions as both internally coherent and coherent across cases, doctrines, and 
time-hence the common provision in written opinions intended to reconcile 
any given decision with all previous ones.640 The coherence will be, just as it is 
with the human version of the situational character, largely an illusion, but not 
so obviously an illusion that the system's legitimacy is threatened.64 I The 
patterns behind the laws will reflect the situational influences of those individu­
als and institutions best able to influence lawmakers' situation. 
Furthermore, courts, in making judgments, will operate according to the same 
attributional impulses and biases-assessing causation, responsibility, and 
blame-very much the way we all do.642 Indeed, a major task for the law is to 
sort out attributional stories and judge responsibility based on the disputants' 
conflicting versions.643 Because of our biases, individuals most likely to be held 
personally responsible are the salient individuals closest to the injury, particu­
larly when their behavior was, in some sense, non-normal (encouraging counter­
factual thinking), when they are members of cultural out-groups, or when 
attributional stereotypes point in their direction. The legal system will seek to 
identify the causes of harm quickly, simply, and in a way that promotes the 
perceptions of closure and coherence.644 
For that reason, and many others that we we have highlighted above, judicial 
attributions will be far too dispositionist-a claim for which we have already 
provided some evidence.645 Where harms are caused by situational influences, 
the law will tend either to seek out and name a dispositional scapegoat on which 
to place responsibility, or to deny that there was a harm (perhaps by derogating 
the victim)646 or the possibility of a legal remedy. Furthermore, in an effort to 
legitimate, not only their own decisions, but the entire system, lawmakers will 
ignore, tolerate, or justify many outcomes that could otherwise be perceived as 
unjust. And they will do so by accepting and reinforcing dispositionism and 
rejecting situationism. Relatedly, lawmakers and those subject to laws will be 
particularly keen to promote and protect individuals' perceived rights to be 
dispositionists-that is, their ability to choose whatever options they like with-
Illusion of Law, supra note 33 (providing evidence consistent with those predictions with regard to the 
now-dominant general schemas of policymaking and corporate law). 
640. See generally Phoebe Ellsworth, Legal Reasoning, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING 
AND REASONING (forthcoming 2005) (on file with authors). 
64 1 .  See generally Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 32. 
642. See generally Hanson, Reyes & Schlanger, Attributional Positivism, supra note 43. 
643. See id. 
644. See generally Benforado, Hanson & Yosifon, Broken Scales, supra note 54. This helps explain 
the attraction of Langdellian positivism in early academic theories and the fact that, to this day, jurists 
continue to claim to be simply applying the law. See Ellsworth, supra note 640. 
645. See supra text accompanying notes 35-63. 
646. See supra Part III.C.2.b.iii (summarizing evidence of people's tendency to derogate victims in 
order to perserve their perception of a "just world"). 
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out the interference of arbitrary or unfair restrictions by salient actors.647 
In addition, lawmakers will seek to avoid obvious tension or contradictions 
between their stated goals and their actions, and they will likely seek to resolve 
"precedential dissonance" in many of the same ways individuals do-from 
changing their goals to changing their opinions, and from trivializing the 
dissonance to emphasizing unrelated self-enhancing features of the system.648 
Their decisions will ultimately be rationalized as consistent with basic self­
affirming and system-affirming conceptions of justice, fairness, equality, merit, 
choice, and the like. 
B. LEGAL THEORY 
Getting to know the situational character, we have come to know more than 
just what moves us. The discussion in Part III teaches us something about what 
moves our own theories about what moves us. We are not referring here to the 
many exterior situational forces behind the long and successful "life" of the 
dispositional actor. That is the topic of other work649 (and, less explicitly, the 
topic of Part V below). We are referring instead to the influence that our interior 
situation tends to have on the shape of the policy theories likely to be most 
successful. Legal theory, too, will share much in common with the law. But, as 
an outside observer, a legal theorist is to law something closer to what a social 
psychologist is to the human variety of situational characters: an observer 
attempting to ascertain what really moves the situational character-to see, for 
example, if the purported attitudes, reasons, and rationalizations of the situ­
ational character square with its behavior. Where apparent incoherence is 
identified, legal scholars offer theories intended either to make sense of the 
decisions (positive theories, which can be legitimating or delegitimating) or to 
show how the law, in practice, should be (re)formed or (re)structured to achieve 
a particular goal (normative theories). 
Knowing something more about the situational character, we can better 
predict which theories will be most highly valued outside of law schools, and 
thus which ones will tend to be advantaged, other things being equal. First, 
successful theories will rely on a highly dispositionist view of the human 
actor-one that presumes that humans will their choices through thought and 
preferences. The model actor-the one that sets the standard for all of us-will 
647. That prediction is connected to the illusion of control (and associated motive for control) .  
Numerous experiments testing "reactance theory" have demonstrated that people (particularly in this 
culture, we suspect) do not like to be told what they can or cannot do. Broadly speaking, when 
individuals perceive an unfair restriction of their conduct, they often experience a strong motivational 
state ("reactance") to remove the perceived restriction or reject it. For thorough discussions of reactance 
theory and evidence supporting it, see JACK W. BREHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL R£ACfANCE ( 1 966) 
and SHARON BREHM & JACK W. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL R£ACfANCE: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL 
( 1 98 1 ). 
648. See supra notes 472-503 and accompanying text. 
649. See, e.g., Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 32; Hanson & Yosifon, The 
Situation, supra note 5 .  
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be a fairly robust version of our widely held, dispositionist self-conceptions. 
The model actor therefore will be a thoughtful, reasoning actor, who approaches 
questions from a data-driven, bottom-up perspective, one who is not biased by 
cognitive shortcuts, distorting knowledge structures, emotions, or any unseen 
interior influences. She will have stable preferences that are consistent over time 
and with her behavior. And exceptions to that conception will be narrow and 
snugly anchored to that conception. 
Legal conclusions and legal-theoretic inclinations will tend to favor the most 
powerful groups (and cultural in_groups).65o Various cloaks of legitimacy will 
be draped over the law and legal theories.65 1 Categories and schemas that tend 
to favor those groups will be created and perceived as neutral and natural, even 
when they are false, incomplete, or biasing. Laws and legal theories will also, 
on the whole, tend to be system-affirming. For all of these reasons, legal 
theories will, like the laws, tend to underestimate the role of situation-too 
often ignoring or downplaying the role of unseen forces that move or exploit the 
situation.652 Similarly, they will vastly limit our ability to see certain harmful 
situational forces and our ability to correct for those that we do see, such as the 
role of market manipulation.653 
System affirmation will be accomplished in significant part through the 
dispositionism that already infects our attributions. Throughout, there will be 
little serious attention given to the possibility that people's conduct deviates 
from that of the model (dispositional) actor. That is, only the most obvious 
interior and exterior situational influences will be acknowledged.654 And those 
theorists who challenge the dominant conceptions will be viewed (along with 
their theories) as members of the same marginal and threatening out­
group(S).655 
The above description, we believe, accurately depicts much of traditional law 
and economics, and it helps to explain its tremendous real-world influence.656 
Unfortunately, social psychology also strongly suggests that such a legal theory 
or legal system will have significant harmful effects--even as measured by 
existing normative theories regarding the goal or goals of law. As the footnotes 
in this section suggest, we have provided evidence for many of these claims in 
650. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 230-84. 
65 1 .  See generally Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 32. 
652. See supra text accompanying notes 472-503 (discussing the role of dispositionism in system 
affirmation). 
653. See Hanson & Kysar, The Failure, supra note 1 32 (describing the failure of existing laws to 
recognize and counteract the market manipulation techniques of the tobacco industry); Hanson, 
Yosifron, & Benforado, Broken Scales, supra note 54 (same with respect to situational sources of 
obesity epidemic). 
654. See supra text accompanying notes 1 5-62. 
655. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 1 57-66; Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of 
Law, supra note 32. 
656. For a description of both, see Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5 ;  Jon Hanson & 
Melissa Hart, Law and Economics, in BLACKWELL'S COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 3 1 1-3 1  (Dennis Patterson ed., 1 996). 
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related work. 
Our point here is that a better understanding of the situational character helps 
us to better understand our policy and policymaking systems. And the lessons of 
social psychology may be as unsettling and counterintuitive for our understand­
ing of those systems as they have been for our understanding of ourselves. The 
very theories that we use to legitimate our systems, for example, may in fact be 
contributing to injustice-as defined by those theories. Insofar as we ignore 
situation, we ignore the limits of presumed autonomy and many of the most 
influential forces in our society--often far more influential than personal choice. 
That situational ignorance, it would seem, likely advantages those people, 
groups, and interests with the greatest autonomy to start with. Thus, situational 
ignorance helps to create-and then legitimate and maintain-power relation­
ships.657 Power that is reinforced by the law is legitimated as the acceptable 
outcome of neutral legal processes. When those processes are understood as 
part of the manipulated, constructed, hidden situation that creates that power, 
any claim of neutrality vanishes-and, with it, the legitimacy that guards 
associated inequalities. 
Part V will provide some support for many of the assertions in this Part; it 
will also demonstrate how legal theorists have dealt with the dissonance created 
by the growing social scientific evidence that we are situational characters. 
V. DISPOSITIONISM IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 
"Living in economic science makes economists think a little differently than 
other people. " 
- George Stigler658 
In Part I, we described the generally dispositionist starting place of legal 
analysis, laws, lawmakers, and indeed virtually all western individuals and 
institutions. As we suggested, no social theory more formally and explicitly 
embraces the basic pre-theoretic axioms of lay dispositionism than neoclassical 
(law and) economics.659 As we argued in a previous article, the success of the 
economic view in policymaking has likely both depended upon and contributed 
to a similar commonsense vision.660 But, as we have argued in this Article, the 
dominant dispositionist model is, in many ways, fundamentally flawed. 
As evidence of those flaws has gained wider audiences and has begun to 
disseminate through academia, that evidence has begun to pose a threat to the 
legal theorists and jurists who are committed to dispositionism. It has created a 
657. Dominant dispositionist theories thus are most valuable to the very groups who have the 
greatest ability to promote such theories through situational influence. 
658. GEORGE J. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED EcONOMIST 8 ( 1988). 
659. We view law and economics as a subgenre of neoclassical economics. 
660. Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5 .  
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dissonance between their motives to achieve simplicity and confirm their exist­
ing theories, on one hand, and their motive for accuracy on the other. The threat 
has been felt most acutely among (law and) economic theorists because of their 
field's dominance in modern policy making, its clear and formal adoption of 
dispositionism, and the system-affirming quality of much of their work. There is 
now an unmistakable uneasiness among (legal) economists and a great deal of 
work attempting to reconcile their theories with the growing evidence that 
seems to contradict it. Indeed, much of the most interesting and important work 
these days involves applying certain features of social psychology to the law 
and economics mode1.661 
Most economists are, of course, humans, and their strategies for coping with 
the theoretic-empiric dissonance are all too human. This section looks closely at 
how law and economics has responded, and how seriously its advocates have 
taken the insights of social psychology. First, it reveals that the dispositionist 
actor has been carefully guarded. Second, it provides further evidence that even 
scholars who have devoted their careers to one or another version of the rational 
actor remain situational characters. 
A. THE DISPOSITIONIST ACTOR OF LAY AND LEGAL-ECONOMIC THEORIES 
"The theory of consumer demand, as is now widely accepted, is based on 
[the] . . . . proposition ' "  that wants originate in the personality of the 
consumer or, in any case, that they are given data for the economist. " 
- John Kenneth Galbraith662 
Economists assume that human agents gather and process information (think) 
in order to identify the best method or means of satisfying their (stable and 
exogenous) preferences through willed choice. Robert Cooter and Thomas Vlen, 
legal economists, summarize this basic starting place in their classic law and 
economics text: 
The construction of the economic model of consumer choice begins with an 
account of the preferences of consumers. Consumers are assumed to know the 
things they like and dislike and to be able to rank the available alternative 
combinations of goods and services according to their ability to satisfy the 
consumer's preferences. This involves no more than ranking the alternatives 
as better than, worse than, or equally as good as one another. . . .  
[T]he preferences of the consumer are subjective. Different people have 
different tastes, and these will be reflected in the fact that they may have 
different preference orderings over the same goods and services. Economists 
leave to other disciplines, such as psychology and sociology, the study of the 
661 .  See infra Part v.c. 
662. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 2-3 ( 1 958). 
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source of these preferences. We take consumer tastes or preferences as given, 
or, as we sometimes say, as exogenous, which means that they are determined 
outside the economic system.663 
From such axioms, it is easy to conclude that each person's actions constitute 
willed choices reflecting the outcome of that information-gathering, preference­
pursuing process. Or, as economist David Kreps summarizes, the basic eco­
nomic approach presumes that "choice is induced from preference . . . .  ,,664 
That is the lesson of what economists call the "Generalized Axiom of 
Revealed Preference" ("GARP" )665 -the approach that, since its first articula­
tion sixty-five years ago "has gradually taken hold of choice theory in general 
and demand theory in particular.,,666 According to Nobel Laureate Paul Samuel­
son, who first formulated revealed preference theory, "[t]he individual guinea­
pig, by his market behaviour, reveals his preference pattern-if there is such a 
consistent pattern.,,667 In this world according to GARP, preferences drive 
choices; so preferences can be inferred from (are revealed by) actual choices­
such that there is no need to ask consumers why they do what they do, because 
what they do reveals the story:668 
Standard economic theory employs an "objectivist" position based on observ­
able choices made by individuals. Individual utility only depends on tangible 
663. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 1 9, at 17 ;  see also id. at 1 7  n.3 ("[W]e hold to the view that 
economics per se is about how [the] alteration [of consumer tastes] takes place."); Martha Nussbaum, 
Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1 197, 1 197-98 ( 1997) ("Law and Economics has been built on a particular set of conceptual 
foundations. These involve at least the following ideas: that rational agents are self-interested maximiz­
ers of utility; that utility can best be understood (for explanatory/predictive purposes) as a single item 
varying only in quantity; that utility is best analyzed in terms of the satisfaction of preferences; that 
preferences are exogenous, i.e., not significantly shaped by laws and institutions; and that the ends 
adopted by an agent cannot themselves be the subject of rational deliberation, although agents may 
deliberate about instrumental means to ends."). 
664. DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 25 ( 1 990). 
665. Id. at 4 1�5. 
666. Amartya K. Sen, Behaviour and the Concept of Preference, 40 ECONOMICA 241 , 241 ( 1973); see 
also id. at 242 (explaining that the revealed preference approach is not limited to market choices "and 
indeed . . .  has been used in studying preferences revealed by non-market behaviour such as govern­
ment decisions, choices of public bodies and political acts like voting"). 
667. Paul A. Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer 's Behaviour, 5 ECONOMICA 61  
( 1 938); see also Paul A.  Samuelson, A Note o n  the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behaviour: An 
Addendum, 5 EcONOMICA 353 ( 1 938). 
668. PAUL A. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 90- 1 1 3  ( 1 947); see also KREps, supra 
note 664, at 27, 29-30; EDWIN MANSFIELD, EcONOMICS 7 1-72 (7th ed. 1 992); Sen, supra note 666, at 241 
("From the point of view of introspection of the person in question, the process runs from his 
preference to his choice, but from the point of view of the scientific observer the arrow runs in the 
opposite direction: choices are observed first and preferences are then presumed from these observa­
tions."). 
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goods and services and leisure. It is inferred from behavior (or revealed 
preferences), and is in tum used to explain the choices made.669 
141  
In this theory, choices are the means by which individuals satisfy their prefer­
ences and by which policy analysts infer those preferences and measure social 
welfare.670 Amartya Sen, yet another Nobel Laureate, insightfully suggests that 
"the popularity of this view . . .  may be due to a mixture of an obsessive 
concern with observability and a . . .  belief that choice . . .  is the only human 
aspect that can be observed. ,,67 1 
It is worth noting here, briefly, the striking parallel between "revealed 
preferences" and the fundamental attribution error: both presume, based largely 
on observability, that behavior is dispositionally explained. Moreover, revealed 
preference theory is successful, not because it has been shown to be true, but 
because it is tractable and comports with our intuitions. Sen (who is an 
important exception to this overgeneralized description of economics)672 puts 
the point this way: 
Faith in the axioms of revealed preference arises . . .  not from empirical 
verification, but from the intuitive reasonableness of these axioms interpreted 
precisely in terms ofpreference . . . .  
I would, therefore, argue that the claim of explaining "behaviour without 
reference to anything other than behaviour" is pure rhetoric and if the theory 
of revealed preference makes sense it does so not because no psychological 
assumptions are used but because the psychological assumptions used are 
sensibly chosen.673 
As we have shown, however, those psychological assumptions are not sensibly 
chosen, and thus there would appear to exist a fundamental attribution error at 
the heart of revealed preference theory and the economic analysis that has been 
built upon it.674 
669. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research?, 40 1. 
ECON. LITERATURE 402, 404 (2002). 
670. See, e.g. , 1.R. HICKS, REVISION OF DEMAND THEORY 6 ( 1 956) ("The economic theory of demand 
does study human beings, but only as entities having certain patterns of market behaviour; it makes no 
claim, no pretence, to be able to see inside their heads."); I.M.D. Little, A Reformulation of the Theory 
of Consumer 's Behaviour, I OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 90, 97 ( 1 949) ("[T]he new formulation is scientifi­
cally more respectable [because] [i]f an individual's behaviour is consistent, then it must be possible to 
explain that behaviour without reference to anything other than behaviour."). 
67 1 .  Amartya K. Sen, The Standard of Living, in 7 TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 1 8  ( 1 986). 
672. Sen is particularly sensitive to what we would call situational considerations. Very loosely, Sen 
argues that, in addition to a person's choices, policymakers should be concerned with a person's 
situation, or range of alternatives or "capabilities." See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS 
FREEDOM (2000); AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILmEs ( 1 985). 
673. Sen, supra note 666, at 243-44 (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also id. at 254 
(indicating that the dominant theory "makes the analysis simpler"). 
674. Again, Sen himself believes that there is more to the situation than most economists assume or 
their theories allow. For instance, in one article, Sen offered the following speculation: 
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It is unsurprising, given their assumptions and perspectives, that many econo­
mists similarly infer freedom (and happiness or welfare)675 from the perception 
of choice and, hence, celebrate markets as the most trustworthy of vehicles for 
the actualization of preferences. Thus, Milton Friedman explains: 
When you hear people objecting to the market or to capitalism and you 
examine their objections, you will find that most of those objections are 
objections to freedom itself. What most people are objecting to is that the 
market gives people what the people want instead of what the person talking 
thinks the people ought to want. That is true whether you are talking of the 
objections of a Galbraith to the market, whether you are talking of the 
objections of a Nader to the market, whether you are talking of the objections 
of a Marx or an Engels or a Lenin to the market. 676 
To Friedman and to most economists, a market choice is, absent strong reason 
to believe otherwise, a free choice.677 And free choice is, in light of the other 
pre-theoretic axioms, the normative standard against which all laws, policies, 
and regulations should be measured. Policies should encourage contracting and 
market transactions wherever possible, and should otherwise seek to achieve 
outcomes that mimic the allocations that would occur were free markets fully 
functioning.678 And it is largely because of those presumptions that many 
economists have responded to evidence that their simple model is badly flawed, 
not by denying the veracity of the evidence, but by warning that any serious 
discussion of such evidence opens the door, or begins us down a slippery slope, 
I would argue that the philosophy of the revealed preference approach essentially underesti­
mates the fact that man is a social animal and his choices are not rigidly bound to his own 
preferences only. I do not find it difficult to believe that birds and bees and dogs and cats do 
reveal their preferences by their choice; it is with human beings that the proposition is not 
particularly persuasive. An act of choice for this social animal is, in a fundamental sense, 
always a social act. He may be only dimly aware of the immense problems of interdependence 
that characterize a society, of which the problem under discussion is only one. But his 
behaviour is something more than a mere translation of his personal preferences. 
[d. at 252-53. 
Professor Jerry Green, in his graduate-level introduction to microeconomics at Harvard University, 
makes a similar admission. He notes that, in attempting to infer people's preferences, economists tend 
to concentrate on "operationaliz[ing] a quantitative description of their observed actions," despite the 
fact that questions about the "context in which we think the people are operating" are just as important. 
Jerry R. Green, Lecture Notes: Lecture I ,  Economics 2010a (FaIl 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with authors). 
675. See Sen, supra note 666, at 244 ('''[A] person is, on the whole, likely to be happier the more he 
is able to have what he would choose."') (quoting Little, supra note 670, at 98); Sen, supra note 666, at 
254 (discussing the "rigid correspondence between choice, preference and welfare assumed in tradi­
tional economic theory"). 
676. MILTON FRIEDMAN, BRIGHT PROMISES, DISMAL PERFORMANCE 89 ( 1983) (emphasis added). 
677. See, e.g., Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 1 57-165 (discussing the extent of 
economists' dispositionism). 
678. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE EcONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW ( 199 1) .  
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to one or another form of totalitarianism.679 
When people perceive a threat to the social system, they tend to see the world 
in more dispositionist terms.680 Relatedly, when dispositionists-particularly 
hard-core dispositionists like "a Friedman"-are confronted with evidence or 
opinions that situation is more significant than they believe, they perceive that 
evidence or opinion as a threat to the system. And all. those who offer such 
criticisms-be they "a Galbraith ' "  a Nader a Marx or an Engels or a 
Lenin"-are themselves dispositionalized into a single out-group of individuals 
who pose a threat to our system.68 I 
We suspect that the interior fundamental attribution error largely ex­
plains-or at least makes possible-both the pre-theoretic axioms of economic 
models and the normative social policies that most legal economists embrace.682 
Again, the attraction and success of that approach stems in part from its 
consonance with perceived, if unexamined, human experience (and with its 
system-affirming effects). And, for similar reasons, we suspect that the same 
influence is reflected in the theories underlying many of our most influential 
social, cultural, political, and economic institutions-particularly those that, like 
economics, have not taken seriously the project of examining our exterior or 
interior situations.683 
The consonance between economic assumptions and common Western lay 
assumptions684 goes beyond merely the pre-theoretic axioms regarding the 
landscape of our interiors. Economists share not only the lay intuition that 
people act according to their thoughts and preferences, but also (at least loosely) 
widely held lay presumptions regarding what those thoughts, preferences, and 
acts tend to be. As several social psychologists recently summarized, "the model 
of the ideal person," "especially in the United States since the 1 970s," has come 
to embody the following characteristics, characteristics that likewise imbue the 
rational actor: 
• oriented primarily toward independent "success" and "achievement." 
• formulates personal goals derived principally from these attributes and 
orientations. 
• evaluates life with reference to the achievement of these goals. 
• makes (or should make) independent, more or less rational choices in 
the pursuit of those goals. 
679. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 190-91 (discussing "the totalitarian 
bogeyman"). 
680. See supra text accompanying notes 472-503 (describing motive to affirm system through 
dispositionaiizing stereotypes). 
68 1 .  FRIEDMAN, supra note 660, at 89. 
682. See supra text accompanying notes 1 5-23 (describing legal economists' failure to account for 
situation). 
683. See supra text accompanying notes 24-63. 
684. See supra text accompanying notes 79-102. 
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• is largely in control of-and individually responsible for-"personal" 
behavior and its outcomes. 
• often regards relationships as competing with personal needs and re­
gards group pressures as interfering with personal goals . . . .  
• strives first and foremost to feel good about the self.685 
Thus, there is an overlap between economic models and lay institutions, not 
only in the interior source of dispositionism, but also in precisely what those 
dispositions are generally assumed to be.686 That second overlap, like the first, 
is no coincidence, a claim we bolster in other work.687 For now, it is sufficient 
to state that the typical assumptions of economic models regarding what 
people's precise dispositions are both reflect and reinforce common lay intui­
tions. Moreover, those dispositions are easily presumed, and difficult to dis­
prove, given that the shared pre-theoretic axioms have little or no place for 
situation. In other words, the presumption that our interiors are driven primarily 
by thinking, preferring, and acting make it difficult to understand how some­
thing other than self-interested goals are behind our behaviors and difficult to 
understand how people's "free" choices could be anything but personally-and, 
taken together, collectively-satisfying. 
B. SCRUTINIZING THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL ACTOR 
"The notion that humans abide by normative principles dies hard, espe­
cially amongst economists . . . .  " 
� Philip N. Johnson-Laird & Eldar Shafir688 
After getting to know the situational character and learning that our assump­
tions about how we think and why we act are fundamentally flawed, it is 
illuminating to look more closely at the most sophisticated justifications thus far 
offered for the unrealistic dispositionism of economics and legal economics. 
Doing so suggests that there is, in fact, no compelling justification. 
Stanford economist David Kreps, winner of the prestigious John Bates Clark 
Medal, and one of the most respected economists and game theorists in the 
business, begins his leading graduate-level text by laying out the basic concepts, 
schemas, and purpose of microeconomics.689 His treatment illustrates what 
today's top economists are teaching tomorrow's top economists about how to 
685. Fiske et aI., supra note 84, at 920. 
686. See supra text accompanying note 548 (explaining that economists, like most non-economists 
in this culture, typically assume that individuals pursue narrow material ends in self-interested ways). 
687. See, e.g., Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 32; Hanson & Yosifon, The 
Situation, supra note 5, at 230-84. 
688. Johnson-Laird & Shafir, supra note 88, at 6. 
689. He calls them the "basic categories: Actors, behavior, institutions, and equilibrium." KREps, 
supra note 664, at 4. 
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justify their approach, and the fact that economics, more than any other social 
science, defines policy analysis and shapes policy.690 
Kreps opens his book by setting forth the basic pre-theoretic axioms of 
economics. He explains, for example, that 
[i]n the standard approach, behavior always takes the form of constrained 
maximization. The actor chooses from some specified set of options, selecting 
the option that maximizes some objective function. In orthodox theory, consum­
ers have preferences that are represented by a utility function, and they choose 
in a way that maximizes their utility . . . .  691 
On this view, nothing inside the model other than preferences influences 
people's behavior,692 and any action reflects a utility maximizing choice among 
options. In other words, the standard economic approach assumes that people 
are both rational and dispositional actors. Thus, Kreps begins by providing the 
basic economic account of human behavior.693 
To his credit, Kreps goes on to admit that people (by whom we suspect he 
means "non-economists") often find those assumptions to be counterintuitive or 
contrary to their own casual empiricism. He writes:  
These models of consumer . . .  behavior typically strike people as fairly 
obnoxious. We don't find consumers strolling down the aisles consulting a 
utility function when making their choices . . . . Nonetheless, we will use the 
standard model of consumer behavior throughout . . .  the book.694 
Because of this lack of realism,695 Kreps concedes, it would "behoove" econo­
mists to explain "why [they] think such models are useful," a task that he then 
takes Up.696 
According to Kreps, economists typically rely on one or more of several 
defenses. The first defense is that 
690. Kreps's description of and justifications for the basic economic approach are fairly conventional­
and, unsurprisingly, they resemble the descriptions and justifications provided by legal economists for 
their approach. See supra text accompanying note 664. 
69 1 .  KREPS, supra note 664, at 4. 
692. The only allowance made for the role of situation is in recognizing the exogenous (that is, 
outside the model and unexamined) constraints of limited budget and limited set of available options. 
693. See supra text accompanying note 664. 
694. KREPS, supra note 664, at 4. 
695. Kreps is not any more specific in describing the common criticism of the economist's model. 
Perhaps he believes, as seems plausible, that people find obnoxious only the hyper-rational actors 
assumed in economics (those who are assumed to "stroll down the aisles of grocery stores of 
supermarkets consulting a utility function"), but not the less extreme versions of economists' key 
assumptions that people act by choosing among options based on preferences. See id. 
696. [d. 
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economic models don't  presume that consumers actively maXlITuze some 
tangible utility function; the presumption is that consumers act as if this is 
what they do. Hence, an important part of the theory of individual behavior 
concerns testabLe restrictions of the models we use: what behavior, if ob­
served, would clearly falsify our models? If the models are not falsified by our 
observations, then our models are good positive models-perhaps not descrip­
tive as to why things happen, but good in describing what happens.697 
Thus, the first line of defense is to claim that microeconomics theory is not a 
normative or causal theory, but a positive theory-that is, a theory concerned 
not with describing "why" individuals do what they do, but with predicting 
"what" individuals will do. According to Kreps, therefore, so long as the 
rational actor theory generates testable predictions, and so long as people do in 
fact behave "as if' they are rational actors, then microeconomics is justified as a 
positive theory, even if the theory does not provide a realistic account of why 
people act that way.698 
That defense was first offered a half century ago by Milton Friedman in 
response to the same basic criticism,699 and it has been refined very little since. 
Its longevity notwithstanding, close inspection reveals some flaws in the logic 
behind the economists' Maginot Line. First, the "as if' claim, insofar as it is 
true, justifies economics only as a positive theory, and not a causal or normative 
theory. Thus, it largely fails as a defense against the criticism it is intended to 
repel: How does one justify premising policy goals and policies on an unrealis­
tic positive theory, except perhaps when the basic model is relied upon solely to 
help predict the effects of a policy change?7oo We are getting slightly ahead of 
ourselves. We should first consider whether economics succeeds even as a 
positive theory. 
As Kreps partially recognizes, the positive theory has some problems: "Unhap­
pily, rather a lot of data has been collected, especially experimentally, which 
falsifies the models we will employ.,,70 I Presumably, Kreps is here acknowledg­
ing the recent work of economic behavioralists on choice biases.702 Still, 
according to Kreps, the game may not be over, because economists still have 
some moves: 
697. [d. at 4-5. 
698. See id. at 5 (concluding that "the ultimate test of [a positive economic] theory is its ability to 
predict real-world events"). 
699. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE EcONOMICS passim ( 1 953). 
700. Cf Sen, supra note 666, at 254 ("People's behaviour may still correspond to some consistent as 
if preference but a numerical representation of the as if preference cannot be interpreted as individual 
welfare. In particular, basing normative criteria . . .  on these as if preferences poses immense difficul­
ties."). 
70 1 .  KREps, supra note 664, at 5 .  
702. See generally infra Part I1I.B. 1 .  
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At this [economists] fall back to our second line of defense by saying that 
such violations may be minor and not amount to much. That is, the standard 
models may be good approximations of individual behavior, and the conclu­
sions of models built from such approximations may thus be approximately 
valid. This requires a leap of faith, but it is still a leap that has some intuitive 
appea1.703 
147 
That seems right. Economists can claim (and, indeed, have long claimedf04 that 
the anomalies are trivial in fact or trivial in effect. According to that defense, the 
positive economic model is still a reasonable approximation of individual 
behavior. As Kreps acknowledges, however, any such assertion is just that: an 
assertion. Such a claim will be convincing only to those people willing to make 
the "leap of faith" necessary to conclude that the empirically demonstrated 
anomalies are minor. 705 
Kreps indicates that many people are willing to make such a leap because of 
the basic model's "intuitive appeal." That also seems right. After all, the leap 
appears to have been made by generations of economists and legal econo­
mistS.706 Still, it is an assertion that seems somewhat in tension with the 
observation that led him to offer these defenses in the first place-namely that 
(non-economistic) people found the basic model counterintuitive.707 And it is an 
assertion that seems rarely tested, and sometimes shown to be sorely mistaken 
when it is.708 
703. KREPS, supra note 664, at 4. 
704. See Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1 ,  1-2 ( 1962). 
705. Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen are similarly nonplussed by the disjunction between conven­
tional economic assumptions and realistic criticisms of those assumptions. See COOTER & ULEN, supra 
note 20, at 1 2  ("While these criticisms sometimes have merit, the fact remains that the three basic 
economic concepts[, maximization, equilibrium, and efficiency,] have wide application to law."). 
706. See Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 5 1  VAND. L. REV. 
1 729, 1 730 ( 1 998) (stating that "virtually all law and economics scholarship exists at the theoretical 
plane, turning on formal models rather than observed behavior"). 
707. See supra text accompanying note 694. 
708. For instance, in his recent Nobel Prize lecture, Joseph Stiglitz recounted how the standard 
defenses of the perfect-information assumption of neoclassical economics failed to withstand frontal 
challenges: 
For more than 100 years, formal modeling in economics had focused on models in which 
information was assumed to be perfect. Of course, everyone recognized that information was 
in fact imperfect, but the hope, following Marshall's dictum "Natura non facit saltum," was 
that economies in which information was not too imperfect would look very much like 
economics in which information was perfect. 
Stiglitz, supra note 365, at 461 .  "The standard proofs of [several] fundamental theorems of welfare 
economics did not even list in their enumerated assumptions those concerning information: the perfect 
information assumption was so ingrained it did not have to be explicitly stated . . . .  [The market failures 
that were taken seriously] were highly circumscribed by assumption." [d. at 466. As it turned out, 
however, "[o]ne of the main results of [Stiglitz's] research was to show that this was not true; that even 
a small amount of information imperfection could have a profound effect on the nature of the 
equilibrium." Id. at 46 1 ;  see also id. at 463 ("[E]ven slight departures from the underlying assumption 
of perfect information had large consequences."). Stiglitz goes on to suggest what might have 
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Alternatively, according to Kreps, the positive model may be salvaged if one 
changes the level of abstraction from individual behavior to that of aggregate 
behavior. That popular defense, too, has purchase, Kreps admits, only "if we 
believe that violations of [the] models . . .  cancel out at the level of aggregate 
behavior," another leap of faith, and "only if all we care about is aggregate 
beha vi or." 709 
Those are two big "only if's," which require another leap of faith that seems 
contrary to the best available evidence. The problem is that there have been few 
testable predictions at that level of abstraction ("aggregate behavior") that have 
in fact been tested in a way that provides much significant support for the basic 
economic assumptions. Indeed, to the contrary, the behavioral critiques of the 
rationality assumption are not aimed just at individual behavior. They reveal 
systematic biases that simply do not cancel out on net.7 Io 
It is precisely the assumption that deviations will tend to cancel out that many 
economic behavioralists claim to have disproven through empirical testing. That 
the Nobel Prize was recently awarded to Daniel Kahneman for his decades of 
work identifying tendencies that often do not cancel out bodes ill for the future 
of this still-popular defense. Moreover, as we have already summarized, the 
evidence that economists do sometimes offer-like downward-sloping demand 
curves-is of little value as an empirical defense of the rational actor model 
inasmuch as it is consistent with a vast range of possible alternative theories.7 I l 
And, finally, even if behavioral deviations from the rational actor model were to 
somehow disappear in the aggregate, it is not clear why that should be any more 
comforting to economists than the person with one foot in ice and the other foot 
in boiling water would be comforted by the observation that, on average, his 
feet are warm. 
motivated this long-term unwillingness to embrace the realism of imperfect information, suggestions 
that resonate with our more general realist critique: 
The creators of the neoclassical model, the reigning economic paradigm of the twentieth 
century, ignored the warnings of nineteenth-century and still earlier masters about how 
information concerns might alter their analyses-perhaps because they could not see how to 
embrace them in their seemingly precise models, perhaps because doing so would have led to 
uncomfortable conclusions about the efficiency of markets. 
Jd. at 46 1 .  The appearance of precision, the motive to reach certain conclusions, we believe, has 
implications far beyond merely, the question of whether economists take into account the reality that 
information is rarely perfect. 
709. KREPS, supra note 664, at 5. 
7 10. See generally Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously J, supra note 1 26 (reviewing 
the economic behavioralism literature, which demonstrates systematic biases of human decisionmak­
ing); see also Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and 
Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1 663, 166-67 (2003) ("A 'mountain of experiments' performed in 
psychology and related disciplines, much of it in the 'heuristics and biases' tradition founded by 
psychologists Daniel Kahneman andn Amos Tverksy, demonstrate that people tend to deviate systemati­
cally from rational norms when they make decisions."). 
7 1 1 .  See Hanson and Yosifron, The Situation, supra note 5, at 1 98-202 (describing how the 
dispositional, profit-maximization assumption about firms is premised ultimately on situational market 
forces). 
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So, it seems, the first line of defense is either not a defense or has already 
fallen, and the second line is driven solely by faith and intuition-a faith and 
intuition that not only lacks empirical support but that is contrary to the best 
evidence.7 1 2 
The weaknesses with those defenses become even more evident when one 
looks at how Kreps, in a subsequent section of his book, describes the purpose 
of economic theory. The topics are closely related, as Kreps seems to recognize, 
given that the defensibility of any theory should depend in part on the purpose 
to which it is being put. That the sun behaves as if activated by a rooster's crow 
may be a useful positive theory to the farmer for deciding when to rise for 
morning chores, but it would be a mistake to use such a theory in attempting to 
influence or understand the sun's relationship to the earth. So what is the goal or 
purpose of economics? According to Kreps, it is to analyze the efficiency and 
specific inefficiencies in various institutional frameworks with a view towards 
policy. 
One tries to see whether a particular institution can, by tinkering or by drastic 
change, be made to yield a socially better outcome; the vague presumption is 
that changes that improve the social weal might be made via social and 
political processes.7 1 3 
Notice Kreps's dramatic, though only implicit, change in emphasis. When 
defending microeconomics, Kreps focused neither on the understanding that the 
theory provides nor the fact that microeconomics can tell us what people want 
or how policy should be made. Indeed, he explicitly distanced economics from 
that ambition. His point was that despite the unrealism of economic models, 
they might nonetheless provide useful positive theories of behavior. In contrast, 
when discussing the purpose of microeconomics, Kreps indicates that its pri­
mary use is to improve social welfare through policy prescriptions and to 
7 1 2. That leaves the third and "most subtle" "line of defense," which, roughly, is that economists are 
able to control the unrealism of economic models: 
Even if we know that there are systematic violations of our models by individuals, violations 
that do not cancel out, we can still gain insight into questions of interest by studying models 
where we assume away those violations. This line of defense is delicate because it requires the 
theorist to have a deep understanding of which assumptions drive the conclusions that are 
generated by the theory . . . .  
KREPS, supra note 664, at 5. The point is indeed subtle, and we are not sure we understand it. But Kreps 
seems to be suggesting that economists can and do, in conducting their efficiency analyses, ignore their 
models' biases, no matter how major and systematic they may be, and then adjust the conclusions 
appropriately in light of what the economists know about the sources and sizes of those biases. That 
third defense requires its own leap of faith-specifically, that economists generating conclusions can 
and do make such "delicate" adjustments. If ours is an accurate interpretation of Kreps's point, we can 
see no reason or evidence to support making such a leap. 
7 1 3. Id. at 7. 
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provide "a better understanding of economic activity and outcomes.,,7 1 4  Thus, 
as we have already hinted, Kreps is attempting to justify a prescriptive use of 
economics by arguing (with little success) that the rational-actor model may be 
useful in making predictions. Put differently, Kreps, like most conventional 
economists, is looking to the rooster for an understanding of the sun. 
The problem for Kreps-indeed, for all of microeconomics, including law 
and economics7 1 s-is that even if economic models did provide valuable 
positive predictions, there is no reason to believe that those models will help us 
understand ourselves or that the policy prescriptions based on those models will 
"improve the social weal." To serve such purposes, we would at least need some 
reason to believe that the "as if' theories of economics are based on a realistic 
account of the human experience. 
It is one thing to use economics to predict that, say, a tax on an activity will 
decrease the amount of that activity. Such a positive prediction follows from the 
"as if' hypothesis and may indeed be useful to policymakers, just as a rooster's 
crow is useful to farmers.716 The problem is that economics is being used to do 
much more in the policymaking arena. The notion of choice-based preference 
satisfaction (and the welfare maximization presumed to follow from it) provides 
the nonnative analytic for determining which activities should be taxed in the 
first place. Indeed, it is the basic person schema that forms the foundation for all 
of law and policy.7 17  If the very notion of choice-based preference satisfaction 
is a widely shared myth, then on what grounds should policy be built around it? 
It is reliance on the presumption of such dispositionism that appears to justify 
Kreps's and others' implicit jump from positive analysis to normative analysis, 
and it is that very presumption that we have argued is mostly myth, rendering 
the jump unjustified. 
Our critique comes into clearer focus by examining more closely what Kreps 
means by the sort of theory on which policy makers should rely. He asks: 
[H]ow does one know when one has learned something from an exercise in 
microeconomic theory? The standard acid test is that the theory should be (a) 
testable and (b) tested empirically, either in the real world or in the lab. But 
many of the models and theories given in this book have not been subjected to 
a rigorous empirical test, and some of them may never be. Yet, I maintain, 
7 14. [d. at 7.  Kreps also mentions the purposes of satisfying intellectual curiosity and giving market 
participants a better way of making "markets work better for themselves." [d. 
7 15 .  See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 19, at 3-4 (describing the use of economics on positive 
grounds, "a scientific theory of behavior," and on prescriptive grounds, "a useful normative standard for 
evaluating law and policy"). 
7 16. As we have already explained, however, the fact that behavior may comport with the disposi­
tional theory does not imply that the behavior is not in fact a consequence of situational constraints. See 
generally Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5. 
7 17. See Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 32, passim; Hanson &Yosifon, The 
Situation, supra note 5, at 230--336; supra Part I. 
2004] THE SITUATIONAL CHARACTER 
models untested rigorously may still lead to better understanding, through a 
process that combines casual empiricism and intuition. 
By casual empiricism joined with intuition I mean that the reader should 
look at any given model or idea and ask: Based on personal experience and 
intuition about how things are, does this make sense? Does it help to put into 
perspective things that have been observed? Does it help organize thoughts 
about a number of "facts?" When and if so, the exercise of theory construc­
tion has been useful. 7 1 8 
1 5 1  
In short, Kreps's argument seems to be that, although it would be preferable to 
have reliable social scientific research to defer to, the fact that economics tends 
to rely on far less is not really a concern. And so Kreps, the pure economist, 
makes explicit what the work of legal economists evinces: The best we can 
hope for from economic models of the sort that dominate policy analysis is not 
realism or testable and tested theories of human behavior, but theory anchored, 
at bottom, in casual empiricism and intuition and a theory that seems to "make 
sense." This is not to say that economists and legal economists do not construct 
and test theories. Clearly they do. The point is that those theories emerge from 
models about human behavior that are themselves untested (at least by econo­
mists). 
Thus, as we emphasized at the outset, the place where economists decide to 
defer to casual empiricism is precisely the place where many critics claim that 
their theory is "obnoxious" and precisely the place where social psychology 
applies its focus.7 19 Instead of falling back on casual empiricism or intuition, 
social psychology relies on testable hypotheses and testing. What social psychol­
ogy through such research teaches-and what we have reviewed throughout this 
Article and its companion-is that it is precisely at that point where neither our 
intuitions nor our casual empiricism can be trusted. As psychologist Robert 
Crowder has expressed the point, intuition can no better teach us about the 
actual operation of our minds than it can about the operation of our kidneys. "To 
deny this means to accept that the brain is translucent in process whereas other 
organs are opaque. Why should this be the case?,,720 
7 1 8. KREPS, supra note 664, at 7. Kreps adds, by way of example: 
Imagine that you are trying to explain a particular phenomenon with one of two competing 
theories. Neither fits the data perfectly, but the first does a somewhat better job according to 
standard statistical measures. At the same time, the first theory is built on some hypotheses 
about behavior by individuals that are entirely ad hoc, whereas the second is based on a model 
of behavior that appeals to your intuition about how people act in this sort of situation. I assert 
that trying to decide which model does a better job of "explaining" is not simply a matter of 
looking at which fits better statistically. The second model should gain credence because of its 
greater face validity, which brings to bear, in an informal sense, other data. 
Id. at 8. 
7 1 9. See supra text accompanying notes 694. 
720. Robert Crowder, The Brain, the Kidney, and the Consciousness (unpublished manuscript, c. 
1990), in Banaji, Implicit Attitudes, supra note \05, at 130. We would go further than Crowder-for 
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The situation that economists, like most humans, have failed to take into 
account, is, like renal workings, barely observable through the lens of conscious­
ness, intuition, or casual empiricism. And so it is that both the interior and 
exterior situations combine to lead us toward the fundamental attribution error, 
to see relatively weak dispositions, and to overlook the more powerful situation. 
At bottom, despite economists' claims and aspirations to be social scientific, 
their work is based on little more than faith and unreliable intuitions, motives, 
and situation. Our best social science tells us not to trust our intuitions as Kreps 
urges, but to be suspicious of them. What "makes sense" to us is too often 
demonstrably wrong. Economics, while claiming to be the hardest of social 
sciences is, at its core, among the softest. Its pre-theoretic axioms are little more 
than the appealing products of our constructed perceptions. And, as we argue in 
other work, the success of economics is partially the result of the fact that many 
people share those intuitions and readily dismiss or disregard more reliable, but 
less self-affirming or system-affirming, findings of social psychology.721 
Let us belabor the point with one more metaphor. It is as if economists are 
advising pilots flying in poor visibility to ignore altimeters that warn of rapid 
descent and to rely instead on intuition about direction and trajectory. Unfortu­
nately, that practice is the tragic inclination of many unseasoned pilots. The 
right advice, of course, is for pilots to disregard intuition and fly their aircraft 
based on scientific instrumentation. Thus, while economists and legal econo­
mists urge us to abide by our shared vertigoes, critical realism urges that we 
recognize, understand, and strive to counteract our intuitive but vertiginous 
dispositionism. 
C. FIVE TYPES OF INADEQUATE "REALISM" 
"[Tlhe profession of economics is not lacking in the instinct of self­
preservation. The other bear sees in the threat to her cubs the ultimate threat 
to the survival of her kind. She reacts with angry venom. Nothing is more 
likely to produce a similar reaction from defenders of the conventional 
economic wisdom than an attack on the edifice which now rationalizes the 
importance of production and the urgency of consumer need. 
The parallel with maternal instinct is important, for the defense of the 
present value system . . .  is largely intuitive. Few economists in recent years 
can have escaped some uneasiness . . . . That uneasiness has reflected the 
crucial weakness of the literature on this point. " 
- John Kenneth Galbraith 722 
unlike our kidneys, our mind may be sending us misleading signals and may itself be subject to 
distorting motivations and manipulations. 
72 1 .  See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5; Benforado, Hanson & Yosifon, Broken 
Scales, supra note 54. 
722. GALBRAITH, supra note 662, at 2-3. 
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In response to mounting criticism, legal economists, following the lead of a 
burgeoning camp of economists, have gradually sought to portray their models 
as based on reasonably realistic accounts of human actors.723 Responses range 
from efforts to minimize the problem of unrealism by denying that the model of 
humanity in conventional economic analysis is in fact terribly unreal, to paying 
lip service to the problem but otherwise ignoring it, to more elaborate efforts 
that involve pursuing the limits of the rational actor model as a research agenda. 
All of these approaches, however, share a basic, and often deep, commitment to 
the basic law and economics paradigm. They countenance only as much "real­
ism" as their authors believe the paradigm can withstand. 
1 .  Counterfeit Realism 
Some of Richard Posner's writings exemplify the minimalist version of legal 
economists' response to the realism challenge. Posner denies that law and 
economics is as unreal or reductionist as its critics contend. In his view, 
[f]ar from being reductionist, as its detractors believe . . . .  [the project of law 
and economics] is not to reduce human behavior to some biological propen­
sity, some faculty of reason, let alone to prove that deep within us, pulling the 
strings, is a nasty little "economic man." It is to construct and test models of 
human behavior for the purpose of predicting and (where appropriate) control­
ling that behavior. Economics imagines the individual not as "economic 
man," but as . . .  one who bases decisions not on sunk costs-these he treats 
as bygones ("Don't  cry over spilt milk")-but on the costs to be incurred and 
the benefits to be reaped from alternative courses of action that remain open. 
The individual imagined by economics is not committed to any narrow, selfish 
goal such as pecuniary wealth maximazation. Nothing in economics pre­
scribes an individual 's goals. But whatever his goal or goals, some or for that 
matter all of which may be altruistic, he is assumed to pursue them in a 
forward-looking fashion by comparing the opportunities open to him when he 
must choose.724 
Posner's point here seems to be that law and economics is based not on a 
caricatured and reductive rational actor model, but on a far more realistic and 
flexible model of humanity-one that allows for virtually any goal. Those 
familiar with much law and economics scholarship may be scratching their 
heads. Posner has often celebrated the reductionism of economic analysis 725_ 
723. See, e.g., W. KIp VISCUSI, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION ( 1 992); see also 
Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously II, supra note 1 32, at 1548-5 1 .  The criticism is 
actually an old one, but only recently has it built up enough weight and legitimacy to get much attention 
from the legal economists themselves. 
724. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 16 ( 1 995). 
725. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 16 (3d ed. 1986) ("[RJationality may 
be a reductionist notion, but reductionism is inherent in scientific inquiry."); POSNER, supra note 1 8, at 
17-18  ("The reader who lacks previous acquaintance with economics may be troubled by what appear 
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almost as frequently as he has assumed that wealth or some similarly "narrow" 
and "selfish" goal is at the bottom of human decision-making,726 and that other 
goals or motivators, such as "morality" should play no role in judicial deci­
sions.727 It was Posner, after all, who based his positive theory of the common 
law on "wealth maximization,,,728 and who informed readers that economic 
theory is "committed to" the assumptions "that people seek to advance their 
self-interest and do so rationally.,,729 And he is not alone. Contrary to Posner's 
claim in the block quote above, "[t]he individual imagined by economics" is in 
fact virtually always "committed to a[] narrow" goal, almost always a "selfish" 
goal, and usually that of "pecuniary wealth maximization.,,73o 
Posner thus responds to the realist critique by denying aspects of his theory 
that he sometimes embraces, even celebrates. But his denial is in the form of 
assertions, not evidence-assertions about what law and economics could be, 
rather than about what it is. He takes refuge in the (largely unrealized) potential 
of law and economics to be more realistic.73 I So it is that he claims that 
"[n]othing in economics prescribes an individual's goals," instead of claiming, 
as he could not, that legal economists are, in practice, ecumenical in modeling a 
vast range of possible human goals.732 So it is that he asserts that the project of 
law and economics is not "to prove that deep within us, pulling the strings, is a 
nasty little 'economic man,' '' instead of asserting, as he could not, that the little 
monster does not figure prominently in most of the analyses that legal econo­
mists conduct, and from which they generate their policy prescriptions.733 
to be severely unrealistic assumptions that underlie economic theory . . . . But abstraction is of the 
essence of scientific inquiry, and economics aspires to be scientific."). See generally Posner, supra note 
4 (responding to Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 64). 
726. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE ( 198 1 )  (explicating Posner's theory 
that the goal of "wealth maximization" best explains the development of the common law). 
727. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 1 07-44 
( 1 999). 
728. See POSNER, supra note 1 8, passim. 
729. Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 343 
( 1974). 
730. See, e.g. , supra text accompanying notes 690-97 (quoting economist David Kreps's admissions 
regarding the unrealistic nature of conventional economic analysis). 
73 1 .  A "real" account of law and economics, taken generally, would never claim that the field 
existed simply to "construct and test models of human behavior for the purpose of predicting . . .  that 
behavior." See supra text accompanying note 724. There are, as we have seen, social sciences devoted 
to that purpose-though Posner and other legal economists have routinely disregarded or disparaged 
them. See supra text accompanying note 587. In any event, law and economics has not been such a 
field. 
732. See W. Bradley Wendel, Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories of Social Norms and the 
Pragmatics of Explanation, 77 IND. LJ. 1 3  (2002) ("The economic mode of analysis has an almost 
pathological aversion to explanations that appeal to values, commitments, loyalties, relationships, or 
emotions."). 
733. See DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF 
ApPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 18 ( 1994); Gregory S. Crespi, Does the Chicago School Need to 
Expand its Curriculum?, 22 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 149, 150-5 1 ( 1 997). See generally A. MITCHELL 
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 10  (2d ed. 1989). 
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We are taking the trouble to lay out Posner's largely nonresponsive response­
emphasizing what law and economics could do rather than what law and 
economics typically does-because this type of defense is extremely com­
mon.734 Yet even the potential version of law and economics, which Posner and 
other legal economists believe immunizes the entire approach, is profoundly 
unrealistic.735 Posner, for example, is willing to accept that people might be 
motivated by goals other than wealth maximization-such as altruism.736 But 
he nevertheless maintains his commitment to the view that whatever the chosen 
goal, it is pursued in a prototypically rational way, with costs and benefits 
balanced in a forward-looking maximizing manner.737 And, of course, beneath 
this assumption is an unstated axiom that it is always one or more personally 
held goals-our dispositions-that move us. This, too, is a common response. 
734. As Gary Becker highlighted in his Nobel lecture, rationality "assumes that individuals maxi­
mize welfare as they conceive it, whether they be selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic." 
GARY BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 1 39 ( 1 996). Becker is not alone among Nobel Laureates to 
emphasize the point. See, e.g., KENNETH ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 17 ( 1974) ("Rationality, 
after all, has to do with means and ends and their relation. It does not specify what the ends are."). 
Moreover, "[t] here is no general principle that prevents the creation of an economic theory based on 
other hypotheses than that of rationality . . . . [A]ny coherent theory of reactions to the stimuli 
appropriate in an economic context . . .  could in principle lead to a theory of the economy." Jolls, 
Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 64, at 1478 n. 1 3  (citing Kenneth J. Arrow, Rationality of Self and Others 
in an Economic System, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 201 ,  
202 (Robin M .  Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1 987». 
735. Moreover, it risks sacrificing one of the core values of legal economists-namely that their 
theories be falsifiable, and thus amenable to social scientific methodologies. See Hanson, Reyes, & 
Schlanger, supra note 43. 
736. "Altruism" is a popular concept for economists to tum to when their rational maximizing model 
is challenged. We suspect that "altruism" is so frequently raised because it appears to be on the opposite 
end of the relevant spectrum from "self-interest," suggesting that economists are entirely open-minded 
about possible "rational" motivations. For a couple of reasons, however, that appearance is, particularly 
as economists define "altruism," an illusion. Altruism is typically treated as motivated ultimately by 
some form of self-interest. Thus, the underlying motive never changes, just its manifestation. See Lynn 
A. Stout, Judges As Altruistic Hierarchs, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1605, 16 10  n. 1 7  ("It is something of 
a standard move for rational choice theorists to suggest that if people behave altruistically this must 
mean that they get pleasure (utility) from helping others, so altruism remains consistent with self­
interest. This move has a tautological flavor: it presumes that people are selfish and so anything they do, 
they must do to make themselves better off."); see, e.g. , Posner, supra note 4, at 1 557 ("All that is 
required to understand altruism as a form of rational self-interest is the assumption of interdependent 
utilities."). The beauty of "altruism" as an acceptable, rational motive is that it renders explicable 
behavior that otherwise seems to contradict narrower models of rational action. Altruism, thus under­
stood, is an escape hatch for hard-core rationalists. But it also raises significant questions about the 
falsifiability of those models, suggesting that the hard-core rationalists are not hard-core social 
scientists. See Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 64, at 1 488-89; cf Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: 
A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 3 17, 326-44 
( 1 977). A second problem with the altruism out is that it maintains the focus on dispositions, a point to 
which we'll return. 
737. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEx. L. REV. 757, 761 ( 1 974) 
("The basis of an economic approach to law is the assumption that the people involved with the legal 
system act as rational maximizers of their satisfactions."); Richard A. Posner, Values and Conse­
quences: An Introduction to Economic Analysis of Law, in CHICAGO LEcruRES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 
189, 19 1  (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000) ("Most economic analysis consists of tracing out the consequences 
of assuming that people are more or less rational in their social interactions."). 
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Indeed, it may be one of the few responses available to those who, like legal 
economists, are committed to "rational actor,,738 or "rational choice" models.739 
Although it is certainly realistic to acknowledge that people may have 
motives other than wealth maximization, it is not realistic to leave unexamined 
and unchallenged the assumption that those ends are pursued by goal­
maximizing, fully autonomous, forward-directed, rational actors. Who, for ex­
ample, is this "man" who suffers no pause over spilled milk, if not the 
"economic man?,,740 The colloquialism is itself a signal of the human tendency 
to be influenced by sunk costs, a tendency that has been documented as 
systematic by social psychologists.74 1 Posner's denial of realism is belied by the 
fact that even his account of what law and economics could be simply ignores 
much of what is in the human experience. Posner makes no serious attempt to 
begin legal-economic analysis with a realistic depiction of how human beings 
think and behave. As we have demonstrated, when one begins to look systemati­
cally at broad ranges of what social science has taught us about humanity, the 
conventional law and economics model's unrealism is revealed as severe in 
almost every aspect. 
Clinging to a demonstrably unrealistic model of the human actor, Posner 
nonetheless goes on to assert that law and economics is comfortable with the 
realities of the human mind: 
738. See infra Part I.C. I  (describing the rational-actor assumption and its significance). 
739. The term "rational choice" assumes a dispositional causal attribution for an actor's behavior. 
Indeed, the inability to identify a maximand or tractable number of maximands has often delayed the 
application of rational choice models to certain actors. See Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private 
and Public Judges, 4 1  PuB. CHOICE 1 07, 1 07 ( 1 983) ("[E]conomists have not had much success in 
creating a theory to explain the objectives of public judges."); David A.  Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and 
the Future of Public-Choice-Influenced Legal Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REV. 647, 653 n. 1 9  ( 1 997) 
(reviewing MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PuBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY ( 1 997)) 
("Public choice theorists have had far more difficulty modeling . . .  judges' behavior, as compared to 
. . .  private economic actors, due to the absence of a compelling theory as to what . . .  judges 
maximize."). That hurdle, however, has not stopped the most resolute economic "modelers." See, e.g., 
Cooter, supra (arguing that judges seek to maximize their prestige among litigants and lawyers); 
Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 
SUP. CT. ECON. REv. I ( 1 993) (indicating that judges self-interestedly pursue numerous ends, including 
their reputations, prestige, and leisure). And, unsurprisingly, "most rational choice analysis of the 
judiciary rests implicitly on the assumption that judges and other people look out only for their own 
interests, narrowly defined." Stout, supra note 736, at 16 10  n . 17 .  
740. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 729, at 343 ("The economic theory [of regulation] is committed to 
the strong assumptions of economic theory generally, notably that people seek to advance their 
self-interest and do so rationally . . . .  The economist [unlike the non-economist] is reluctant to accept 
. . . .  [the distinction] between a profit foregone and a loss incurred-the former is a cost too, indeed the 
same kind of cost."); POSNER, supra note 1 8, at 7-8 (describing the rational actor as one who ignores 
sunk costs). 
74 1 .  E.g. , Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 64, at 1489-93. In light of such evidence, Posner has 
very recently revamped his "rational actor model" to "predict" this phenomenon-the absence of which 
he once indicated was the defining feature of that rational actor model. POSNER, supra note 36 1 ,  at 
257-58. 
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Realistic about means as well as ends, economics does not depend on the idea 
that human beings are effortless and infallible calculators. A market may 
behave rationally, and hence the economic model of human behavior apply to 
it, even if most of the individual buyers (or buys) are irrational. Irrational 
purchase decisions are likely to be random and hence cancel each other out, 
leaving the average behavior of the market to be determined by the minority 
of rational buyers (or purchases).742 
1 57 
While Posner begins here by stating that the economic approach is "realistic" 
about ends and means, what he actually argues is that economics does not 
"depend" on realistic assumptions about human beings. Posner's point is that 
economic theory can predict downward-sloping demand curves even if "most" 
people are not rational. In other words, because price increases do lead to 
quantity decreases in the number of products purchased by consumers, as basic 
economic models predict, Posner suggests that his reliance on the economic 
model is fully vindicated, as is his dismissal of other realities that his approach 
ignores. In a world where consumer behavior does map a downward-sloping 
demand curve, legal economists may, according to this view, feel confident 
disregarding factors other than conventional "choice" variables, such as price, 
that might influence consumer behavior. 
But this is a non sequitur. No one is claiming that the problem with law and 
economics is its inability to predict a downward-sloping demand curve. Neither 
do critics argue that more realistic views of human behavior actually predict 
upward sloping demand-curves. Downward-sloping demand curves are per­
fectly consistent with numerous consumer models ;743 they are neither the test of 
realism, nor the issue under debate.744 Ultimately, Posner falls  back on the 
742. POSNER, supra note 725, at 1 6-17. 
743. See, e.g., Dan Ariely, George Loewenstein, & Drazan Prelec, Coherent Arbitrariness: Stable 
Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences, 1 1 8 Q.J. ECON. 73-106 (2003) (demonstrating how the 
illusion of stable, ordered preferences can be created with arbitrary anchors, and considering the effects 
of that possibility for conventional economic assumptions); Gary Becker, Irrational Behavior and 
Economic Theory, 70 1. POL. EcON. 1 , 4 (showing that "negatively inclined market demand curves result 
not so much from rational behavior per se as from a general principle which includes a wide class of 
irrational behavior as well"). For discussions of those insights for policy purposes, see Jon D. Hanson 
& Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regula­
tion, 1 07 YALE L.J. 1 163, 1 2 1 9  n.254 ( 1998); Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 64, at 1481-82; 
Loewenstein, supra note 573, at 2 1 2  ("Sensitivity to price and other costs and benefits is a prediction of 
purely rational theories of addiction, but almost any decision-theoretic model of addiction, including [a 
visceral account of addiction], would predict responsiveness to price."). 
744. Posner emphasizes in a recent book that, although Gary Becker did show that a downward-
sloping demand curve is not evidence that people are behaving as rational actors, Becker 
did not suggest that most consumers are irrational . . .  or that well-attested economic phenom­
ena other than the downward-sloping market demand curve, such as the tendency of the prices 
of the same good to be equalized, could be explained without assuming rationality. Buyers do 
not in fact choose randomly. Rationality is the only reasonable explanation for their reactions 
to changes in relative prices. 
POSNER, supra note 36 1 ,  at 26 1 .  Posner misses the point. First, Becker did not set out to show that 
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claim that the rational-actor construct is intended, not as a realistic model of 
human behavior, but as a model whose legitimacy rests in its ability to predict 
human behavior.745 His assumption that people often behave as if they are 
rational actors is, despite the absence of compelling empirical evidence in 
support of that belief,746 enough for Posner and most other economists.747 But 
even if the rational actor model did generate accurate predictions of human 
behavior, the fact that that model is premised on demonstrably unrealistic 
assumptions should cut against the wisdom of making it the basic framework 
through which to analyze law, not in favor of it. That the sun rises as if the 
rooster's crow released it from the horizon may be a useful positive theory for 
deciding when to awaken; but if the purpose is one of "predicting and (where 
appropriate) controlling,,748 the sun's behavior, one would do well to forget the 
rooster and to begin with a more realistic account of celestial dynamics. 
In sum, although they claim that economics is committed to realism, Posner 
and many scholars applying his basic approach only pretend to be sensitive to 
consumers are irrational; he would have been unjustified in claiming as much, given that his was a 
theoretical argument. What Becker did show is that the key piece of evidence that Posner and other 
economists have relied on as proof of the rationality of consumers does not, in fact, provide such a 
demonstration. As Becker explained, a vast range of (non-rational) models are consistent with downward­
sloping demand curves, including even the extreme model in which people make purchases randomly. 
But no scholar has claimed, as Posner seems to suggest, that people behave totally randomly. And 
again, we have yet to see any scholar propose a model that would predict upward-sloping demand 
curves. Posner is thus knocking down a straw man. The point is that downward-sloping demand curves 
reveal very little about what moves consumers, and Posner offers little else by way of evidence to 
suggest that the rational actor model has had much predictive success. 
Similarly, the fact that Becker said nothing explicitly about "the tendency of the prices of the same 
good to be equalized," see id., is no help to Posner. First, we are not sure that Becker's insight about 
downward-sloping demand curves does not apply as well to the tendency for prices of the same good to 
be equalized. The fact that people have limited resources and will not buy as many of the higher-priced 
versions of the same good, even if they make their purchases randomly, may itself lead sellers to push 
prices toward equality. Second, we again know of no one who has argued that their model of human 
behavior predicts that the prices of the same good should tend toward vast disparities. Indeed, we 
cannot even imagine what such a model would look like. 
Couple all that with the vast amount of evidence indicating that people do not behave according to 
the rational actor model and the justification for maintaining the model appears to lie in something 
other than the logic of the argument itself can express. 
Finally, if all that economists mean by "rational" is that a person about to buy a widget will choose 
the lower priced of two otherwise identical widgets, then we hereby accept the claim that people are, 
other things (including the situation) equal, rational. But by so describing humanity we would not have 
described much that is meaningful about them, and we would hardly have provided a useful theory of 
the human animal for making or reforming (or even just explaining) law. 
745. POSNER, supra note 361 ,  at 263 (Although '''economic man' is unrecognizable in real life," "a 
psychologically realistic picture of the average person . . . . has methodological problems. In theory­
making, descriptive accuracy is purchased at a sacrifice of predictive power."). 
746. Cf Banaji, Implicit Attitudes, supra note 1 05, at 1 3 1  ("The stronger the assumption that a 
concept has already earned admission to the mansion of science, the lower may be the demand to 
immediately prove just what the particular procedure and construct it presumably captures really 
predict."). 
747. See supra text accompanying notes 688-72 1 .  
748. See supra text accompanying note 725. 
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realism in order to justify ignoring it. He is engaging in what we describe as 
countetfeit realism; it is both token and false.749 
2. Defensive Realism 
Defensive realists, in contrast to counterfeit realists, accept the notion that 
more accurate descriptions of human behavior exist, but they nevertheless resist 
the implication that the law and economics approach should therefore be 
significantly altered. The work of Jennifer Arlen exemplifies this relatively 
recent tendency of legal economists to acknowledge the discoveries of social 
psychologists with one hand even as they sweep away its significance with the 
other.750 Arlen, for example, agrees that 
[c]onventional law and economics scholars must take behavioral research into 
account in analyzing legal issues, particularly in analyzing the merits of 
normative policy prescriptions derived from standard economic theory. The 
growing body of literature that enriches conventional law and economics in 
this way is an exciting development. 75 1 
But Arlen quickly marginalizes the potential implications of behavioral re­
search for conventional law and economics. Her treatment, like that of many 
other legal economists, appears to reveal defensiveness more than it does 
"excitement" about the implications of behavioralism. She examines three 
salient biases identified by behavioralists-the endowment effect, the optimism 
bias, and the "fairness" preference-and indicates how "real world forces . . .  
might cause these biases to be weaker [in real life] than they appear to be in the 
laboratory.,,752 Arlen further emphasizes that experts, and lawyers in particular, 
may be able to "reduce" people's tendency to fall prey to the illogical behav­
ioral patterns mapped by the realist critics of law and economics. And then she 
concludes with the observation that a theory that assumes the presence of 
certain central specific findings of behavioralists "cannot yield clear normative 
policy implications any more than can conventional law and economics.,,753 
Re-examining the well-known Cornell coffee mug experiment, for example, 
Arlen argues that the implications of the "endowment effect" which that study 
appears to have demonstrated, may not be as important to legal analysis as 
economic behavioralists have proposed.754 She points out that the endowment 
749. Posner deserves credit, though, for at least responding to the critique that law and economics is 
based fundamentally on unrealistic assumptions about the human actor. The more common response 
has, until recently, largely been to ignore such criticisms. 
750. Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 5 1  VAND. L. 
REV. 1 765 ( 1998). 
75 1 .  Id. at 1 787. 
752. Id. at 1 770. 
753. Id. at 1 780. 
754. See supra notes 1 43-46 and accompanying text; Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism 
Seriously I, supra note 1 26, at 674-75 (reviewing experiments). 
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effect has not been strong when subjects receive, not a mug, but only a fungible 
token that may be redeemed for an assigned value. Most commercial transac­
tions, she notes, involve currency that is more similar to tokens than coffee 
mugs. Furthermore, the endowment effect appears to vanish when people "do 
not actually possess the commodity at the time they are asked to trade it, but 
possess only the promise of the commodity.,,755 
Arlen argues that the influence of the "optimism bias" is similarly variable, 
and would not, without more specification, justify additional regulatory interven­
tion.756 People overestimate the risk of being hit by lightning, she argues, but 
may underestimate "a whole category of risk, such as the risk of product defects 
when some risks in the category are well-publicized and others are not.,,757 
People also increase their ability to assess risk, Arlen contends, in multiple-play 
scenarios-that is, where people repeatedly encounter the same kind of risk. 
And again, Arlen suggests that with respect to the legal system, people will rely 
on experts and lawyers who have experience and are thus "less likely to 
overestimate the merits of their case.,,758 
Arlen also downplays evidence that people exhibit favorable attitudes to­
wards "fairness," an attitude that does not seem to comport well with the basic 
law and economics approach. The "fairness bias" is revealed in experiments 
such as the ultimatum game. Typically, a subject is asked in that experiment to 
accept or reject another subject's proposed split of a given sum of money. If the 
first subject accepts the split they both pocket the money according to their 
agreement. If the subject rejects the split, neither party takes home anything. In 
such experiments subjects regularly reject inequitable divisions, a result that 
does not square easily with the standard conception of the rational actor, who 
should be as worried about what the other person gets as she is about spilled 
milk. Free money, on this account, is free money. 
Arlen again contends that such evidence does not warrant a departure from 
the conventional economic approach. Fairness concerns are, she emphasizes, 
context-dependent. Indeed, there is "some evidence . . .  that people will obey 
instructions to ignore fairness concerns.,,759 Relatedly, there is no way of 
knowing when fairness will be a factor: "[T]he role of fairness concerns . . .  
appear[s] to depend on many situation-specific factors such as the background 
of the person, the context of the decision, [and] the instructions given . . . . , ,760 
For this reason, it seems doubtful to Arlen that that the situation-specific 
755. Arlen, supra note 750, at 1 778-79. She also emphasizes findings that the endowment effect 
may not apply if a liability rule rather than a property rule protects the entitlement. ld. 
756. The optimism bias refers to the well-documented finding that people tend to think that their 
own chances of obtaining a good outcome from a set of circumstances is greater than the chances of 
people in general of obtaining a good outcome from the same circumstances. See Hanson and Kysar, 
Taking Behavioralism Seriously l, supra note 1 26, at 654-58 (reviewing studies). 
757. Arlen, supra note 750, at 1 783. 
758. ld. at 1 784. 
759. ld. at 1 786. 
760. ld. at 1 787. 
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consideration of "fairness" will be a helpful concept in  the analysis of law. 
Notice that Arlen is not attempting to incorporate social psychology's in­
sights, as she claims to want to do. Nor does she ask about how social 
psychological findings might undermine assumptions of law and economics or 
how those insights might render individuals and institutions subject to forces 
that legal economists have never considered. Instead, hers is essentially an 
apology for, and defense of, conventional law and economics, which systemati­
cally disregards those insights. Thus, she concludes: 
[B]ehavioral economic analysis of law is likely to remain as a set of sugges­
tions for amending conventional law and economics, together with an associ­
ated set of problems that require sustained attention. It is not likely to emerge 
as an alternative framework for analyzing legal issues. Behavioral economic 
analysis of law is unlikely to replace conventional law and economics unless 
it can formulate a superior model of human behavior suitable for making 
normative decisions about optimal legal regimes . . . .  76 1 
Like many legal economists, Arlen seems preoccupied with the possibility 
that behavioralist insights might be used to "justify additional intervention" by 
law into the affairs of the autonomous rational actor that lies at the core of the 
legal economist's vision of the person, the economy, and the republic. And it is 
a possibility that she seems strongly to oppose. She is by no means unusual in 
that regard-dispositionism and related schemas for markets (as preference­
satisfying) and regulations (as preference-frustrating and paternalistic) are im­
mensely influential in policymaking and among dominant policy theorists 
(particularly legal economists).762 Arlen therefore emphasizes that insofar as the 
alleged biases exist, they should be understood to bedevil and render untrustwor­
thy the decision making of judges, juries, and other potential governmental 
intermeddlers. 
Samuel Issacharoff has, at times, responded to behavioralism in that same 
defensive-realist vein. That is, he is willing to stipulate that people are subject to 
specific cognitive biases that are inconsistent, in theory, with the conventional 
law and economics mode1.763 The "self-serving bias," he recognizes, encour­
ages "people to integrate information in a fashion most consistent with their 
self-interest" which can obstruct, for instance, efficient or wealth-maximizing 
settlements of their disputes.764 And other decisional heuristics, Issacharoff 
notes, can lead people to act as if they have an aversion "for extreme posi­
tions.,,765 
761 .  {d. at 1787-88. 
762. See generally Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law, supra note 32, at 6-32 (describing some of 
the history and effects of the "markets good" and "regulation bad" policy schemas). 
763. Issacharoff, supra note 706, at 1735. 
764. {d. at 1738. 
765. /d. at 1740. 
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Indeed, Issacharoff not only makes these admissions, but he also correctly 
places himself among the vanguard of legal scholars advancing behavioralist 
insights. He "has actively participated in developing the experimental economic 
literature and [has sought] to apply it in the development of legal norms.,,766 He 
is, by any measure, exceptionally open-minded among legal economists and 
among the vanguard of behavioralists in legal academia. Nonetheless, Issacha­
roff, like Arlen, is unwilling to relinquish law and economics' basic presump­
tions. Before doing so, "there must [first] be a normative theory of " how to 
assess" the lessons of behavioral science with respect to social welfare.767 
Furthermore, Issacharoff makes clear that theory must comport with the basic 
dispositionist axioms of law and economics: 
There is no doubt that in order to perfect its models of rational conduct, law 
and economics requires a terribly reductionist account of human behavior . . . .  
It is certainly the case that the mechanical simplifications of Homo economi­
cus strongly caution against most forms of regulatory restraints on the market. 
It is further true that the tools of psychology may yet yield a richer understand­
ing of how these human wants and desires play out in the institutional setting 
of law. 
But this cannot possibly translate into a justification for greater constraints 
on individual decision making. Bounded rationality should not become the 
pretext for the imposition of an overarching regulatory structure on individu­
als . . . . [F]undamentally, it would indeed be ironic if greater insight into the 
complexity of human decision making became the justification for taking the 
freedom to decide, even if imperfectly, from those very individuals.768 
Thus Issacharoff, like Arlen, draws the line at any "greater insight into the 
complexity of human decision making" that could justify greater intervention 
by law into the affairs of autonomous individuals. Arlen and Isaacharoff are, it 
seems, more committed to protecting the appearance of a manageable legal 
theory than they are to taking seriously the possibility that that theory is itself 
deeply threatened by the sort of evidence they are reviewing. Their realism, in 
that sense, is defensive.769 
766. Id. at 1 73 1 .  
767. /d. at 1 736. The point seems to assume, among other things, that ( I )  law and economics 
provides such a normative theory, (2) the positive implications of behavioralist findings do not have 
prescriptive implications for policy, and (3) any general normative theory of law is not itself under­
mined by those findings. 
768. Id. at 1745 (footnotes omitted). 
769. The key difference between counterfeit realism and defensive realism is that defensive realists, 
unlike counterfeit realists, do not claim to be realists in fact. Rather, they seek to justify their 
commitment to unrealistic models. In other respects counterfeit realism and defensive realism share 
much in common. In both, the conversation about social psychology's implications for the rational 
actor model is extremely narrow. Biases and heuristics are singled out and flips are made concerning 
their applications in specific doctrinal areas. In a way, this positions behavioralism in a familiar trope of 
legal-theoretic dispute, mirroring the contours of the debate witnessed in many of the critical legal 
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In the time since Issacharoff posed the critiques and reservations that we have 
described above, he and several coauthors have embarked on a project that aims 
to cordon off more precisely those areas of legal policy where social psychologi­
cal insights should be brought to bear, and beyond which the import of such 
insights can and should be passed over in favor of the basic rational actor 
model.770 Two other prominent behavioralists, Cass Sunstein and Richard Tha­
ler, have been simultaneously advancing a similar project.77 1 Both pieces 
conclude, roughly, that social psychology's teachings about human actors should 
be taken into account when doing so would: 1) benefit large groups of people 
who are prone to non-rationality, and 2) where doing so would not unduly 
burden, or limit the freedom of, those who are not so afflicted and actually do 
think rationally.772 
That formulation is quite appealing as an analytical proposition, but it 
reckons with only a small and tractable sample of the lessons of social psychol­
ogy and affiliated fields. Issacharoff and his co-authors write as if realism does 
not pose a significant challenge to the basic law and economics approach: 
[W]e argue that in many cases it is possible to have one's cake and eat it too. 
We propose an approach to evaluating paternalistic regulations and doctrines 
that we call "asymmetric paternalism." A regulation is asymmetrically paternal­
istic if it creates large benefits for those who make errors, while imposing 
little or no harm on those who are fully rational. Such regulations are 
relatively harmless to those who reliably make decisions in their best interest, 
while at the same time advantageous to those making suboptimal choices.773 
The explicit goal of this project is to develop a theory that can both respond to 
critiques of the conventional rational actor model and also sustain disposition­
ism: 
studies critiques of law and economics. In any event, it is ironic that this indeterminacy charge is now 
employed by legal economists against the newer threat of behavioralism. Part of our larger project is to 
show that social psychology is not so indeterminate in its lessons for law. But for now we simply want 
to emphasize the shallow level at which the question of realism is evaluated by legal economists 
responding to behavioral critiques of their approach. 
770. Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O 'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 
Regulationfor Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism", l S I  
U .  PA. L. REv. 1 2 1 1 (2003). For other writings i n  which Issacharoff has repeated and extended his call 
for a conservative use of the' insights of social psychology in legal analysis, see Samuel Issacharoff, 
Behavioral Decision Theory in the Court of Public Opinion, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 67 1 (2002); Samuel 
Issacharoff, The Difficult Path from Observation to Prescription, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (2002). 
77 1 .  Professors Sunstein and Thaler have written an article with a very similar purpose, and which 
tracks Issacharoff and his colleagues' arguments fairly closely. Both sets of authors apparently 
developed the idea independently and at about the same time. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. 
Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 159 (2003). We will not 
review the Sunstein and Thaler piece here, but we believe that our analysis is appropriate to it no less 
than to Issacharoff and his coauthors. 
772. Camerer et aI., supra note 770, at 1 2 1 2; Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 77 1 ,  at 1 162. 
773. Camerer et aI., supra note 770, at 1 2 1 2  (footnote omitted). 
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[The] approach we term "asymmetric paternalism," reflects trepidations shared 
among all of the authors about the use of behavioral research to justify 
paternalistic policies. We have two major concerns. First, while research in 
behavioral economics documents commons mistakes ,  those mistakes are typi­
cally far from universal, and we worry that paternalistic policies may impose 
undue burdens on those people who are behaving rationally in a particular 
situation. Second, behavioral economics is in an early stage of development, 
and therefore its findings should elicit more caution than those from more 
"mature" fields (which are by no means themselves invulnerable to revision). 
These and related concerns suggest caution in promoting paternalistic policies 
at this stage and lead to our more conservative notion of asymmetric paternal­
ism.774 
There are, in our view, several analytic and normative problems with "asym­
metric patemalism,,,775 but for present purposes we want only to highlight how 
strongly it is committed to engaging social psychology's insights in a manner 
that leaves the basic dispositionist picture of the human actor in place, unchal­
lenged as the central starting place for legal theory. 776 
One way that it does so is by beginning with a highly schematic view of 
human actors as somehow comprised of two basic categories of people: those 
who "make errors" in their own utility analyses, and those who are "fully 
rational" in a given situation.777 Those categories are not, in our view, the 
fundamental starting places that emerge from the lessons of social psychology. 
While it is true that studies focused on narrowly defined "choice biases" show 
that some people are more prone to them in narrowly defined choice-contexts 
than are others, this, as we have tried to demonstrate in this Article, is just one 
774. /d. at 12 15 .  Sunstein and Thaler are similarly explicit about their pre-analytic allegiance: "Our 
only qualification is that the general presumption should be in favor of freedom of choice, and that the 
presumption should be rejected only when individual choice is demonstrably inconsistent with indi­
vidual welfare." Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 77 1 ,  at 24. 
775. Not the least of these problems is framing the debate in terms of paternalism and anti­
paternalism. We have not used those terms throughout this Article, reflecting our serious misgivings 
regarding the definitions, connotations, and schematic associations of those categories in policy 
debates. As we have previously argued, a situationist or critical realist perspective requires a reconceptu­
alization of the idea of paternalism. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situation, supra note 5, at 336-40 
(grappling with "the paternalism bogeyman"). 
776. It may be worth highlighting again that, while the "behavioral economics" work that Issacha­
roff and his co-authors refer to here might fairly be described as new (indeed, it is new to economists), 
social sciences other than economics have long been interested in studying and theorizing about why 
humans behave as they do and how they make sense of themselves and their environs. Put differently, 
the fields that we are summarizing in this Article seem quite "mature"-at least as compared to law and 
economics which, though influential, seems more the boisterous adolescent. 
777. Issacharoff and his co-authors simply assert that these are the findings of social psychology that 
are relevant to a paternalism inquiry: "Recent developments in the social sciences have provided new 
foundations for paternalism. The latest entrant into the paternalism debate comes from the introduction 
into legal analysis of developments in behavioral economics. By cataloging a list of common decision­
making errors that even highly competent, well-functioning people make in predictable situations, this 
research potentially broadens the scope of situations in which paternalistic policies could usefully be 
developed." Camerer et aI., supra note 770, at 12 14. 
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small part of the situation, and just one aspect of the situational character.778 
The absence of evidence of bias in a particular choice context hardly justifies 
the conclusion that legal theory can therefore rest easy relying on the conven­
tional rational actor model in such contexts. Nor is bias in choice-making the 
only relevant situation influencing those who do make "irrational" choices in a 
given context. We have argued in this Article that we are all, in virtually all 
situations, in incredibly powerful ways influenced by features of our situations 
that we do not appreciate.779 There remains an ardent dispositionist presumption 
778. See supra Part III.B. 1 .a (describing legal scholars' tendency to focus on "choice biases" in their 
efforts to incorporate social psychology into legal analysis). 
779. Readers and commentators have occasionally suggested that we have overstated the extent to 
which individuals are moved by situation. They point out that roughly one-third of the subjects in 
Milgram's first set of experiments, in which "teachers" were told to shock "students" up to 450 volts, 
actually declined to do so. They claim that such evidence is in tension with our thesis that people are 
situational characters. Some critics go further and suggest that, in light of such dispositionist heroes, 
this project should be devoted, not to describing the situational character, but to encouraging people to 
be more successful dispositional actors. To those observations, we have several responses. 
First, the social psychology experiments, such as Milgram's, do not actually indicate that some 
subjects were not significantly influenced by external situation. To begin with, all of the subjects in 
Milgram's first experiment "shocked" the "teacher" up to at least 300 volts-a greater shock than most 
people would predict they themselves would inflict in such a setting. Moreover, Milgram's experiment 
was set up to be a "situation" in which people would not be induced to inflict much harm on the 
"students." That is, the design and protocol were intended and predicted to lead most subjects to 
"choose" against inflicting significant shocks: after all, there was a fellow subject (with heart trouble!), 
screaming and kicking the wall and asking to be set free in the next room. There were, in other words, 
extremely strong (and obvious) situational forces encouraging people to not shock or to stop at low 
levels. That is what is so amazing about the experiment: it revealed features of the environment that 
seemed irrelevant but that were far more powerful than the more visible and seemingly more powerful 
features. The fact that some subjects opted to stop shocking between 300 volts and 450 volts doesn't 
necessarily prove the strength of their disposition; it may simply reveal the growing force of other 
elements of their situation. Put differently, all of the behavior in that experiment is consistent with our 
situational account of human behavior-and much of it is inconsistent with the dominant dispositional 
account. (The dispositionist actor should beware Occam's Razor.) . 
Second, our definition of "situation" is not limited to merely underappreciated or unseen "external" 
influences. This is an important point, because some confusion may result from the fact that when 
social psychologists were first discovering the power of situation, they were focused on environmental 
influences. Advances in social psychology revealing just how mysterious our own interiors are to even 
ourselves--dispositionist schemas, notwithstanding-help make clear that our interiors, too, are "situ­
ational," as we have defined that term. Thus, even when people behave in ways that seem inconsistent 
with the pressures of external forces, that does not imply that they are making "choices" in response to 
their "will," conscious thinking, and stable preferences. As we have argued at length, although the 
concepts of thinking, preferring, willing, and choosing may give us an affirming story, narrative, or 
schema for understanding our behavior and that of others, they are more or less illusory. And that is a 
major part of what we mean by "situational." 
We have occasionally heard the related objection that we are ignoring evidence that people often do 
attribute their behavior to situational forces. For instance, when students perform poorly on an exam, 
they are more inclined to attribute the outcome to some situational force ("That test was unfair!") than 
they are when they perform well ("I'm a genius !"). We acknowledge that tendency and others like it, as 
well as the cultural influences that can make individuals more or less inclined to attribute conduct to 
external influences. And we believe those exceptions are important for a number of reasons that we 
hope in future work to get to examine. We pay them scant attention here because they do not pose an 
exception to dispositionism, as we define that term: The situationist attributions that do sometimes 
occur are typically limited to only the most obvious or affirming elements of situation, a fact that itself 
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in back of the whole asymmetric-paternalism approach, one that never strays 
from the presumption that all people's preferences are more-or-Iess stable and 
exogenous to their situations. Even among those who have a hard time ratio­
nally pursuing their preferences, the preferences themselves are mostly taken as 
given, or are at least not considered a pressing element of the inquiry. 
Asymmetric paternalism is a theory designed to evade rather than to grapple 
with the evidence suggesting that we are situational characters. In so doing it 
reaches conclusions that are largely uncontroversial, and not at all threatening to 
our sense of ourselves. It is hard to take issue with the claim that defaults should 
be set in a manner that will likely engender the most utility for most, but which 
allows for individual opt-outs for those who exercise their rationality and can 
determine for themselves that a different arrangement will be better for them 
personally. Who's not for that? The approach bears, by its authors' own account, 
a striking resemblance to conventional ways of thinking about default rules, to 
the way legal economists typically think about default rules, and to how default 
rules actually work.780 Issacharoff and his co-authors recognize this and offer it 
as evidence of the fact that their approach can contribute to, rather than detract 
from, the advance of the basic law and economics approach: 
An appealing way to explain how these laws came about [laws embracing 
utility maximizing default rules but allowing for mutability by individuals] is 
that the law reflects what we are calling asymmetric paternalism and uses it as 
a cost-benefit standard. In this sense, asymmetric paternalism complements 
the basic law and economics belief that the law tends to move toward efficient 
solutions. An attentiveness to minimizing costs to rational actors while maxi­
mizing benefits to boundedly rational actors fits well within a richer concep­
tion of efficiency. 78 1 
Issacharoff and his co-authors went looking for a theory that traditional 
antipaternalists, and traditional legal economists, could accept without much 
quarrel, and that is exactly what they found. It is no surprise then that their 
framework, like those in its intended audience, misses much of the situation and 
reveals the otherwise unseen power of our interior situation (such as the role of motivation), and are 
often subject to the very same criticisms that we make of the dispositionist default. 
All that being said, we do not disagree with those who suggest people should learn how better to 
control or determine their own behavior. Our problem is with the assumption that the means to that end 
is by continuing to promote dispositionism and ignore the more powerful role of situation. As this 
Article should suggest, we believe it is important for individuals (citizens, consumers, lawmakers, legal 
theorists, and others) to become far more aware than they are of the extent to which we are all moved 
by forces within us and around us that are more or less unseen. Such an understanding will not 
transform them from situational characters to dispositional actors; rather, it will reduce the effect of the 
dispositionist illusion and give them greater awareness of and control (perhaps even dispositional 
control) over their situations. 
780. Cf Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 77 1 ,  at 1 199 ("The argument for libertarian paternalism 
seems compelling to us, even obvious."). 
78 1 .  Camerer et aI., supra note 770, at 1 223. 
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promotes a legal-theoretic focus that guarantees not finding it. As Issacharoff 
and his coauthors conclude their article: "[Asymmetric paternalism] should 
appeal to everyone across the political spectrum and can potentially shift the 
debate from one about whether or not paternalism is justified, to one about 
whether the benefits of mistake-prevention are larger than the harms imposed on 
rational people. The idea is designed to focus debates about paternalism on 
these empirical terms.,,782 Shifting the debate in this direction, we contend, 
entrenches an unrealistic dispositionism more than it offers a response to 
evidence critiquing it. These scholars focus the debate on empirical questions 
that emerge from a theoretical starting place that is not, we contend, well­
steeped in empiricism, much less critical realism. 
3. Selective Realism 
Another category of response to the realist challenge has been what we call 
"selective realism." In this approach scholars employ specific findings from 
social psychology to justify specific claims or conclusions, but make no effort to 
incorporate a full range of evidence from social psychology, either for the 
particular claim they are pursuing or for the basic starting point of their 
approach to legal analysis. Selective realism of that sort has already been 
adequately described elsewhere.783 Given the length of this article already, 
therefore, we cannot justify a proportional discussion here. It is, we hope, 
sufficient to point out that product liability scholars have long been tapping into 
the economic behavioralism literature to make assertions about how well in­
formed consumers are. In doing so, they have tended to be quite selective about 
what "cognitive biases" they emphasize, depending on whether they have 
concluded that consumers overestimate risks or underestimate risks. Essentially, 
those scholars still employ the rational actor model, with some selected biases 
thrown in. 
4. Weak-Form Realism 
Other efficiency-oriented scholars have been more willing to get real. Profes­
sors Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler, for example, use strands 
of psychological research in an approach dubbed "behavioral economics" or 
"behavioralism," to "explore the implications of actual (not hypothesized) 
human behavior for the law.,,784 Although they fall further from the trunk than 
782. Id. at 1 254. 
783. See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note 1 26, at 693-723 
(describing and providing examples of selective realism in products liability debate); Hanson & Kysar, 
Taking Behavioralism Seriously II, supra note 1 32, at 1548-53 (describing Kip Viscusi's selective 
realism in analyzing cigarette markets, smoking, and the need for regulation); Jon D. Hanson & 
Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to Market Maniuplation, 6 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 259, 370-80 (2000) (describing James Henderson and Jeffrey Rachlinski's 
selective realism in their critique of enterprise liability). 
784. See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 64, at 1 476. Weak-form realism is distinguished from 
selective realism, as we have defined the terms, in that it is not limited to a particular policy question or 
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Posner, and the other quasi-realists, they do not fall far from the law and 
economics tree. They attempt "to model and predict behavior relevant to law 
with the tools of traditional economic analysis, but with more accurate assump­
tions about human behavior.,,785 They emphasize that their project is "deeply 
constructive,,786 to the law and economics paradigm: "Behavioral economics is 
a form of economics, and our goal is to strengthen the predictive and analytic 
power of law and economics, not to undermine it. ,,787 We describe this as 
weak-form realism, currently the most common and fastest growing mode of 
psychology-based critical engagement with economics.788 
The inadequacy of weak-form realism, though perhaps less acute, has much 
in common with the failures of counterfeit realism, defensive realism, and 
selective realism. Instead of beginning with a realistic understanding of human 
actors, weak-form realists maintain the familiar and affirming dispositionist 
actor and engage only "phenomena that have reasonably precise implications 
for legal issues.,,789 They pick and choose among psychological findings, and 
select only those that seem directly applicable to a pre-existing policy debate 
within the law and economics paradigm.790 And, in doing so, they operate 
according to the same "economics first, realism second," priority rule: 
The project of behavioral law and economics . . .  is to take the core insights 
and successes of economics and build upon them by making more realistic 
assumptions about human behavior. We wish to retain the power of the 
economist's approach to social science while offering a better description of 
the behavior of the agents in society and the economy.79 1 
In other words, phenomena that do not "have reasonably precise implications 
for legal issues" or that may threaten "the core insights of economics" (and, we 
might add, core conceptions of the human animal) are off the table. So, for 
instance, Jo11s, Sunstein, and Thaler maintain the consumer "choice" center-
issue. Weak-fonn realism, in other words, attempts to provide a general theory (a revised law and 
economics) to be applied across all settings. Weak-fonn realism, as we will describe, is nonetheless 
selective in the sense that it considers only a small fraction of tractable choice biases. 
785. /d. 
786. [d. 
787. /d. 
788. For other excellent work adopting what we describe as the weak-fonn realist approach, see 
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality 
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1 05 1  (2000); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" 
Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 
(2000) (arguing that the new approach provides a "more accurate description of human choice than the 
law otherwise has available, which in tum should improve both positive and nonnative legal analysis"). 
789. See lolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 64, at 148 1 .  
790. A s  Richard Posner complains i n  his defense against weak-fonn realism, "Behavioral economics 
is defined by its subject rather than by its method and its subject is merely the set of phenomena that 
rational-choice models (or at least the simplest of them) do not explain." POSNER, supra note 36 1 ,  at 
264. 
79 1 .  lolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, supra note 64, at 1487. 
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piece of basic economics, in which consumers are presumed to act disposition­
ally to serve their own ends.792 The only difference here is that the consumer's 
behavior is "bounded" in ways that influence, in predictable ways, the consum­
er's actual decisions. The focus remains on the actor-who is deciding, consum­
ing, and judging in accordance with her mostly exogenous dispositions and 
preferences. The now-bounded actor is simply plugged into the choice-driven 
models of conventional law and economics to yield positive or normative policy 
conclusions. In short, realism, in the weak-form variety adopted by Jolls, 
Sunstein, and Thaler, is bounded. 
5. Strong-Form Realism 
A few have gone still further in abandoning the artificiality of conventional 
economic modeling. In a set of articles coauthored with Doug Kysar, one of us 
has argued that behavioralism should be "taken more seriously" than scholars 
had previously allowed. It is not enough to recognize that, say, consumers may 
be subject to certain biases in their processing of product information. Rather, a 
clear implication of the behavioralist literature is the deeper insight that percep­
tions, and even preferences, are manipulable by other actors in the model. That 
is, perceptions and preferences are endogenous in the sense that they are subject 
to influence by other actors, such as product manufacturers and sellers.793 And, 
further, because those actors can influence perceptions and preferences, they 
will-indeed, competitive processes require as much. We call that approach 
strong-form realism.794 
But even that form of realism, as two of its critics highlight, may be 
unjustifiably shy in holding onto the law and economic approach that it purports 
to challenge. Professors Henderson and Rachlinski assert in the concluding 
paragraphs of their critique: 
[W]e cannot help but note that although [Hanson & Kysar] claim to have 
embraced cognitive psychology and taken it seriously, in truth they hold 
792. And that view is common among economic behavioralists. See, e.g., Thomas S. Vlen, Evolu­
tion, Human Behavior, and Law: A Response to Owen Jones 's Dunwoody Lecture, 53 FLA. L. REv. 93 1 ,  
933-34 (2001 )  ("The central distinguishing contention of this emerging emendation of rational choice 
theory is that human beings are imperfectly rational. In the pursuit of their ends people make 
systematic, predictable mistakes that the law can take into account in its attempts to regulate human 
behavior."). 
793. See Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously I, supra note 1 26 (identifying the 
problem); Hanson& Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously II, supra note 1 32 (providing market 
evidence); Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously III, supra note 786 (discussing possible 
solutions); Hanson & Kysar, The Failure, supra note 403. 
794. One author has recently lumped Hanson and Kysar's work in with the weak-form behavioralists 
and interpreted it as assuming that "irrational behavior" is stable, in the sense that it is insensitive to the 
role of context. See Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessi­
mism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 907 (2002). We can only 
assume that Professor Mitchell somehow missed those sections of the Hanson and Kysar trilogy that 
emphasized "market manipulation." 
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closely to a conventional economic analysis of product-related risk. For 
example, Hanson and Kysar argue that "manufacturers' manipulative prac­
tices may inflate consumers' perceptions of a product's overall desirability," 
and the "consumers' misperception [that this manipulation creates] would 
result in inefficient purchases." If consumer preferences are completely con­
structed, then what exactly is supposed to be the efficient level of consump­
tion? Should the socially optimal demand for soup be measured with the cans 
in alphabetical order, or not? On a rainy day, or sunny? With what kind of 
music or ambient odors (if any) in the background? In what section of the 
store? What should the labels look like? How big are the cans? Risk is no 
different. . . . The notion that manufacturers distort consumer risk-perception 
assumes that there is some natural and appropriate risk-benefit assessment 
from which manufacturers lead consumers astray. If we take seriously the 
psychological proposition that all preferences are constructed, then there is no 
magical correct level of risk that consumers should endure . 
. . . A complete, serious assessment of what cognitive psychology means for 
products liability has yet to be undertaken.795 
Although we would challenge portions of their description of Hanson and 
Kysar's work,796 we accept their final point that legal scholars have yet to 
conduct "a complete . . .  assessment" of the implications of cognitive psychol­
ogy for law. Current strains in the debate all share an unwillingness to relin­
quish a demonstrably unrealistic conception of the human animal and to build 
instead from a more realistic foundation. It is to introduce that project-what 
we call "critical realism"-that this Article and its companion are largely 
directed. 
VI. THE SITUATIONAL CHARACTER'S SITUATION 
Throughout this Article, we have focused on social psychological findings 
that reveal the fallacy of the dispositionism that pervades common sense, law, 
conventional legal theory, and, as we just reviewed, the dominant theoretic 
domains of economics and economic behavioralism. In depicting the situational 
character, we have shown how, dispositionist appearances notwithstanding, 
much of what moves us is unseen. We have described some of the countless 
interior and exterior situational influences that give shape to our sense of our 
experience. We have particularly emphasized the interior situational realities 
behind our dispositionist charade-the unseen biases in our mind, unseen 
knowledge structures, and motivations, and many other aspects of unexamined 
and often un-examinable interiors. We have illustrated how our interior situation 
795. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and Cognitive Biases: 
The Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 2 13, 258 (2000). 
796. Among other things, it understates the extent to which Hanson and Kysar challenge the 
conventional economic model, overstates the extent to which they argue that preferences are con­
structed, and significantly misstates the source of "distortion." 
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and behavior can be easily influenced b y  exterior situational influences. Indeed, 
virtually every experiment in social psychology largely depends upon, and thus 
reveals, that manipUlability. 
Of course, it is not just the social psychologists in their labs who are 
attempting to move us through the situation. As we explained in The Situation, 
the (situational) imperatives of the market, themselves situational imperatives, 
provide one common and possibly troubling source of external situational 
influence. But there is a lot more to the situation. 
A. SEEING IT 
And there are other even simpler ways to demonstrate the role of situation, 
our fear of it, and our attempt to ignore or downplay its existence. It is not just 
that we are by our nature subject to situational influences over our thoughts and 
behavior. Before we ever think or behave at all, our lives are already powerfully 
shaped by the situation of our births in society. There's a situational character 
born every minute. And each is born into a situation that tremendously influ­
ences what her life will be like, what opportunities she will have, or not have, 
and how she will respond to the opportunities she does have. We are born rich 
or poor. We are born "wanted" or "unwanted." We are each born with a 
particular set of talents and limits. We are each endowed with our looks, our 
brains, and our bodies. We are born first among siblings, last, or somewhere in 
between. We may be part of one family or another, one community or another, 
and one culture or another. Though perhaps none of those situational parameters 
is decisive, taken together they provide an immense influence over our options, 
our aspirations, our experiences, our memories, our sense of ourselves, our 
sense of what is natural and appropriate, and more. And just as importantly, to 
further our picture of the situational character, the situational influences of the 
"birth lottery," though in many ways self-evident, remain largely unseen through 
our dispositionist lenses. 
The power of the birth-lottery belies our dispositionist self-conceptions, and 
the dispositionist assumptions at root in so many of our conventional legal and 
social theories. For example, there are approximately 240 million Americans 
with health insurance, and approximately 40 million without. Those without it 
are generally the working poor, who cannot afford to buy private health 
insurance and who are often ineligible for state and federal health insurance 
programs. Those forty million suffer higher rates of deaths from treatable 
diseases than do the rest of us. Those who live in poor neighborhoods attend 
schools with far fewer educational resources available than those who live in 
wealthy ones, and consequently find themselves on the short end of the achieve­
ment gap.797 
Those born into an African-American family are three times more likely to 
797. See MATIHEW MILLER, THE Two PERCENT SOLUTION 7-1 1 (2003) ("Every free-market fan knows 
that you get what you pay for. When the affluent suburb of Scarsdale, New York, pays teachers with a 
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find themselves living below the poverty line than are those born into a white 
family.79s The average African-American family's net worth is about twelve 
percent of the average white family's net worth?99 And that huge disparity is 
not explained by factors like earnings rates, education, or savings rates. soo More 
than 25% of of black households have no positve wealth, while just 14% of 
white households are in that situation. so I Similarly, those born into single parent 
households are three times more likely to find themselves living in poverty than 
are those born to two-parent households.s02 Those who happen to be born in 
Mississippi are more than twice as likely to find themselves starting off in 
poverty than are those lucky enough to be born in Connecticut. S03 And those 
who are born into poverty tend to end up far poorer than those born into wealth, 
with concomitantly lower levels of overall health, occupational opportunities, 
consumption patterns, and life-expectancies.s04 And, of course, all of those 
examples assume a person is born in America-itself an assumption with 
potentially immense situational consequences. 
B. MISSING IT 
The evidence is all around us, and one need not have read a single social 
psychological experiment to see and understand the power of situation. Even 
the deepest dispositionists among us can see this situational elephant in the 
corner when it is called to our attention. And yet, we tend to look away and 
again see only ourselves and other individuals. Our common, affirming knowl­
edge structures and self-conceptions do not take account of those situational 
influences and manage to keep us a safe distance from "that comer." 
In his recent book The Two Percent Solution, Matthew Miller examines the 
problem of what he calls "luck" in American society. As Miller uses the term, 
"luck is the shorthand that describes those things that shape our lives that are 
entirely outside our control. We' re talking mostly about the pre-birth lottery, 
those aspects of a person's experience dictated by the womb from which he or 
she happens to emerge."S05 In his chapter "Taking Luck Seriously," Miller 
masters degree and five years of teaching more than $60,000, and New York City pays her counterpart 
in the 40s, is there really a question about where most of the top talent goes?"). 
798. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 447 ( l 2 l st ed. 2001 ). 
799. See DALTON CONLEY, B EING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND SOCIAL POLICY IN 
AMERICA I ( 1999). 
800. See generally id. 
801 .  See EDWARD N. WOLFF, Top HEAVY: THE INCREASING INEQUALITY OF WEALTH IN AMERICA AND 
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 3 (2002). 
802. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 798, at 447. 
803. See A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF THE UNITED STATES: SOCIAL CONDITIONS AND TRENDS 80 (Mark S. 
Litman ed., 1 998). 
804. See generally ROBERT M. HAUSER, INTERGENERATIONAL EcONOMIC MOBILITY IN THE UNITED 
STATES: MEASURES, DIFFERENTIALS, AND TRENDS (Ctr. For Demography and Ecology, Univ. of Wis.­
Madison, CDE Working Paper No. 98- 12, 1 998). 
805. MILLER, supra note 797, at 70. 
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points out the elephant to two of the best-known and most effective proselytiz­
ing dispositionists, Milton Friedman, the Nobel Laureate in economics, and 
William Bennett, the conservative moralist. Miller, in a mind-bogglingly simple 
research strategy, simply asked them about it. 
Bennett, when asked about the bigger picture, could not easily hide behind 
reassuring dispositionist anecdotes. Instead, he just admitted that factors relating 
to a person's birth lottery "matter hugely" and that many people don't "exercise 
autonomy and make a difference in their own lives . . .  because they're in 
crappy families, crappy schools, crappy neighborhoods. ,,806 
Friedman's response was even more revealing.807 Friedman, recall, is among 
the most influential proponents of the necessary relationship between freedom 
and free markets, a view that begins and ends with a deep dispositionism. Even 
as a young economist, Friedman was aware of the problem posed by the 
situational elephant for the economic theories he advocated. In an early paper, 
as Miller describes, Friedman took pains to show that social inequality may be 
not just the result of "natural endowments or inherited wealth," but also the 
byproduct of individual work and spending habits: 
[O]ne cannot rule out the possibility that a large part of the existing inequality 
of wealth can be regarded as produced by men to satisfy their tastes and 
preferences . . .  [that] the link between differences in natural endowment or 
inherited wealth and the realized distribution of income is less direct and 
simple than is generally supposed . . . . [This analysis] has implications for 
normative judgments about the distribution of income and the arrangements 
producing it-inequalities resulting from deliberate decisions . . .  clearly raise 
very different normative issues than do inequalities imposed on individuals 
from the outside.808 
Even were Friedman correct that we cannot "rule out the possibility" that 
individual choice accounts for disparities in poverty,809 that would not suggest 
that we should therefore make that possibility the cornerstone assumption in our 
theories. Rather it should counsel a further look at just how "possible" this is, 
and how possible it is that "outside" influences, such as inherited wealth, are 
actually hugely important. And of course, as we have been arguing in this 
Article, the fact that wealth effects might be attributable to individual choices 
and behaviors does not support the dispositionist conclusions that Friedman 
claims to deduce from them. 
In any event, we are here interested in how scholars and policymakers, even 
S06. See id. at S4. 
S07. See id. at 69-92. 
SOS. See id. at 73 (quoting Milton Friedman, Chance, Choice and the Distribution of Income, 61 J. 
POL. ECON. 277, 290 ( 1953) (third alteration in original». 
S09. More recent scholarship, by the way, suggests that we can rule out that possibility. See, e.g. , 
CONLEY, supra note 799. 
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those with no reason to encounter the findings of social psychology, have 
managed to miss some seemingly obvious elements of "the situation." Follow­
ing that early article, Friedman spent the next several decades of his career 
without ever seriously questioning his early argument. In 1962's Capitalism and 
Freedom, however, he did supplement it, arguing that there was no more reason 
to question a landholder's inheritance of property than there was to question a 
singer's inheritance of her voice. And based on that observation, Friedman 
concluded that "[m]ost differences of status or position or wealth can be 
regarded as the product of chance at a far enough remove."S IO 
Sensing that there still seemed to be a giant elephant in the room, Miller 
pointed out to Friedman that the cases of the lucky property owner and the 
lucky vocalist do not nullify the problem of situational luck. Instead, they 
exemplify the ubiquity of the problem. Microphone in hand, Miller pushed 
Friedman on the point. Friedman revealed that even after spending most of his 
Nobel-Prize winning career largely ignoring it, he could still see, when it was 
highlighted in this way, that indeed luck is a powerful situational influence on 
individuals. "Society may want to do something about luck," Friedman told 
Miller, as if he had just seen the elephant for the first time. "You' ve asked a very 
hard question. I don't know that I have the simple answer to it," Friedman 
conceded to Miller. S I I  
Yet in book after book and article after article over the course of decades, 
Friedman's solution to this "very hard question" has been to paper over it. 
Friedman is like the rest of us. Even the situation that is in our midst and that 
should be obvious to us, the most basic situational influences over our lives, are 
easily missed or explained away. Although situational forces can be in plain 
view, a person, armed with reassuring knowledge structures, can spend a 
lifetime not seeing them. It bears noting that perhaps no American intellectual 
has had as much influence over American policy over the last half-century as 
Milton Friedman has.s l 2  
But, there with Miller in  his den, Friedman had a few more moves to make, 
which further reveal the lengths to which many of us will go to ignore powerful 
situational influences for the sake of maintaining a simpler, more reassuring 
dispositionism. Regarding the ubiquity of luck and its importance as a social 
factor, Friedman regrouped and retorted: "See, the question is, what you're 
really talking about, is determinism versus free will": "But you can't really 
justify free will. . . . .  You can keep going back. There's no first cause. Nobody 
has ever solved the argument of determinism versus free will. And you and I 
8 10. See MILLER, supra note 797, at 75 (quoting MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 
( 1962» . 
8 1 1 . ld. at 85. 
8 12. For a review of Friedman's career and influence, see Chen & Hanson, The Illusion of Law, 
supra note 32, at 14-23; see also George W. Bush, Remarks in a Tribute to Milton Friedman, 38 
WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc:. 782 (May 9, 2002) (proclaiming that Friedman's "vision has changed 
America, and it is changing the world"). 
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aren't going to do so either."s l 3  Consciously or not, Friedman sought to escape 
from the question of luck by jumping down an unrelated slippery slope. Miller 
was not claiming, nor would we, that luck determines outcomes; instead, he was 
pointing out that luck, as William Bennett put it, "matters hugely."s I4 The 
question still pending for Friedman was, if you can't say that free will is at the 
bottom of all relevant human behavior, then why assume it is and why assume 
that situation is all but totally irrelevant? Put another way, if there is an 
unsolvable philosophical conundrum afoot, or a problem of empirical uncer­
tainty, then what wisdom is there in shrugging our shoulders and assuming that 
it can be left out of our fundamental theories altogether? There are numerous 
reasons why individuals tend to see situationist arguments as determinist claims. 
One that bears highlighting here is simply that our general inability to see 
situation renders us unable to see either its effects or how it and its effects might 
be usefully altered. Situation is treated as given, fixed, and natural. From that 
perspective, situationist arguments look like claims that we are moved by forces 
over which we have no control-as individuals or as a society. That claim 
seems determinist and, in any event, is quite threatening to our own sense of 
ourselves and our systems. Understandably, those making such a claim-that 
unseen forces play a major role in our behavior-are eagerly dismissed as, 
among other things, straw-men determinists. But to acknowledge situation is 
not to surrender to it, but rather it is to take a necessary step in gaining some 
control over it. The situation can be altered-indeed, is being altered constantly. 
It reflects and reinforces those entities or groups with the power to influence it. 
The elephant is not just sitting in the comer; it moves and can be made to move. 
C. DENYING WHAT WE CANNOT ADMIT 
Friedman, at one point, did answer the question. Acknowledging the elephant 
in one breath and then denying it in the next, he said: "In a sense we are 
determinists. In a sense we are and in another sense we can't let ourselves 
be."s I 5 Although it is true that situation matters hugely, "we can't let ourselves 
be" anything but dispositionists. s l 6  
And so the game is  up. The theories that we develop for understanding and 
predicting and influencing human conduct - including (or, perhaps particularly), 
the policy theories developed by the most sophisticated and influential analysts, 
are not meant to be based on what we know to be true. It is about maintaining a 
8 13. MILLER, supra note 797, at 86-87. Note that economists generally have no place for the "will" 
in their models; instead, their models tend to be deteriminist in the sense that preferences are treated as 
fixed and exogenous, and behavior is treated as responsive to those preferences. 
8 14. See supra note 806. Ironically, Milton and Rose Friedman's memoirs are entitled, Two Lucky 
People, an irony that did not escape Milton. 
8 15 .  MILLER, supra note 797, at 86-87. 
8 1 6. This reaction is not unlike the sort of reaction that many of us undergo when experiencing 
cognitive dissonance. See supra notes 461-7 1 and accompanying text (describing how we seek to 
trivialize the dissonance or to highlight other affirming features of ourselves or our beliefs). 
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theory that is plausible, simple, and affinning. Denying the effect of exterior 
and interior situation is itself a manifestation of that very situation. Friedman, it 
seems, can't handle the truth. But, then, who can? Situationism is, for all the 
reasons we' ve provided (and then some), a frightening and potentially paralyz­
ing vantage point. 
There is a long tradition of denying situationism among economists. A half 
century ago, for instance, John Kenneth Galbraith lamented the dispositionism 
of his fellow economists: "At least in social disciplines, obsolescence and 
irrelevance are a small price to pay for the privileges of remaining comfortably, 
even if archaically, with the familiar, the settled and the safe.,,8 1 7 But the fear is 
by no means exclusive to economists. 
Situationism is widely feared. Even social psychologists who are most famil­
iar with the power of situation lose sleep over what their evidence seems to 
suggest. Susan Fiske, one of the most prominent social psychologists of her 
generation, describes her fear this way: 
An absence of intent ultimately implies an absence of responsibility for the 
effects of categorization . . . . It has led me to have the following nightmare: 
After testifying for the plaintiff in a case of egregious and demonstrable 
discrimination, a cognitive social psychologist faces the cross-examining 
attorney. The hostile attorney, who looms taller than Goliath, says "Tell us, 
Professor, do people intend to discriminate?" The cognitive social psycholo­
gist hedges about not having any hard data with regard to discrimination, 
being an expert mainly in stereotyping. When pressed, the psychologist 
admits that stereotypic cognitions are presumed to underlie discriminatory 
behavior. Pressed still further, the psychologist reluctantly mumbles that, 
indeed, a common interpretation of the cognitive approach is that people do 
not stereotype intentionally, whereupon the cross-examining attorney says in a 
tone of triumph, "No further questions, Your Honor.,,8 1 8  
Her concern, just like Friedman's and our own, i s  what to do with the 
individuals who seem to act unjustly-those times when we see a victim and an 
injurer and we want the injurer to pay and the victim to be compensated. Are we 
left with no option but to chalk it up to situation and send the parties on their 
way? That seems to be the only alternative that the dispositionist can imagine. 
Fiske, as she would go on to explain, got back to dispositionism by claiming 
that individuals can choose to wield some influence over their automatically 
activated stereotypes. But as others have pointed out since, although her rescu­
ing argument was reassuring, the best evidence suggests that it is overly 
8 1 7. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 2 ( 1977). 
8 1 8. Susan T. Fiske, Examining the Role of Intent: Toward Understanding Its Role in Stereotyping 
and Prejudice, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT 253, 254 (James S. Uleman & John A. Batgh eds., 1 989) 
(citation omitted). 
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SO, we are stuck with our nightmare. We hold onto our dispositionist views 
tenaciously, even well beyond the point where our claims about the truth of the 
matter have been abandoned. We are dispositionists, not because humans are 
dispositional, but because there is too much that has already been built upon the 
dispositionist foundation to begin building elsewhere, and because disposition­
ism helps us to sleep. 
As Nobel Laureate Isaac Bashevis Singer elegantly expressed the dilemma: 
"Of course I believe in free will. I have no choice."s2o And so it is that the 
illusion of our freedom, our dispositionism, our wills, are forced upon us by 
fears and forces in our situation that we do not see, and would prefer not to. We 
have no choice but to pretend that we have a choice. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
"None of us enjoys the thought that what we do depends on processes we 
do not know; we prefer to attribute our choices to volition, will, or self­
control. . .  . Perhaps it would be more honest to say, 'My decision was 
determined by . . .  forces I do not understand. ' "  
- Marvin Minskys2 1  
Taken together, the social psychological findings we have reviewed here 
should shake our self-conception at its foundation. What has been revealed in 
the studies we reviewed cannot be considered marginal or anomalous. Situation, 
it seems, moves us far more than we suspect in our slumbering, blissful 
dispositionism. That conclusion is hard to take, hard even to get our mind 
around, because of this very dispositionism, which sees us as responsible for 
our situations and not the other way around. 
Our "situational character" is clearly incomplete as a model, a description, or 
a vision of humanity.s22 But our aim has not been to provide a comprehensive 
picture. It has been to demonstrate that the model of human agency we so often 
8 19. See Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 598; see also supra text accompanying notes 595-61 9  
(discussing automaticity). 
820. See Norman Green, The Salon Interview-Isaac Bashevis Singer, SALON.COM, Apr. 28, 1 998, at 
http://dir.salon.com/books/intiI998/04/cov_si_28int.html. 
82 1 .  MARVIN MINSKY, THE SOCIETY OF MIND 306 ( 1 985). 
822. There are no doubt many influences to which we are susceptible that are not visible through the 
lens that we have offered, either because of their complexity, or because they are as yet undiscovered by 
the social science on which we draw. And, although we have certainly privileged social psychology and 
related fields in this Article, our focus reflects our own situational and cognitive limitations and not a 
belief that other social sciences or ways of understanding ourselves don't have much to offer. To the 
contrary, we believe that there is a great deal to learn about what moves us from anthropology, 
sociology, history, other subfields of psychology, various critical theories, and market practices (such as 
marketing and public relations). If that is correct, then it should only heighten concern about the flaws 
of dispositionism, rather than weigh against adopting a situationist approach. 
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work with-as laypeople, as legal scholars, and as policymakers-is wrong. 
And not just wrong, but clearly and dangerously wrong, in that it drastically 
understates both internal and external situational influence over our perceived 
cognitions, attitudes, will, and behavior. 
Our readers may be asking themselves, or itching to ask us, just exactly 
where all this leaves us. How can the situational character be put to work, as the 
rational actor, for example, has been? In future writing, we will have much 
more to say, and others will too,823 about the implications of situationism for 
policymaking and legal theory. In this Article and its companion, our ambition 
is to make the case for realism and to reveal many of the sources of the unreal 
perceptions and theories that now dominate. 
The situational character is meant to retire the rational actor and its disposition­
ist kin, not to fill its shoes and perform in legal theory as we have come to 
expect our theories to perform. We have shed light on why, given that we are 
situational characters, dispositionist worldviews have emerged and why many 
people react as they do to challenges to those worldviews. Such resistance, in 
itself, does not rebut the claims we have made; it simply helps prove them. 
Social science is not supposed to be answer-driven, and our system of justice is 
not supposed to be appearance-driven, stopping only at convenient and comfort­
able conclusions. 
When proponents of dispositionism embrace situational blindness in the 
name of freedom and responsibility, the untruth on which our systems are built 
is laid bare. To relieve the resultant dissonance, requires that we relinquish 
823. In fact, some scholars are more situational than others. Outside of law and economics, some 
scholars have been quite sensitive to one or more element of situation. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, 
Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 ( 1990) (synthesizing fundamental elements of feminist 
legal scholarship, including the concept of "positionality," which parallels in significant ways our 
notion of "situationism"); GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMuNmEs WITHOUT BUILDING 
WALLS (2000) (analyzing the ways in which government policies and the built environment, rather than 
individual personal choice, give shape to lived experience within different communities); LANI GUINIER 
ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: LAW SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE ( 1997) (arguing that traditional 
legal pedagogy is often alienating to women, forcing women to abandon values and perspectives 
brought with them to law school in order to conform to the law school environment); Duncan Kennedy, 
Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF THE LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRmQuE 40 
(David Kairys ed., 1 982) (exploring the ways in which the structure of legal education channels 
students career choices in definite ways, but which nevertheless provide a plausible account of student 
complicity in the process); TODD D. RAKOFF, A TIME FOR EVERY PuRPOSE: LAW AND THE BALANCE OF LIFE 
(2002) (arguing, among other things, that the structure of our days and nights is changing under the 
influence of unseen but powerful influences over the management of time); ELIZABETH WARREN & 
AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE Two-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING 
BROKE (2003) (arguing that, contrary to widespread belief, two-income families typically spend nearly 
all of their income on situational necessities rather than on choice-driven luxuries, leaving most 
families on the brink of bankruptcy should they encounter unforeseen expenses such as illness or 
unemployment). And some social psychologists have begun to write, as we have, explicitly about the 
distortions of dispositionism and the power of situation. Our hope is that by identifying some of the 
sources of our disposition ism, and detailing the extent to which we are situational characters, we have 
buttressed that work by connecting it to a firm social-scientific, general foundation and by revealing the 
unreal foundations of now-dominant theories. 
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either the belief that our system is legitimate-meritocratic, fair, democratic, 
just, freedom-enhancing, and so on-or the immense edifice erected upon that 
dispositionist bulwark. 
We are dispositionists trapped in situational characters. We can't escape our 
condition through denial-be it deliberate disregard of what we know about the 
human animal or subconscious redoubling of our faith in the illusion of disposi­
tionism. Any solution is to be located mostly, like the problem itself, in the 
situation. 
There is a tragic irony in our predicament. By blinding ourselves to the very 
forces that impinge upon our freedom, we are surrendering to them. To be 
serious about liberty requires that we not unwittingly tum over the situational 
strings to whoever has the means and ends to manipulate them. Indeed, our 
greatest dispositional act may be to acknowledge that we are situational charac­
ters and to choose to understand and gain some voice and control over the 
situation that largely controls us. In that very important sense, we do have a 
choice. 

